Villa vs. Allen

A prisoner held under valid process issued by a court with jurisdiction may not be discharged on habeas corpus on a claim of amnesty for murder; the benefit must be pleaded and proved at the regular trial. Because the information charged murder rather than treason or sedition, judicial notice could not supply the political character of the killing, and entitlement under the July 4, 1902 proclamation had to be established de novo as to Villa.

Simeon Villa was alleged to have been an officer of the revolutionary army, while the deceased Piera was a lieutenant of the Spanish civil guard held as a prisoner of war during the insurrections referenced in the presidential proclamation of July 4, 1902. Henry T. Allen was Chief of the Philippines Constabulary and custodian of Villa under criminal process. The proclamation expressly extended pardon and amnesty to treason, sedition, and offenses political in character or growing out of internal political feuds or dissensions, while excluding persons finally convicted of murder, rape, arson, or robbery except upon special application. Section 528 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901 barred habeas corpus where custody rested on process issued by a court with jurisdiction.

Simeon Villa stood jointly charged with Dimas Guzman, Isidro Guzman, Ventura Guzman, Jose Guzman, and Cayetano Perez for the murder of one Piera, described as a lieutenant of the Spanish civil guard. According to the application, Villa was an officer of the revolutionary army and Piera was an officer of the Spanish army who, at death, was a prisoner of war in Filipino power, with no motive other than internal political feuds or dissensions between Spaniards and Filipinos. The joint case was tried in the Court of First Instance of Isabela on January 6, 1902, in Villa's absence as to him, resulting in the acquittal of Dimas Guzman and Ventura Guzman and the sentence of life imprisonment upon Jose Guzman and Isidro Guzman.

Thereafter Jose Guzman and Isidro Guzman appealed, and the Supreme Court conceded to them the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, the record showing the act was due to internal political feuds or dissensions. Villa was apprehended in Manila on August 6, 1903, under the arrest order issued by Judge J.H. Blount of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, and was held awaiting transportation to Ilagan, Isabela Province for trial, not having yet been tried. At the habeas corpus hearing the Solicitor-General admitted identity of the joint charge and the acquittal of the appealing Guzmans under amnesty, and the parties agreed the evidence in that appeal record could be considered.

The trial-level factual premise material to review was undisputed custody under process of a court possessing jurisdiction to issue it, coupled with Villa's non-participation in the earlier trial and judgment that had benefited his co-accused.

• Obliteration of the Offense by Amnesty: Petitioner argued that the amnesty proclamation completely obliterates the offense, with the same effect as if the general law punishing it had been repealed or annulled, so no trial could follow.
• Entitlement Shown by Guzman Record: Petitioner maintained that all facts connecting him to the offense were contained in the Supreme Court record in the Guzman appeal, which determined the act was due to internal political feuds or dissensions, and that as a revolutionary officer charged over a Spanish officer prisoner of war he had been pardoned with no remaining crime to prosecute.
• Immediate Discharge on Habeas Corpus: Petitioner contended that discharge should be granted on habeas corpus without the formality of a regular trial under the information.

• Lawful Custody Under Valid Court Process: Respondent countered that Villa was held by virtue of the arrest order of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, was arrested in obedience thereto in Manila on August 6, 1903, was held for transportation to Ilagan for trial in compliance with the order, and had not yet been tried upon the charge.

• Bar of Habeas Corpus by Valid Process: Whether habeas corpus must be disallowed where the prisoner is held under process issued by a court having jurisdiction, unless an exception applies for amnesty cases.
• Effect of Amnesty on Murder Charge: Whether the amnesty proclamation obliterates a murder charge so as to preclude trial and compel discharge on habeas corpus as if the punishing law had been repealed.
• Mode of Invoking Amnesty: Whether a murder accused must obtain amnesty benefits through plea and proof in the regular judicial proceeding rather than by collateral discharge on habeas corpus.

• Bar of Habeas Corpus by Valid Process: Yes. The writ was disallowed, there being no dispute over custody under process of a court with jurisdiction, with remand required under Section 528 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901.
• Effect of Amnesty on Murder Charge: No. Amnesty did not operate as an automatic repeal-like extinction of the charged murder so as to bar trial, the information charging murder rather than treason or sedition.
• Mode of Invoking Amnesty: The benefits had to be sought by pleading the defense and proving entitlement at trial de novo, not by discharge on habeas corpus.

• Bar of Habeas Corpus by Valid Process: Custody under process issued by a court or magistrate with jurisdiction precluded allowance of the writ, and even after allowance jurisdiction appearing required denial of discharge for informality or defect in process, judgment, or order. Applied here, detention by the Chief of the Philippines Constabulary under the Isabela Court of First Instance arrest order for trial fell squarely within the statutory bar, a point left undisputed as to issuance and jurisdiction.
• Effect of Amnesty on Murder Charge: By its terms the proclamation was both pardon and amnesty, covering treason, sedition, and offenses political in character or growing out of the specified feuds or dissensions. Insofar as it reached treason and sedition it could be regarded as amnesty in the nature of public law, judicially noticed and potentially operating like repeal under United States vs. Wilson; whether discharge on habeas corpus would lie for such charges was left undecided. As to ordinary crimes such as murder arising from Filipino internal feuds, it was in the nature of pardon, and a court could not judicially notice that the murder charged grew out of the described political feuds, so extinction of the charge could not be assumed collaterally.
• Mode of Invoking Amnesty: At common law pardon before issue joined had to be pleaded in confession and avoidance, with suitable presentation after issue joined, before sentence, or on appeal, and neither a prison keeper nor a habeas corpus court was the proper tribunal to decide entitlement under the proclamation in question. The proclamation itself excluded persons finally convicted of murder, rape, arson, or robbery, remitting them to special application, underscoring individualized inquiry. Reliance on the Guzman acquittal was insufficient because Villa had not participated in that trial, neither he nor the Government was bound by it as to him, and his case had to be tried de novo with evidence disclosing his personal entitlement.

• Habeas corpus barred by valid process — Where liberty is restrained under process, judgment, or order of a court of record possessing jurisdiction to issue or render it, the writ shall not be allowed, and jurisdiction appearing after allowance precludes discharge for informality or defect. Applied to require remand of Villa to the arresting court's custody for trial.
• Amnesty distinguished from pardon in operation — Amnesty commonly denotes general pardon for treason and other high political offenses, belonging to international law and synonymous with oblivion or pardon in English law; insofar as the proclamation covered treason and sedition it partook of amnesty as public law, while as to ordinary crimes like murder, robbery, or arson arising from internal feuds it partook of pardon. The distinction controlled why a murder information could not be treated as repealed by mere invocation of the Guzman result.
• Pleading and proof of pardon — A pardon obtained before issue joined must be pleaded as confession and avoidance, with appropriate presentation at later stages including appeal; after conviction and sentence, discharge historically required suing out habeas corpus at common law, while American practice allowed discharge by the keeper upon presentation. Here, entitlement under the July 4, 1902 proclamation had to be pleaded and proved in the regular criminal proceeding, not decided by the jailer or on habeas corpus.
• Non-mutuality of co-accused amnesty adjudication — A judgment conceding amnesty to appealing co-defendants does not bind a non-participating co-accused nor the Government as to him. Villa therefore had to establish his own entitlement upon a de novo trial rather than rest on United States vs. Guzman.

• "If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appear after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order." — States the statutory bar under Section 528 that compelled denial of the writ given undisputed valid process and jurisdiction.
• "Amnesty commonly denotes the 'general pardon to rebels for their treason and other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended by some breach of the law of nations.'" — Supplies the canonical definition used to classify the treason-sedition aspect of the proclamation as amnesty.
• "If the defendant wishes to avail himself of the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, it will be necessary for him to plead this defense, and the evidence must disclose in this particular case that he is entitled to its benefits." — Articulates the ratio requiring plea and individualized proof at trial rather than collateral release.
• "The defendants Villa did not participate in that trial and was not bound by the proceedings of the Court of First Instance therein, nor would the Government be bound by the judgment in that case. As to him the case must be tried de novo." — Explains why the prior Guzman amnesty acquittal could not automatically extend to Villa.

• United States vs. Wilson, 7 Peters, 163 — Cited as authority that a legislative general amnesty for strictly political offenses, being in the nature of public law, has the same effect as repeal or annulment of the punishing law; distinguished as inapplicable to decide Villa's murder charge on habeas corpus.
• United States vs. Guzman (Jose and Isidro Guzman appeal) — Prior decision granting appellants amnesty benefits and acquittal; held not dispositive for Villa, who was not a party thereto and must be tried de novo.

• Section 528, Code of Civil Procedure of 1901 — Bars allowance of habeas corpus where custody is under process, judgment, or order of a court with jurisdiction, and bars discharge for mere informality or defect once jurisdiction appears; applied to mandate remand to the Constabulary for delivery to Isabela for trial.
• Proclamation of the President, July 4, 1902 (Amnesty Proclamation) — Extends pardon and amnesty to treason, sedition, political offenses, and offenses growing out of specified internal political feuds or dissensions during the insurrections, but excludes persons theretofore finally convicted of murder, rape, arson, or robbery except by special application; applied to require individualized pleading and proof rather than automatic extinction of Villa's murder charge.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, J., McDonough, J., concur. Willard, J., concurs in the result.

• Torres, J. — Maintained the murder charge was extinguished objectively by amnesty, which wipes out, pardons, and forgets the crime itself, unlike a merely subjective pardon presupposing a subsisting crime; since the Guzman defendants had been declared within the July 4, 1902 amnesty, taken the oath, and secured dismissal, the October 16, 1901 warrant had lapsed and could not support Villa's detention or a revived prosecution. Without a subsisting punishable act, the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to determine, and Villa should have been released on habeas corpus after taking the required oath, with notice to the trial court and Attorney-General for entry in the record.