Villanueva vs. Commission on Elections

A certificate of candidacy is withdrawn only by a sworn statement, and substitution is proper only when the withdrawal occurs after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy; an unsworn withdrawal or a withdrawal made on or before that last day does not permit substitution, and votes cast for the invalid substitute are stray.

The case concerns the January 30, 1980 local elections in Dolores, Quezon, and the opposing candidacies for vice-mayor of Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes and Vivencio G. Lirio. The controlling statutory backdrop is the 1978 Election Code, particularly Sections 27 and 28 on withdrawal or cancellation of certificates of candidacy and substitution of candidates in case of death, withdrawal, or disqualification.

On January 4, 1980, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy for the January 30, 1980 elections, Narciso Mendoza Jr. filed with the Election Registrar of Dolores, Quezon, a sworn certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor. Later that same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter withdrawing his certificate.

On January 25, 1980, Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes filed with the same Election Registrar a sworn “Certificate of Candidacy in Substitution” of Mendoza for vice-mayor.

On January 31, 1980, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Vivencio G. Lirio as duly elected vice-mayor based on its canvass. The Board considered all votes cast in favor of Villanueva as stray votes because his certificate of candidacy was not given due course by the COMELEC in Manila and his name was not included in the certified list of official candidates.

On February 6, 1980, Villanueva filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul Lirio’s proclamation. He prayed that the COMELEC order the official counting of votes cast in his favor and thereafter proclaim him as duly elected vice-mayor.

On February 21, 1980, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9192 denying the petition. It reasoned that Villanueva could not have filed a candidacy in substitution of Mendoza because Mendoza’s withdrawal produced no legal effect, not having been made under oath as required by Section 27 of the Election Code, and that even assuming the withdrawal was effective, it was made not after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy under Section 28 but on the very same last day. The COMELEC reaffirmed its stand when Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration, issuing Resolution No. 9885 dated July 31, 1980. Hence, Villanueva filed the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.

• Validity of Mendoza’s Withdrawal: Petitioner insisted that the withdrawal of Narciso Mendoza Jr.’s certificate of candidacy was valid and effective, and therefore his own certificate of candidacy in substitution of Mendoza’s was likewise valid and effective.
• Withdrawal Before Election Day: Petitioner pointed out that a certificate of candidacy duly filed may be withdrawn or cancelled at any time before the day of election.
• Liberal Construction: Petitioner invoked a liberal construction of the law to support the efficacy of the withdrawal and his substitute candidacy.
• Annulment of Proclamation: Petitioner alleged that there was sufficient legal basis for annulment of respondent Lirio’s proclamation, having supposedly polled the highest number of votes for vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon.

• Validity of Withdrawal: Whether the withdrawal of Narciso Mendoza Jr.’s certificate of candidacy, not made under oath, produced legal effect under Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code.
• Substitution: Whether petitioner could validly file a certificate of candidacy in substitution of Mendoza when the withdrawal was made on the last day for filing certificates of candidacy, rather than after that day, under Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code.
• Counting of Votes and Proclamation: Whether votes cast for petitioner should be counted and the proclamation of respondent Lirio as vice-mayor annulled.
• COMELEC Review: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, lack or excess of jurisdiction, or patent error of law in denying petitioner’s petition and motions for reconsideration.

• Validity of Withdrawal: No. Section 27 requires a sworn statement of withdrawal; an unsworn withdrawal produces no legal effect, so Mendoza remained a candidate until election day.
• Substitution: No. Even assuming the withdrawal was effective, Section 28 permits substitution only when the withdrawal occurs after the last day for filing certificates; a withdrawal on the last day does not allow substitution, and petitioner’s January 25 filing was long after the last day.
• Counting of Votes and Proclamation: No. Because petitioner was not a valid candidate, votes cast for him are stray under Section 155(15), and there is no legal basis to annul Lirio’s proclamation.
• COMELEC Review: No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, lack or excess of jurisdiction, or patent error of law; certiorari review is limited to those grounds.

• Validity of Withdrawal: Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code provides that no certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdrawn or cancelled unless the candidate files with the office which received the certificate or with the Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation at any time before the day of election. The provision is clear and unambiguous. It was undisputed that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not made under oath. The withdrawal therefore produced no legal effect for failure to comply with the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law. Mendoza remained a candidate for vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon up to January 30, 1980, the date of the elections, as correctly ruled by the COMELEC.
• Substitution: Even assuming the withdrawal was effective, petitioner could not derive comfort from it. Under Section 28, substitution by reason of withdrawal is proper only when the withdrawal is made after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Mendoza withdrew on January 4, 1980, the very last day for filing certificates. Because the withdrawal was made prior to or on the last day, substitution was not allowed. The person filing a certificate of candidacy in such circumstances files in his own right, not as a substitute, and the filing must not be after the last day for filing ordinary certificates of candidacy, which was January 4, 1980. Petitioner filed his certificate on January 25, 1980, long after that deadline. He was therefore not a candidate, either in substitution of Mendoza or in his own right. The Court declined to apply a liberal construction because the terms of the statute are clear and unmistakable.
• Counting of Votes and Proclamation: Since petitioner was not a valid candidate, whatever votes may have been cast in his favor are necessarily considered stray votes under Section 155(15) of the Election Code. There is thus no legal basis for the annulment of respondent Lirio’s proclamation as vice-mayor.
• COMELEC Review: The COMELEC did not commit any error in issuing Resolution Nos. 9192 and 9885. Under the present Constitution, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC is limited to review by certiorari, which may be invoked only when there is grave abuse of discretion, or lack or excess of jurisdiction, or patent errors of law. No such ground was shown. The petition was dismissed.

• Sworn Withdrawal Requirement — Under Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code, a duly filed certificate of candidacy is considered withdrawn or cancelled only if the candidate files a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation with the office that received the certificate or with the COMELEC at any time before election day. An unsworn withdrawal produces no legal effect. In this case, Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal did not remove him as a candidate, and the COMELEC correctly denied petitioner’s substitution on that ground.
• Substitution After Last Day for Filing — Under Section 28, substitution of a candidate by reason of withdrawal is proper only when the withdrawal is made after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. If the withdrawal is made prior to or on the last day, substitution is not allowed; the subsequent filing is treated as an original candidacy and must itself comply with the deadline for ordinary certificates. Here, Mendoza withdrew on the last day, January 4, 1980, and petitioner filed on January 25, 1980, so the substitute candidacy was invalid.
• Stray Votes — Votes cast in favor of a person who is not a valid candidate are considered stray votes under Section 155(15) of the Election Code. Because petitioner was not a valid candidate, votes cast for him could not be counted for purposes of proclamation.
• Limited Certiorari Review of COMELEC Decisions — Review of COMELEC decisions, orders, or rulings by the Supreme Court is limited to certiorari on grounds of grave abuse of discretion, lack or excess of jurisdiction, or patent errors of law. The Court found none and dismissed the petition.
• Clear Statute, No Liberal Construction — Where the terms of a statute are clear and unmistakable, a liberal construction that would expand the scope of substitution is not warranted. The Court applied Sections 27 and 28 according to their plain terms.

• "No certification of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdrawn or cancelled unless the candidate files with the office which received the certificate of candidacy or with the Commission, a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation at any time before the day of election." — This is the Court’s quotation of Section 27, the provision it applied to hold that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect.
• "That the withdrawal of Mendoza's certificate of candidacy was not made under oath is not disputed. As such, the withdrawal produces no legal effect for failure to comply with the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law." — This states the ratio decidendi on the first issue: the statutory oath requirement is mandatory, and noncompliance rendered the withdrawal ineffective.
• "For substitution to take place, the withdrawal must be effected after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. If the withdrawal was made prior to or on the said last day, as what happened in the instant case, substitution is not allowed." — This is the Court’s controlling formulation on substitution, distinguishing withdrawals after the filing deadline from those made on or before it.
• "Whatever votes may have been cast in his favor are necessarily considered stray votes. [Section 155 (15), Election Code] There is thus no legal basis for the annulment of respondent Lirio's proclamation as vice-mayor." — This states the consequence of petitioner’s invalid candidacy and the basis for denying the annulment of the proclamation.

• Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 — Cited by the majority for the limited scope of Supreme Court review of COMELEC decisions, orders, or rulings: certiorari lies only for grave abuse of discretion, lack or excess of jurisdiction, or patent errors of law. The Court relied on this standard to dismiss the petition after finding no such error.

• Section 27, 1978 Election Code — Requires that a duly filed certificate of candidacy be considered withdrawn or cancelled only upon a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation filed with the office that received the certificate or with the COMELEC at any time before election day. The Court applied this to hold Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal ineffective.
• Section 28, 1978 Election Code — Permits a voter qualified for the office to file a certificate of candidacy in substitution of a candidate who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy, on or before midday of election day. The Court applied this to hold that substitution was improper because Mendoza’s withdrawal was made on the last day, not after it.
• Section 155 (15), Election Code — Provides that votes cast for a candidate whose certificate of candidacy is not valid are considered stray votes. The Court applied this to petitioner’s votes because he was not a valid candidate.

De Castro, J., wrote the majority decision. Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concurred.

• Fernando, C.J. — Dissented on the ground that the bona fides of petitioner Crisologo Villanueva y Parades as a substitute candidate cannot be successfully assailed. Consequently, the votes cast in his favor must be counted, and there is sufficient justification for his proclamation as Vice Mayor assuming he polled a greater number of votes than private respondent Vivencio Lirio.
• Teehankee, J. — Dissented from the majority’s technical and literal reading of the Election Code provisions on substitute candidates. He argued that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal was an actual fact, that no votes were cast for Mendoza, and that the lack of oath was a technicality that should not frustrate the people’s will; he cited Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, Gundan vs. Court of First Instance, and Canceran vs. COMELEC for the proposition that the oath requirement is directory or a harmless irregularity after the people have expressed their will. He further argued that Mendoza’s filing and withdrawal on the same last day showed a sham candidacy, and that the majority’s construction created a loophole for sham candidates to shut out bona fide substitutes. He maintained that Mendoza’s withdrawal should be considered substantially after the last day, that election laws should give effect to the will of the voters, and that petitioner’s substitute certificate should be given due course, his votes counted, and he seated if the official count showed he polled the highest number. He cited De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, Badelles vs. Cabili, Yra vs. Abano, Corocoro vs. Bascara, Pungutan vs. Abubakar, and Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas. He also noted that petitioner allegedly received 3,112 votes against Lirio’s 2,600, a margin of 452 votes, and that the Provincial Election Officer sent the substitute candidacy papers by registered mail, received only on February 11, 1980.