Villalon vs. IAC

An interlocutory order that patently abuses discretion may be challenged by certiorari. The confidentiality of disbarment proceedings under Section 10, Rule 139 is a waivable privilege of the lawyer whose personal and professional reputation it protects, so a trial court cannot strike material impeaching testimony on that ground over the lawyer’s waiver.

Private respondent Catalina Neval Vda. de Ebuiza, mother of the other Ebuizas, is the adverse party of petitioner Atty. Roman R. Villalon, Jr. and his sons over a parcel of land in Urbiztondo, San Juan, La Union. Villalon claimed that a deed of absolute sale over the property in his and his sons’ favor was his contingent fee for professional services rendered to Ebuiza’s parents in Civil Case No. 1418. The same property and deed were also the subject of Administrative Case No. 1488, a disbarment case against Villalon referred to the Office of the Solicitor General and still pending.

On May 16, 1979, private respondent Catalina Neval Vda. de Ebuiza, mother of the other private respondents all surnamed Ebuiza, filed Civil Case No. 2799 before the then Court of First Instance of La Union against petitioner Atty. Roman R. Villalon, Jr. and his sons. The complaint sought annulment of a deed of absolute sale, recovery of possession, and damages over a parcel of land in Urbiztondo, San Juan, La Union. The property was also the subject of Administrative Case No. 1488, a disbarment case previously filed on July 22, 1975 with the SC by private respondent Francisco Ebuiza, charging Villalon with falsification of a deed of absolute sale of that property in his and his sons’ favor. Villalon claimed the deed was his contingent fee for professional services he had rendered to Ebuiza’s parents for successfully handling Civil Case No. 1418 entitled “Paulino Ebuiza, et al. vs. Patrocinio Ebuiza, et al.” before the then Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch II. The disbarment case was referred by the SC to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation, where testimonial evidence was received; it remained pending.

In the course of the trial of Civil Case No. 2799, petitioners introduced in evidence the testimonies of some private respondents—Catalina Neval Vda. de Ebuiza, Francisco Ebuiza, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan—given in the disbarment case. Petitioners did so for the purpose of impeaching their testimonies in the civil case. Private respondents responded by filing a Motion to Strike from the records of the civil case all matters relating to the proceedings in the disbarment case.

Over petitioners’ opposition, on September 20, 1985, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion. The dispositive portion ordered all direct references to the proceedings in the disbarment case against Atty. Villalon, Jr. stricken out from the records and barred further references to such matters. The RTC relied on Section 10, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.”

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied on October 17, 1985. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus before the CA to nullify the September 20, 1985 Order and to require the RTC to allow the impeaching evidence to remain in the records of the civil case.

• Impeachment: Petitioners claimed that private respondents’ witnesses “have given conflicting testimonies on important factual matters in the disbarment case, which are inconsistent with their present testimony and which would accordingly cast a doubt on their credibility.”
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners prayed for annulment of the CA Decision sustaining the RTC Orders of September 20, 1985 and October 17, 1985 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

• Certiorari Against an Interlocutory Order: Whether certiorari may be availed of to contest an interlocutory order striking evidence from the records on the ground of patent abuse of discretion.
• Impeachment of Adverse Witnesses: Whether the RTC deprived petitioners of their right to impeach the credibility of private respondents’ witnesses by striking from the civil case records their testimonies in the disbarment case showing inconsistent statements material to the issues.
• Confidentiality of Disbarment Proceedings: Whether the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings under Section 10, Rule 139 may be waived by the lawyer in whose favor it is vested, so as to allow the testimonies to remain in the civil case records.

• Certiorari Against an Interlocutory Order: Yes. Although the order is interlocutory, certiorari lies where it was issued in patent abuse of discretion, or when the broader interests of justice require it and ordinary appeal is not an adequate remedy.
• Impeachment of Adverse Witnesses: Yes. The RTC deprived petitioners of their right under Sections 15 and 16, Rule 132 to impeach adverse witnesses by proving prior inconsistent statements material to the civil case.
• Confidentiality of Disbarment Proceedings: Yes. The confidentiality under Section 10, Rule 139 is a privilege waivable by the lawyer whose personal and professional reputation it protects, and Villalon waived it.

• Certiorari Against an Interlocutory Order: The RTC Order was interlocutory, and the general rule is that interlocutory orders are not subject to separate appeal or review on certiorari. But certiorari may be availed of to contest an interlocutory order to correct a patent abuse of discretion by the RTC. It may also be applied for when the broader interests of justice so require or when ordinary appeal is not an adequate remedy. Here, the RTC order was issued in patent abuse of discretion because it struck evidence that petitioners were entitled to offer for impeachment. The CA’s suggested remedy of a formal offer of evidence under Rule 132, Section 35, while procedurally correct, would be inadequate and ineffective for purposes of impeachment. The broader interests of justice required that petitioners be given sufficient latitude to present and prove their impeaching evidence for judicial appreciation.
• Impeachment of Adverse Witnesses: Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132 sanction impeachment of an adverse party’s witness by contradictory evidence or by evidence that the witness made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony. Before such impeachment, the statements must be related to the witness with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present; the witness must be asked whether he made the statements and, if so, allowed to explain them; and if the statements are in writing, they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. Petitioners introduced the testimonies of private respondents in the disbarment case because those witnesses had given conflicting testimonies on important factual matters inconsistent with their testimony in the civil case, which would cast doubt on their credibility. The subject matter of the disbarment proceedings—the alleged falsification of the deed of absolute sale in petitioners’ favor—was the same issue raised in the civil case for annulment of that deed. By striking the testimonies, the RTC deprived petitioners of their right to impeach the credibility of their adverse parties’ witnesses despite the materiality of the statements to the issues in the civil case.
• Confidentiality of Disbarment Proceedings: Section 10, Rule 139 provides that proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential except for the final order, which shall be made public. But that confidentiality is a privileged right vested in the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose personal и professional reputation it is vested. Under the general principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, among others, the lawyer may waive it. The RTC therefore erred in holding that Villalon was not at liberty to waive the privilege of confidentiality because of the public interest involved, even if the waiver would serve his interest, and that Section 10, Rule 139 provided no exception. The SC also noted that even private respondents’ counsel touched on some matters testified to by NEVAL in the disbarment proceedings and which were the subject of cross-examination.

• Certiorari against interlocutory orders — As a general rule, interlocutory orders are not subject to appeal or certiorari. Certiorari may be availed of to correct a patent abuse of discretion, when the broader interests of justice require it, or when ordinary appeal is not an adequate remedy. The SC applied the exception because the RTC’s strike order patently abused discretion and the CA’s suggested formal offer of evidence was inadequate for impeachment.
• Impeachment of an adverse party’s witness — A witness may be impeached by contradictory evidence, by evidence of bad general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity, or by evidence of prior inconsistent statements. For prior inconsistent statements, the statements must be related to the witness with the circumstances of the times, places, and persons present; the witness must be asked whether he made them and allowed to explain; and written statements must be shown before questioning. The SC applied this to allow the disbarment testimonies because they were material and inconsistent with the witnesses’ civil case testimony.
• Waiver of confidentiality of disbarment proceedings — The confidentiality of disbarment proceedings under Section 10, Rule 139 is a privilege or right vested in the lawyer for the protection of his personal and professional reputation. It may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, among others. The SC applied this to uphold Villalon’s waiver and reject the RTC’s ruling that public interest made the privilege non-waivable.

• “certiorari may be availed of to contest an interlocutory order to correct a patent abuse of discretion by the lower Court in issuing the same.” — The SC recognized an exception to the rule against certiorari against interlocutory orders.
• “The offer of evidence, suggested by respondent Appellate Court as a remedy open to petitioners, while procedurally correct, would be inadequate and ineffective for purposes of impeachment.” — The SC explained why the CA’s suggested remedy did not cure the RTC’s strike order.
• “that confidentiality is a privileged/ right which may be waived by the very lawyer in whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional reputation it is vested, pursuant to the general principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, among others.” — The SC characterized the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings as a waivable privilege of the lawyer it protects.
• “By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their right to impeach the credibility of their adverse parties’ witnesses by proving that on former occasions they had made statements inconsistent with the statements made during the trial, despite the fact that such statements are material to the issues in the Civil Case.” — The SC held that the strike order violated petitioners’ right to impeach adverse witnesses under Rule 132.

• Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975) — Supporting precedent, cited for the rule that certiorari may be availed of to contest an interlocutory order to correct a patent abuse of discretion.
• Sanchez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 327 (1976) — Supporting precedent, cited for the rule that certiorari may be applied for when the broader interests of justice require it or when ordinary appeal is not an adequate remedy.

• Section 10, Rule 139, Rules of Court — Provides that proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential except for the final order which shall be made public; applied as a waivable privilege of the lawyer whose reputation it protects.
• Sections 15 and 16, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Govern impeachment of an adverse party’s witness by contradictory evidence or prior inconsistent statements and the procedure for laying the predicate; applied to allow the disbarment testimonies.
• Article 6, Civil Code — Cited for the general principle that rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, among others; applied to uphold Villalon’s waiver of confidentiality.
• Rule 132, Section 35, Rules of Court — The CA suggested a formal offer of evidence under this provision; the SC held that remedy inadequate and ineffective for purposes of impeachment.