Vidal-Plucena vs. Balgos, Jr.

In actions for recovery of possession of a portion of real property, jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the portion actually sought to be recovered, not the assessed value of the entire property from which that portion is taken.

Petitioner Elizabeth Vidal-Plucena is the registered owner of a 10,000-square-meter parcel of land in Balungao, San Leonardo, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, covered by TCT No. T-19220, which she inherited from her late parents and had been tilling since the 1980s. Respondents are then Mayor Flaviano Balgos, Jr. and Franson Valencia, who allegedly caused the construction of small concrete houses and pigpens on a portion of the land without petitioner's consent. The dispute centers on which court—RTC or Municipal Trial Court—has jurisdiction over the complaint for recovery of possession, a question governed by Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, which allocate original jurisdiction between first and second-level courts based on the assessed value of the property involved.

Elizabeth Vidal-Plucena is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Balungao, San Leonardo, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19220. She had been tilling the land since the 1980s, having inherited it from her late parents. The entire property measures approximately 10,000 square meters and, according to a tax declaration under her name, has an assessed value of ₱34,160.00.

Sometime in 2013, Plucena was surprised to discover that someone had entered and fenced a portion of the subject land, erecting small concrete houses and pigpens thereon without her consent. Upon inquiry, Plucena and her sister, Ruth G. Vidal, learned that the structures were owned by then Mayor Flaviano Balgos, Jr. and Franson Valencia, collectively the respondents. According to Plucena's neighbors, Mayor Balgos and Mrs. Valencia had ordered the construction. When confronted, Mrs. Valencia claimed ownership of the lot where the structures stood. Plucena raised the matter with Mayor Balgos, but her concerns went unheeded.

Plucena thereafter had the land surveyed to determine the exact portion illegally occupied. The survey revealed that the fenced and occupied portion, measuring approximately 60 square meters, belonged to Ruth. Plucena nonetheless claimed that about 60 square meters of the subject land was unlawfully occupied by the respondents. She prayed that the respondents be ordered to vacate the land and that the improvements be removed.

Respondents, in their Answer, questioned the RTC's jurisdiction over the subject matter, contending that the assessed value of only the 60-square-meter portion allegedly encroached—not the entire property—should be the basis for determining jurisdiction. According to respondents, the assessed value of the entire property is merely ₱204.96, more or less, placing the case within the Municipal Trial Court's jurisdiction. The RTC agreed and dismissed the complaint by Order dated March 9, 2020, holding that the "property involved" refers to the 60-square-meter portion sought to be recovered. Plucena's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Order dated July 20, 2020, prompting the present petition.

• Jurisdiction Based on Entire Property: Petitioner argued that although her claim involved only a 60-square-meter portion of the land, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, does not distinguish whether the title to or interest in the property be in whole or in part, and therefore the assessed value of the entire property should control.
• Absence of Separate Tax Declaration: Petitioner maintained that there is no separate tax declaration for the 60-square-meter portion of the lot, implying that the assessed value of the entire property is the only available basis for determining jurisdiction.
• Need for Statutory Interpretation: Petitioner insisted that the present Petition should be given due course as the facts and circumstances require the Court's interpretation of the law, notwithstanding the denial of a prior petition of the same nature filed by her sister Ruth.

• Jurisdiction Based on Portion Sought to be Recovered: Respondents reiterated that the basis for determining which court has jurisdiction should be the assessed value of the 60-square-meter portion sought to be recovered, not the assessed value of the entire 10,000-square-meter lot.
• Prior Dismissed Petition: Respondents pointed out that petitioner had previously filed a petition involving the same issues, docketed as G.R. No. 254294, which had been denied by the Court for lack of merit.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, specifically whether the assessed value of the entire property or only the portion sought to be recovered should determine jurisdiction.
• Propriety of Rule 45 Petition: Whether the petition, which involves questions of fact and was filed directly with the Supreme Court, is proper under Rule 45 and the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

• Jurisdiction: No. The RTC did not commit reversible error. Jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the "property involved" or "interest therein," which refers to the 60-square-meter portion actually sought to be recovered, not the entire 10,000-square-meter property.
• Propriety of Rule 45 Petition: No. The petition raises questions of fact, which are outside the province of a Rule 45 petition, and direct recourse to the Supreme Court violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

• Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for. Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 both refer to "the assessed value of the property involved" or "interest therein." The Court agreed with the RTC that the only "property involved" in the case is the 60-square-meter portion allegedly encroached and sought to be recovered, not the entire one-hectare property. The assessed value of the entire property cannot be the basis for determining jurisdiction because the entire property is not involved in the case. The Court further held that a party-plaintiff cannot be given the discretion as to which assessed value to use; otherwise, it would constitute an unintended license to forum shop. The 60-square-meter portion can be the subject of segregation, and its approximate value can be determined through the extant records, including the tax declaration, but petitioner failed to do so.
• Propriety of Rule 45 Petition: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law; factual questions are not the proper subject of such an appeal. While the issue of which assessed value should determine jurisdiction is concededly a question of law, its resolution would require a determination of facts—the valuation of the subject land, the size of the occupied portion, its location, and the valuation of that portion, as well as the improvements erected—all of which are questions of fact. None of the recognized exceptions allowing the Court to review factual issues is present. Moreover, petitioner's direct recourse to the Supreme Court via a Rule 45 petition violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, under which direct resort from lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts — Under this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions and prevent the overcrowding of its docket. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner's direct filing of a Rule 45 petition with the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court of Appeals, was improper.
• Jurisdiction over Subject Matter Determined by Allegations in the Complaint — Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for. The Court applied this principle to confirm that the complaint sought recovery of only a 60-square-meter portion, and therefore the assessed value of that portion—not the entire property—governed jurisdiction.
• Rule 45 Limited to Questions of Law — A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law; factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. The Court invoked this rule to decline review, noting that resolving the jurisdictional issue would require factual determinations regarding the valuation and size of the occupied portion.

• "It is quite clear therefore that what determines jurisdiction is assessed value of the 'property involved' or 'interest therein.' Surely, there could no other [sic] 'property involved' or 'interest therein' in this case than the 60 square meters portion allegedly encroached and occupied by and being recovered in this suit from the defendants. The assessed value of the entire ONE HECTARE property in the name of the plaintiff could not be the basis in determining the court's jurisdiction because such entire property is not involved in this case." — This passage, quoted by the Supreme Court from the RTC's Order, articulates the controlling rationale: jurisdiction is tied to the property actually in dispute, not the broader titled property from which it is drawn.
• "The party-plaintiff, Plucena, in this case, cannot be given the discretion as to which assessed value to use; otherwise, it will be an unintended license to forum shop." — This statement defines the policy rationale against allowing a plaintiff to choose between the assessed value of the entire property and that of the disputed portion, linking the rule to the prohibition on forum shopping.

• Dy vs. Bibat-Palamos, 717 Phil. 782 (2013) — Cited in support of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reinforcing that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is improper when the appropriate remedy is available in lower tribunals.
• Suarez vs. Judge Villarama, 526 Phil. 68, 74-76 (2006) — Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions.
• Cabiling vs. Dangcalan, 787 Phil. 187, 196 (2016) — Cited for the settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.

• Section 19(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — Confers on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds ₱20,000.00 (or ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila). The Court interpreted "property involved" to mean the portion actually sought to be recovered.
• Section 33(3), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — Confers on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed ₱20,000.00 (or ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila). The Court relied on the phrase "the assessed value of the property or interest therein" to hold that the 60-square-meter portion's assessed value, not the entire property's, governs jurisdiction.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.