Villaber vs. COMELEC

A conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude because the second element of the offense — knowledge at the time of issuance that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank — imports deceit and is contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, thereby disqualifying the convicted person from being a candidate for or holding any elective public office under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioner Pablo C. Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for the congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber had previously been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, a conviction affirmed by the Court of Appeals and ultimately by the Supreme Court, which had become final and executory on February 2, 1993. The disqualification framework at issue is Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which bars from candidacy any person sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude, unless plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.

On February 19, 2001, Pablo C. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman in the First District of Davao del Sur for the May 14, 2001 elections. His rival candidate, Douglas R. Cagas, filed his own certificate on February 28, 2001. On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, COMELEC, Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, having issued a check in the amount of P100,000.00 that was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Cagas asserted that this crime involves moral turpitude, disqualifying Villaber under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, and further alleged that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating he was "eligible for the office I seek to be elected," a ground for cancellation under Section 78 of the same Code.

The conviction had a long procedural history. The RTC of Manila sentenced Villaber to one year imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision on April 23, 1992. Villaber then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 106709, but the Third Division dismissed the petition on October 26, 1992, and the resolution became final and executory on February 2, 1993.

In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered that his conviction had not become final and executory because the affirmed decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. He further argued that even if the judgment were final, it could not serve as a basis for disqualification because violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude. After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.

On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division found merit in Cagas's petition and issued a resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy, applying the ruling in People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude. Villaber's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc on May 10, 2001, prompting the present petition.

• Non-finality of conviction: Petitioner maintained that his conviction had not become final and executory because the affirmed decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence.
• No moral turpitude: Petitioner argued that even if the judgment of conviction were final and executory, it could not be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.
• Tuanda inapplicability: Petitioner contended that the Court's pronouncement in People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer.
• Abandonment of Tuanda: Petitioner insisted that the ruling in Tuanda had been abandoned or modified in Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines, which reiterated Vaca vs. Court of Appeals, where the penalty of imprisonment was deleted and only a fine was imposed, such that the offense no longer involves moral turpitude.

• Moral Turpitude: Whether violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, thereby disqualifying a person convicted thereof from being a candidate for or holding any elective public office under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.

• Moral Turpitude: Yes. Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude because the second element of the offense — knowledge at the time of issuance that the drawer lacks sufficient funds — imports deceit and is contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner.

• Moral Turpitude: The Court adopted the definition of "moral turpitude" from Black's Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties a person owes to fellow men or society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. While the Court acknowledged in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude and that the determination is ultimately a question of fact frequently depending on all the circumstances surrounding the violation, the Court also held that the question can be resolved by analyzing the elements of the crime alone, as it did in Dela Torre with respect to the crime of fencing. The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit. The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude, as it imports deceit. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, the Court held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person." The Court in Tuanda made no distinction between lawyers and non-lawyers, nor did it declare that the offense constitutes moral turpitude only when committed by a member of the Bar. Petitioner's reliance on Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines and Vaca vs. Court of Appeals was rejected, as those cases merely deleted the prison sentence in favor of a fine based on the philosophy of the Indeterminate Sentence Law; the Court made no pronouncement in those cases that the offense ceases to involve moral turpitude when only a fine is imposed. Accordingly, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions.

• Moral Turpitude — Definition — Moral turpitude is defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." The Court consistently adopted this definition from Black's Law Dictionary.
• Determination of Moral Turpitude — Question of Fact — Whether a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. However, the question can also be resolved by analyzing the elements of the crime alone, as the Court did in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections with respect to the crime of fencing.
• Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 Involves Moral Turpitude — The second element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 — knowledge at the time of issuance that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank — imports deceit and manifests moral turpitude. This ruling applies regardless of whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer, and regardless of whether the penalty imposed includes imprisonment or only a fine.
• Elements of B.P. Blg. 22 — The three elements are: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

• "The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude." — This sentence is the ratio decidendi of the case, pinpointing the specific element of B.P. Blg. 22 that the Court identified as the source of moral turpitude.
• "In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute." — This passage, quoted from Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections, articulates the Court's nuanced approach to moral turpitude, acknowledging that the classification of a crime as malum in se or malum prohibitum is not always dispositive.
• "Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a member of the Bar but is not so when committed by a non-member." — This passage rejects petitioner's argument that the Tuanda ruling on moral turpitude applies only to lawyers, establishing that the doctrine has general application.

• People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692 (1990) — Controlling precedent. The Court held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and affects the good moral character of the person convicted. The Court made no distinction between lawyers and non-lawyers regarding whether the offense involves moral turpitude.
• Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections, 258 SCRA 483 (1996) — Followed. The Court held that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, that the determination is ultimately a question of fact, and that the question can be resolved by analyzing the elements of the crime alone.
• Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986) — Cited for the proposition that the circulation of valueless commercial papers pollutes the channels of trade and commerce, injures the banking system, and hurts the welfare of society and the public interest.
• Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 130038, Sept. 18, 2000 — Distinguished. The Court clarified that the deletion of the prison sentence in favor of a fine under the philosophy of the Indeterminate Sentence Law did not constitute a pronouncement that the offense ceases to involve moral turpitude.
• Vaca vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656 (1998) — Distinguished. Same as Rosa Lim; the deletion of imprisonment did not affect the moral turpitude characterization.
• International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, 221 SCRA 760 (1993) — Cited for the proposition that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude exists by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or malum prohibitum.
• In re Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815 (1967) — Cited for the definition of moral turpitude as encompassing "everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."

• Section 12, Omnibus Election Code (Batasaang Pambansa Blg. 881) — Disqualifies any person sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude from being a candidate and holding any office, unless granted plenary pardon or amnesty. The disqualification is deemed removed after the expiration of five years from service of sentence, unless the person again becomes disqualified within the same period. This provision was the basis for the COMELEC's disqualification of Villaber.
• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Provides grounds for denial of due course or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on false material representation. Cagas alleged Villaber's statement that he was "eligible for the office I seek to be elected" was false.
• Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — Defines the offense of issuing checks without sufficient funds and prescribes the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year, or a fine, or both. The Court analyzed the elements of this provision to determine whether the offense involves moral turpitude.

Davide, Jr. C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.