Villafuerte vs. Commission on Elections

A false representation in a certificate of candidacy is material, and thus a ground to cancel the COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, only if it relates to a qualification for elective office or to an ineligibility affecting the candidate’s right to run; a candidate’s use of a nickname, even if potentially misleading, does not constitute a material misrepresentation absent a deliberate intention to deceive the electorate as to the candidate’s identity or eligibility.

For the May 13, 2013 local elections, Luis R. Villafuerte and Miguel R. Villafuerte both filed certificates of candidacy for Governor of Camarines Sur. Miguel’s father, the then incumbent Governor Luis Raymund “LRay” Villafuerte, Jr., was simultaneously running for Congress. On October 25, 2012, Luis filed before the Commission on Elections a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel Miguel’s COC, alleging that Miguel deliberately made a false material representation by declaring in his COC that his nickname or stagename was “L-RAY JR.-MIGZ” and that the name to appear on the official ballot was “VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-MIGZ NP.” Luis contended that Miguel omitted his first name “Miguel” and inserted “LRAY JR.,” the nickname of his father, thereby misleading voters.

• The COC and the alleged misrepresentation: Respondent Miguel R. Villafuerte filed his COC for Governor of Camarines Sur stating his name as “VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-MIGZ” and indicating “L-RAY JR.-MIGZ” as his nickname or stagename. Petitioner Luis R. Villafuerte, also a gubernatorial candidate, claimed that respondent’s real baptismal first name is “Miguel” and that by using “LRAY JR.” — the nickname of his father, the incumbent Governor Luis Raymund “LRay” Villafuerte, Jr. — respondent deliberately omitted his true first name, thereby making a false material representation intended to mislead voters and gain an unfair advantage.

• Respondent’s defense: Respondent denied committing material misrepresentation. He asserted that he had been using the nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” and not just “MIGZ”; the choice of name to appear on the ballot was a matter of personal preference; and any confusion was avoided because his name would appear first on the alphabetical list. Respondent further adduced affidavits from witnesses stating that, due to striking physical similarities and mannerisms, he had been known as “LRAY JR.” and that the appellation distinguished him from his father, who was popularly known as “LRAY” and was running for Congress.

• COMELEC rulings: The COMELEC First Division found that existing law and jurisprudence confine material misrepresentation to false statements concerning a candidate’s qualifications (e.g., citizenship, residency, age); a misrepresentation as to a nickname is not a ground to cancel a COC under Section 78. The En Banc affirmed, emphasizing that the petitioner’s allegations did not touch on respondent’s eligibility or qualifications for office.

• Supreme Court petition: Petitioner elevated the case arguing that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion by limiting Section 78 to qualifications and by ignoring the ruling in Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, where votes cast using a misleading nickname were declared stray. Petitioner also claimed that the automation law (R.A. 9369) requiring alphabetical listing was violated, to his prejudice.

• Scope of Material Misrepresentation: Petitioner argued that Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, penalizes “any” material misrepresentation, not only those relating to qualifications. He maintained that a false representation of one’s name or nickname constitutes a material falsehood affecting the candidate’s eligibility to be voted for, because it deliberately misinforms and deceives the electorate.

• Application of Villarosa: Petitioner contended that the COMELEC erroneously disregarded Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which held that a candidate’s use of a misleading nickname that appropriates the identity of another person renders the corresponding votes stray and demonstrates malice that should justify the cancellation of a COC.

• Violation of Automation Law: Petitioner claimed that respondent’s use of “LRAY JR.-MIGZ” undermined the alphabetical listing requirement under Section 13 of R.A. 9369 (amending R.A. 8436), placing respondent’s name ahead of petitioner’s in the ballot and causing unfair disadvantage and voter confusion.

• Materiality: Respondent Miguel R. Villafuerte countered that a nickname is not a material fact because it does not affect a candidate’s qualifications or eligibility. He maintained that there was no deliberate attempt to mislead, as the nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” had been his personal usage and distinguished him from his father.

• No voter confusion: Respondent asserted that voters could readily identify the candidates, especially since his full name would appear on the ballot and the inclusion of “MIGZ” provided a clear distinction. The bare alphabetical placement, without more, is insufficient to prove deception or disadvantage.

• Material Misrepresentation: Whether a candidate’s false declaration of his nickname in the certificate of candidacy constitutes a material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, such as to warrant denial of due course or cancellation of the COC.

• Relevance of Villarosa: Whether the ruling in Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which treated votes for a misleading nickname as stray, applies to a petition to cancel a COC based on material misrepresentation.

• Effect on Alphabetical Listing: Whether the chosen nickname’s effect on the alphabetical arrangement of candidates under the automated election law amounts to a material misrepresentation or a ground to cancel the COC.

• Material Misrepresentation: A candidate’s nickname is not a material fact under Section 78. Material misrepresentation refers exclusively to false statements about qualifications for elective office or ineligibilities that affect the candidate’s right to run or to hold the office. The Court drew from Salcedo II v. COMELEC, Aratea v. COMELEC, and Justimbaste v. COMELEC in holding that the phrase “material representation” covers matters such as citizenship, residency, age, or term limits — qualifications necessary for eligibility. A nickname does not pertain to any such qualification. Furthermore, a false representation must involve a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” The evidence showed that respondent had been called “LRAY JR.” due to his resemblance to his father and that the nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” served to differentiate him from the incumbent governor. No intent to deceive as to his identity was established.

• Relevance of Villarosa: Villarosa was distinguished as an election protest case concerned with the appreciation of ballots under the manual election system, not with a petition to cancel a COC. The proper remedy for petitioner’s grievance — that votes for respondent should be declared stray — was an election protest, not a Section 78 petition. Moreover, in Villarosa the candidate used her husband’s nickname “JTV” alone, without any accompanying distinguishing name, and admitted to being popularly known by a different nickname. Here, respondent’s nickname was paired with the name “MIGZ,” which differentiated him from his father and negated any inference of bad faith.

• Effect on Alphabetical Listing: The claim that the alphabetical ordering under R.A. 9369 would confuse voters and prejudice petitioner was rejected as speculative and without evidentiary basis. Voters can identify the candidate of their choice regardless of the order of names on the ballot. The alleged disadvantage did not make the nickname a material misrepresentation or a valid ground for COC cancellation.

• Material Misrepresentation in a Certificate of Candidacy — A false representation in a COC is “material” and can justify cancellation only when it pertains to a qualification for elective office or an ineligibility that affects the candidate’s right to run for or hold the office. The misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or conceal a fact that would otherwise render the candidate ineligible (Salcedo II v. COMELEC; Aratea v. COMELEC). A false statement about a candidate’s nickname, name, or surname is not, without more, a material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (Justimbaste v. COMELEC). The proper remedy for complaints regarding the use of a misleading nickname in the ballot is, where appropriate, an election protest, not a petition to deny due course or cancel a COC.

• “As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a ‘material representation,’ the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of the Code. […] Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office.” (quoting Salcedo II v. COMELEC)

• “Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a ‘deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.’ In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the public as to one’s identity is not within the scope of the provision.” (quoting Salcedo II v. COMELEC)

• “At all events, the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as ‘material misrepresentation’ under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to ‘qualifications for elective office.’” (quoting Justimbaste v. COMELEC)

• Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 371 Phil. 377 (1999) — Controlling. Established that material misrepresentation under Section 78 pertains to qualifications for elective office and must involve a deliberate attempt to deceive. The use of a surname, absent intent to mislead, does not justify COC cancellation.

• Aratea v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 105 — Followed. Applied the rule that misrepresentation as to eligibility (violation of the three-term limit) is material because it involves a disqualification to run for office.

• Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179413, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 736 — Followed. Held that the use of a Filipino name other than that registered at birth is not a material misrepresentation absent an intent to deceive the electorate about identity.

• Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 394 Phil. 730 (2001) — Distinguished. An election protest case involving the appreciation of ballots and the declaration of “JTV” votes as stray votes; not applicable to a petition to cancel a COC under Section 78.

• Section 73, Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless a sworn COC is filed within the period fixed by law.

• Section 74, Omnibus Election Code — Enumerates the required contents of a COC, including the declaration that the candidate is eligible for the office and the option to include “one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality.” A candidate must use his baptismal name unless officially changed; the section does not make the nickname or ballot name a qualification for office.

• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Provides that a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC may be filed “exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.” The Court interpreted “material representation” as limited to false statements concerning qualifications or eligibility.

• Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 (amending R.A. 8436) — Requires that candidates’ names be arranged alphabetically by surname on the official ballot. The Court held that the provision does not make a candidate’s chosen nickname a ground to cancel a COC; claims of disadvantage from the order of listing are speculative.

Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, concurred.
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion was on leave.