Vilar vs. Paraiso

An ecclesiastic who fails to validly resign from his ministry before the date of the election remains disqualified to hold municipal office under Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, and a purported resignation that is not registered or reflected in the cancellation of his license to solemnize marriages may be treated as a sham. A candidate who obtained second place in an election cannot be declared the duly elected winner when the first-place candidate is declared ineligible, absent an express statutory provision authorizing such a declaration.

Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were rival candidates for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in the general elections of November 13, 1951. The municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Paraiso the winner with a plurality of 41 votes. Vilar instituted quo warranto proceedings, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office because he was a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, a status disqualified under Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code. The case was originally brought to the Court of Appeals, which certified it to the Supreme Court pursuant to Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, on the theory that one of the appeals raised questions of law exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.

In the general elections of November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were candidates for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. After the canvass, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Paraiso the duly elected mayor with a plurality of 41 votes. Vilar then instituted quo warranto proceedings, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office because he was a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, disqualified under Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, and prayed that Paraiso's proclamation be declared null and void and that he be declared the duly elected mayor in his place.

The evidence for the petitioner showed that Paraiso was ordained as a minister of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944 and was given a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries. He acted as minister in Rizal, Nueva Ecija continuously from 1944 to 1950, renewing his license as prescribed. On April 19, 1950, Paraiso transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, and on April 7, 1951, he applied for and was issued a license to solemnize marriages as minister of the new church, valid up to the end of April 1952. This license was never cancelled, and neither the head of the United Church nor Paraiso requested its cancellation. Paraiso was publicly known as a minister of the United Church of Christ, and he did not attach a copy of his alleged resignation to his certificate of candidacy.

The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tended to show that Paraiso filed his resignation as minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to engage in politics; that the resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951; that he turned over his chapel and office to elder members of his religious order on August 21, 1951; and that he had refrained from conducting religious services since then. The trial court, however, found that Paraiso never ceased to be a minister and that the alleged resignation was a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law. The trial court declared Paraiso's proclamation null and void but refrained from declaring Vilar as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds. Both parties appealed, and the case was certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals.

• Ineligibility of Respondent: Petitioner argued that respondent Paraiso was ineligible to hold the office of mayor because he was a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, a status disqualified under Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code.
• Right to be Declared Elected: Petitioner prayed that he be declared the duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija in lieu of respondent, having obtained the second-highest number of votes.

• Validity of Resignation: Respondent denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, and that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951.
• Petitioner Not Entitled to Office: Respondent argued that even if he was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to take his place.

• Ineligibility of Respondent: Whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, was ineligible to hold office under Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, with his resignation duly accepted, thereby removing his disability.
• Right of Second-Place Candidate: Whether petitioner, having obtained second place in the elections, could be declared the duly elected mayor in place of the ineligible respondent.

• Ineligibility of Respondent: Yes. Respondent was disqualified to hold the office of mayor, the Court finding that he never ceased to be a minister and that his alleged resignation was a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office.
• Right of Second-Place Candidate: No. The Court cannot declare the second-place candidate as the duly elected mayor in the absence of an express provision authorizing such a declaration, as the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and has presented his certificate of candidacy.

• Ineligibility of Respondent: The Court examined the evidence and found no reason to deviate from the trial court's finding that respondent never ceased to be a minister and that his alleged resignation was a mere scheme to circumvent the law. The Court emphasized that if respondent sincerely intended to resign, he should have resigned in due form and had the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public of the minister's authority to discharge religious functions and to keep it informed of any change in his religious status, which is necessary for the protection of the public, especially regarding the authority to solemnize marriages, the registration of which is mandatory under Articles 92-96 of the new Civil Code. The Court rejected the argument that the duty to secure cancellation devolved upon the head of the organization, holding that the law imposes upon the interested party, respondent himself, the duty of effecting such cancellation. The Court also noted that respondent failed to attach a copy of his alleged resignation to his certificate of candidacy, knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office. The documents purporting to show the resignation and its acceptance were branded as self-serving, and the minute book of the church meetings was found to have been prepared haphazardly, leading the Court to believe that the supposed resignation and acceptance were made at a later date to cure respondent's ineligibility.

• Right of Second-Place Candidate: The Court held that it cannot declare the second-place candidate as the duly elected mayor in the absence of an express provision authorizing such a declaration. Citing prior cases, the Court stated that when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and has presented his certificate of candidacy. The Court further noted that Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180, the Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the contestee is declared ineligible, the contestant will be proclaimed, and the law contemplates no such result because it permits the filing of the contest by any registered candidate irrespective of whether the latter occupied the next highest place or the lowest in the election returns.

• Ineligibility of Ecclesiastics — Under Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, an ecclesiastic is disqualified to hold municipal office. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that respondent, a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, was disqualified because his alleged resignation was not validly effected, as he failed to secure the cancellation of his license to solemnize marriages and failed to attach his resignation to his certificate of candidacy.

• Registration of Ministerial Status — The registration of a minister's authority to solemnize marriages serves a two-fold purpose: to inform the public of the minister's authority to discharge religious functions and to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent's failure to have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries indicated that he never truly ceased to be a minister.

• Second-Place Candidate Cannot Be Declared Elected — When the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and has presented his certificate of candidacy. The Court applied this doctrine to deny petitioner's prayer to be declared the duly elected mayor.

• "Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries." — This passage articulates the Court's core reasoning for finding that respondent's resignation was a sham, emphasizing the importance of registration as evidence of a genuine change in ministerial status.

• "The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status." — This passage defines the two-fold purpose of registration of ministerial status, which the Court relied upon to conclude that respondent's failure to register his resignation indicated that he remained a minister.

• "As the trial court aptly remarked 'All these lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the supposed resignation and acceptance were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the respondent.'" — This passage quotes the trial court's finding, which the Supreme Court adopted, that the resignation documents were prepared retroactively to cure respondent's disqualification.

• "When the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy." — This passage states the controlling doctrine that a second-place candidate cannot be declared the winner when the first-place candidate is ineligible, which the Court applied to deny petitioner's prayer.

• Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare the second-place candidate as elected, even if eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and has presented his certificate of candidacy.

• Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180, the Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the contestee is declared ineligible, the contestant will be proclaimed, and the law contemplates no such result because it permits the filing of the contest by any registered candidate.

• Section 2175, Revised Administrative Code — The provision disqualifying ecclesiastics from holding municipal office. The Court applied this provision to hold respondent ineligible for the office of mayor, being a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines.

• Articles 92-96, New Civil Code — The provisions making the registration of a minister's authority to solemnize marriages mandatory. The Court cited these provisions to emphasize the importance of registration and to support its finding that respondent's failure to cancel his license indicated that he remained a minister.

• Section 173, Republic Act No. 180 (Revised Election Code) — The provision governing election contests. The Court cited this provision to support its ruling that the law does not authorize the declaration of the second-place candidate as the winner when the contestee is declared ineligible.

• Sections 17 and 31, Judiciary Act of 1948 — The provisions under which the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court, upon the theory that one of the appeals was exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concurred.