Villa vs. Court of Appeals

The favorable provisions of R.A. No. 7659 must be given retroactive effect to reduce the penalty of a convict already serving sentence for drug offenses under R.A. No. 6425, even if the convict is concurrently serving a sentence for a different crime, provided the convict is not a habitual delinquent as defined in Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code. A motion for reconsideration and modification of sentence filed before the appellate court may be treated as substantial compliance with the rules on habeas corpus to effect such modification.

Petitioner Violeta Santiago Villa was charged with and convicted of illegal possession of prohibited and regulated drugs under Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended. Separately, she was convicted of illegal possession of firearms and was serving a sentence for that offense as well. The dispute centers on whether the favorable amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law), which reduced penalties for certain drug offenses, should be applied retroactively to her already-final conviction for drug possession, and whether the Court of Appeals had competence to entertain her motion for modification given the finality of the judgment and her concurrent incarceration for a separate crime.

On May 4, 1991, in Guiguinto, Bulacan, petitioner Violeta Santiago y Villa, alias "Violy," was found to have possessed two sticks of marijuana cigarettes, a prohibited drug, and fourteen decks of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, without authority of law. She was accordingly charged before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 11, in Malolos, with violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 for possession of prohibited drugs. After trial, the RTC rendered its decision on May 22, 1992, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing her to reclusion temporal in its maximum period — seventeen years, eight months and one day to twenty years — and imposing a fine of twenty thousand pesos.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, on May 16, 1994, she was separately convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to a prison term ranging from seventeen years, four months and one day to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum. On August 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on the drug case, affirming the RTC conviction but modifying the penalty to an indeterminate sentence of six years and one day as minimum to ten years as maximum, with a reduced fine of ten thousand pesos. Petitioner had commenced serving her sentence at the Correctional Institution for Women in Mandaluyong City on August 14, 1993.

On January 12, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Modification of Sentence with the Court of Appeals, seeking retroactive application of the ruling in People vs. Simon, which held that the favorable provisions of R.A. No. 7659 should be applied retroactively to reduce penalties for certain drug offenses. She prayed that her sentence be reduced from six years and one day to ten years, to six months to two years and four months, and that her sentence for the drug offense be declared fully served. The Court of Appeals denied the motion on March 22, 1996, reasoning that the retroactive application of R.A. No. 7659 would only be relevant if the convict had already served more than the maximum imposable penalty under the law, and not where the convict is also serving sentence for another crime. A motion for reconsideration of that resolution was likewise denied, prompting the present petition.

• Retroactive Application of Favorable Penal Law: Petitioner argued that the favorable provisions of R.A. No. 7659 should be applied retroactively to her case pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and the ruling in People vs. Simon, entitling her to a reduced penalty of six months of arresto mayor to two years and four months of prision correccional.
• Full Service of Sentence: Petitioner maintained that because she had been serving her sentence since August 14, 1993, and the reduced imposable penalty under R.A. No. 7659 was less than the time already served, her sentence for the drug offense should be declared fully served.
• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Petitioner raised the issue of whether the Court of Appeals was competent to reopen the case or consider her motion for reconsideration and modification of sentence for the purpose of reducing the penalty.

• Concurrent Sentence as Bar: Respondent Court of Appeals argued that the retroactive application of R.A. No. 7659 would only be relevant if the convict had already served more than the maximum imposable penalty under the law, and not where the convict is also serving sentence for another crime, as in petitioner's case where she was concurrently serving a sentence for illegal possession of firearms.

• Jurisdiction to Modify: Whether the Court of Appeals had the competence to reopen the case or to consider the motion for reconsideration and modification of sentence filed for the purpose of reducing the penalty.
• Retroactive Application Despite Concurrent Sentence: Whether final conviction and serving of sentence in another case is a bar to the reduction of sentence for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, by virtue of the favorable and retroactive provisions of R.A. No. 7659.

• Jurisdiction to Modify: Yes. The Court of Appeals should have treated the motion for reconsideration and modification of sentence as a substantial compliance with the rules on habeas corpus, which is the proper remedy for invoking the retroactive effect of R.A. No. 7659 when the judgment has become final and executory.
• Retroactive Application Despite Concurrent Sentence: No, a concurrent sentence for another crime is not a bar. The favorable provisions of R.A. No. 7659 must be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, provided the convict is not a habitual delinquent as defined in Article 62 of the same Code. Conviction for illegal possession of drugs or firearms does not constitute habitual delinquency.

• Jurisdiction to Modify: In People vs. Simon, the Court established that when a judgment has already become final and executory or the accused is already serving sentence, the proper remedy to invoke the retroactive effect of R.A. No. 7659 is a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. However, in the interest of justice, the Court has relaxed this rule and treated motions for reconsideration and modification of sentence as substantial compliance with the rules on habeas corpus. This relaxation was applied in People vs. George Agustin y Pocno and People vs. Rita Labriaga and Joel Labriaga, where the Court held that the rules on habeas corpus should be liberally applied in cases sufficient in substance. Following these precedents, the Court of Appeals should have treated petitioner's motion as a petition for habeas corpus and modified the penalty accordingly.

• Retroactive Application Despite Concurrent Sentence: The Court of Appeals denied retroactive application on the ground that petitioner was concurrently serving a sentence for illegal possession of firearms, making the reduction irrelevant. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the ruling in Simon is clear: the favorable provisions of R.A. No. 7659 must be given retroactive effect except in the case of a habitual criminal as provided in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner does not fall within that exception, as habitual delinquency under Article 62, paragraph 5, refers only to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification. A conviction for illegal possession of drugs, or for illegal possession of firearms, is not reckoned in habitual delinquency. To deny petitioner the right to avail of the beneficial ruling in Simon would violate a right clearly granted by law. Applying Simon, since petitioner possessed only two sticks of marijuana and fourteen decks of shabu with total weight not even indicated, the proper penalty is prision correccional; applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be within the range of arresto mayor, yielding an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor to two years and four months of prision correccional. Because petitioner had been serving sentence since August 14, 1993, which exceeds the reduced imposable penalty, her sentence for the drug offense was deemed fully served. However, her continued detention was necessary until the full term of her sentence for illegal possession of firearms had been served.

• Retroactivity of Favorable Penal Laws (Article 22, Revised Penal Code) — Penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, provided the convict is not a habitual criminal as defined in Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code. This applies even when a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is already serving the same. By force of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the beneficent provisions of Article 22 apply to crimes punished by special laws, including drug offenses under R.A. No. 6425. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the favorable penalty reductions under R.A. No. 7659 must be applied retroactively to petitioner's drug conviction.

• Habitual Delinquency as the Sole Exception to Retroactivity — Habitual delinquency, under Article 62, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, is reckoned only with respect to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification. Convictions for drug offenses or illegal possession of firearms do not constitute habitual delinquency. The Court found that petitioner was never convicted of any of the enumerated crimes, and thus the exception did not apply to her.

• Liberal Application of Habeas Corpus Rules for Retroactive Modification of Final Sentences — When a judgment has become final and executory and the convict is already serving sentence, the proper remedy to invoke the retroactive effect of favorable penal laws is a petition for habeas corpus. However, in the interest of justice, the Court has relaxed this rule and treated motions for reconsideration and modification of sentence as substantial compliance with the rules on habeas corpus, provided the motion is sufficient in substance.

• "In Simon, it is clear that the favorable provision of R.A. No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law) must be given retroactive effect except in the case of a habitual criminal as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code." — This passage states the controlling rule on retroactive application of favorable penal amendments to drug offenses, directly resolving the central issue of the case.

• "Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of the said Code the beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws." — This quotation, drawn from People vs. Simon and reproduced in the decision, establishes that Article 22's retroactivity principle applies to special laws, not just the Revised Penal Code — a foundational point for the Court's ruling.

• "To deny petitioner's light to avail of the beneficial ruling in Simon would be a violation of a right clearly granted by law." — This statement underscores the Court's position that retroactive application of favorable penal laws is a statutory right, not a discretionary concession, and that the concurrent service of an unrelated sentence cannot defeat that right.

• People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994) — Controlling precedent. The Court held that the favorable provisions of R.A. No. 7659 must be given retroactive effect to reduce penalties for certain drug offenses under R.A. No. 6425, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, except for habitual criminals. The Court also established that habeas corpus is the proper remedy when the judgment has become final. This case was directly applied to reduce petitioner's penalty.

• People vs. Moran, 59 Phil. 406 (1934) — Cited for the proposition that courts are under obligation to apply Article 22 retroactively irrespective of whether the accused has applied for it, as the provision would otherwise be "useless and nugatory."

• People vs. George Agustin y Pocno, 248 SCRA 44 (1995) — Followed. The Court treated a motion for modification of sentence as substantial compliance with the rules on habeas corpus, applying a liberal construction in cases involving retroactive application of R.A. No. 7659.

• People vs. Rita Labriaga and Joel Labriaga, 250 SCRA 163 (1995) — Followed. The Court reiterated that the rules on habeas corpus should be liberally applied in cases sufficient in substance, treating a motion as substantial compliance therewith.

• Rolando Angeles y Bombita vs. Director of New Bilibid Prison, G.R. No. 117568, January 4, 1995 — Cited as the originating resolution allowing liberal application of habeas corpus rules in cases involving retroactive application of R.A. No. 7659.

• Lamen vs. Director, Bureau of Correction, 241 SCRA 573 (1995) — Cited in support of the remedy of habeas corpus for invoking retroactive effect of favorable penal laws.

• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, as defined in Article 62, even if a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Applied to grant petitioner retroactive benefit of the reduced penalties under R.A. No. 7659 for her drug offense.

• Article 10, Revised Penal Code — Provides that offenses not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code but punished by special laws shall be supplemented by the provisions of the Code. Relied upon to establish that the beneficent provisions of Article 22 apply to crimes punished by special laws such as R.A. No. 6425.

• Article 62, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Defines habitual delinquency as convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification. Applied to determine that petitioner's convictions for drug possession and illegal possession of firearms do not constitute habitual delinquency, and thus the exception to Article 22's retroactivity does not apply.

• Section 8, Article II, R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659 — The provision under which petitioner was charged and convicted for possession of prohibited drugs. The favorable amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7659 reducing the penalty for small quantities of drugs were applied retroactively to reduce petitioner's sentence.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the proper indeterminate penalty given the reduced imposable penalty of prision correccional, yielding a minimum within the range of arresto mayor and a maximum within prision correccional.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred.