Vicente vs. Avera

A notice of lis pendens binds only a transferee pendente lite whose transferor's title is subject to the outcome of the pending litigation; it does not affect a registered owner whose title is not subject to the results of that case. The registered owner's clear legal right to possession, being one of the attributes of ownership, may be protected by a writ of injunction against the implementation of a writ of execution that would unduly deprive the owner of such right.

The petitioners, spouses Protacio Vicente and Dominga Vicente, purchased the property in dispute from Jovencio Rebuquiao, the registered owner, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 1, 1987. Respondent Delia Soledad Avera claimed ownership over the same property by virtue of a separate Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage allegedly executed on October 9, 1987 by Jose Rebuquiao, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney from Jovencio Rebuquiao, in favor of Avera and her then-spouse Roberto Domingo. The property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34351, and the dispute over ownership arose in the context of a marriage nullity case between Avera and Domingo, which involved the distribution of property acquired during their cohabitation.

Jovencio Rebuquiao was the registered owner of the property in dispute, then covered by TCT No. 34351. On October 1, 1987, Rebuquiao executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners, spouses Protacio Vicente and Dominga Vicente, over the property. Respondent Delia Soledad Avera alleged that on October 9, 1987, Jose Rebuquiao, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney granted to him by Jovencio Rebuquiao, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of Roberto Domingo, Avera's spouse at the time, and herself.

On May 29, 1991, Avera filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, entitled "Delia Soledad Domingo, etc. vs. Roberto Domingo" and docketed as JDRC Case No. 1989-J. In this case, Avera asserted exclusive ownership over the property in dispute. On January 23, 1992, a notice of lis pendens was inscribed on TCT No. 34351, pertaining to the JDRC case pending at the time. Since 1997, petitioners possessed the property in dispute.

On July 22, 1998, TCT No. 34351 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the Registry of Deeds issued petitioners TCT No. 14216 for the property in dispute, on the basis of the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987. The notice of lis pendens was carried over to TCT No. 14216. On November 28, 1994, the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City rendered a Decision in the JDRC case, declaring the marriage of Avera and Domingo void and ordering the property acquired during their cohabitation to be put in the custody of Avera, including the property in dispute.

After the decision in the JDRC case became final and executory, the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City issued a Writ of Execution. On June 13, 2001, the same trial court issued an Alias Writ of Execution, declaring that although the property was now registered in the name of Protacio Vicente under TCT No. 14216, the transfer was made notwithstanding the annotation of the notice of lis pendens, and thus the property could still be the subject of a writ of execution to satisfy the judgment in favor of Avera. Pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution, respondent Ronberto Valino, in his capacity as Sheriff IV of the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, served a Notice to Vacate dated August 15, 2001 on petitioners.

On August 17, 2001, petitioners filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim before the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City. On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order before the RTC, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City, to enjoin Sheriff Valino from implementing the alias writ of execution. On September 4, 2001, the trial court issued a TRO and, on May 29, 2002, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, enjoining respondents from enforcing the notice to vacate. On March 30, 2003, it rendered a decision making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent, holding that petitioners were entitled to permanent injunction considering that it is undisputed that petitioners are the registered owners of the subject property, which certificate of title confers upon them conclusive ownership of the property, and that the writ of execution issued in the JDRC case could only be issued against a party to the action, and thus not to the petitioners.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City, holding that petitioners are bound by the outcome of the JDRC case because the annotation of the notice of lis pendens (January 23, 1992) was ahead of petitioners' registration of the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 (July 22, 1998). Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied.

• Registered Ownership and Right to Possession: Petitioners maintained that as the registered owners and actual possessors of the property in dispute, they are entitled to a writ of injunction that will prevent the implementation of the writ of execution corresponding to the JDRC case.
• Collateral Attack on Title: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in dismissing the complaint because in so doing, it made an implied recognition that a real property titled under the Torrens system may be attacked collaterally in contravention of law and established jurisprudence.
• Effect of Lis Pendens: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in concluding that the petitioners are bound by the lis pendens, it being clear that the property was acquired long before the lis pendens was annotated, as petitioners became owners of the property on October 1, 1987 and not on July 20, 1998 when their ownership was merely confirmed by the title issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds.

• Binding Effect of Lis Pendens: Respondents asserted that petitioners are not entitled to the writ of injunction because the petitioners are subject to the outcome of the JDRC case and thus the implementation of the writ of execution is due to the notice of lis pendens annotated on their TCT.
• Inexistence of the Deed of Sale: Respondents alleged that there was no sale by Rebuquiao in favor of petitioners on October 1, 1987.
• Timing of the Sale: Respondents alleged that if there was a sale, the same happened in 1997, the year petitioners registered the deed of sale executed in their favor.

• Propriety of Injunction: Whether injunction lies in favor of the petitioners to prevent the respondents from interfering in the exercise of their rights over the property in dispute.
• Effect of Lis Pendens: Whether the notice of lis pendens annotated on the petitioners' certificate of title subjects their title to the outcome of the JDRC case.
• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: Whether the respondents' allegation that the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 in favor of petitioners does not exist constitutes a collateral attack on the certificate of title.

• Propriety of Injunction: Yes. The petitioners, as registered owners and actual possessors of the property, have a clear legal right to the property that is entitled to protection through a writ of injunction, and the implementation of the writ of execution would violate that right.
• Effect of Lis Pendens: No. The notice of lis pendens does not affect the petitioners' title because it pertains to the JDRC case, an action for nullity of marriage between Avera and Domingo, and not to litigation involving Rebuquiao, the petitioners' transferor, whose title is not subject to the results of the JDRC case.
• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: Yes. The respondents' allegation that the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 in favor of petitioners does not exist constitutes a collateral attack on the certificate of title, which is prohibited under Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529.

• Propriety of Injunction: Injunction, as a preservative remedy, aims to protect substantive rights and interests. To be entitled to a writ of injunction, the complainant must establish the following requisites: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. The grant of the writ is conditioned on the existence of the complainant's clear legal right, which means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is "enforceable as a matter of law." As the registered owners and actual possessors of the property in question, petitioners have a clear legal right to the property in dispute. Section 51 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 provides that registration is the operative act that conveys or affects registered land as against third persons. Thus, a TCT is the best proof of ownership of land. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioners are the registered owners and actual possessors of the subject property. Moreover, as the registered owners, petitioners have the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. The implementation of the writ of execution would unduly deprive petitioners, as the registered owners, of their right to possess the subject property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. Until petitioners' title is annulled in a proper proceeding, Avera has no enforceable right over the property in dispute. Since Avera failed to prove her indubitable right over the subject property, petitioners possess a clear and unmistakable right over the property in dispute that requires the issuance of a writ of injunction to prevent any damage to their interests as registered owners.

• Effect of Lis Pendens: Section 24, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a purchaser of the property affected by the notice of lis pendens is deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action only from the time of filing such notice. Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reiterates this rule. Thus, a notice of lis pendens affects a transferee pendente lite, who by virtue of the notice, is bound by any judgment which may be rendered for or against the transferor, and his title is subject to the results of the pending litigation. A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It serves to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. In the case at bar, the notice of lis pendens does not affect petitioners' title to the property in dispute. A notice of lis pendens concerns litigation between a transferor and a third party, where the transferee who acquires land with a notice of lis pendens annotated on the corresponding certificate of title stands in the shoes of his predecessor and in which case the transferee's title is subject to the results of the pending litigation. The notice of lis pendens does not concern litigation involving Rebuquiao, who transferred his title to the property in dispute to petitioners, and his title. The notice of lis pendens pertains to the JDRC case, an action for nullity of the marriage between Avera and Domingo. Since Rebuquiao's title to the property in dispute is not subject to the results of the JDRC case, petitioners' title to the same property is also not subject to the results of the JDRC case.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: It was erroneous for respondents to assail the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 in favor of petitioners, because this constitutes a collateral attack on petitioners' TCT. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 prohibits a collateral attack on a Torrens title. This Court has held that a petition which, in effect, questioned the validity of a deed of sale for registered land constitutes a collateral attack on a certificate of title. In the case at bar, respondents' allegation that the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 in favor of petitioners does not exist clearly constitutes a collateral attack on a certificate of title. The allegation of the inexistence of the deed of sale in effect attacks the validity of the TCT issued in the petitioners' names.

• Lis Pendens Doctrine — A notice of lis pendens affects a transferee pendente lite, who by virtue of the notice is bound by any judgment which may be rendered for or against the transferor, and whose title is subject to the results of the pending litigation. However, the notice of lis pendens does not affect the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien; it serves only to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution. In this case, the Court held that the notice of lis pendens annotated on the petitioners' title did not bind them because it pertained to the JDRC case, an action for nullity of marriage between Avera and Domingo, and not to litigation involving Rebuquiao, the petitioners' transferor. Since Rebuquiao's title was not subject to the results of the JDRC case, the petitioners' title was likewise not subject to those results.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title — Under Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack; it cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. A petition which, in effect, questions the validity of a deed of sale for registered land constitutes a collateral attack on a certificate of title. In this case, the respondents' allegation that the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 in favor of petitioners does not exist was held to constitute a collateral attack on the TCT issued in the petitioners' names, because the allegation of the inexistence of the deed of sale in effect attacks the validity of the TCT.

• Requisites for Injunction — To be entitled to a writ of injunction, the complainant must establish: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. The grant of the writ is conditioned on the existence of the complainant's clear legal right, which means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is "enforceable as a matter of law." In this case, the petitioners, as registered owners and actual possessors, had a clear legal right to the property, and the implementation of the writ of execution would violate that right by unduly depriving them of their right to possess the property.

• "A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It serves to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution." — This passage defines the limited function of a notice of lis pendens, clarifying that it is merely a protective mechanism and does not independently create or affect substantive rights.

• "The notice of lis pendens does not concern litigation involving Rebuquiao, who transferred his title to the property in dispute to petitioners, and his title. The notice of lis pendens pertains to the JDRC case, an action for nullity of the marriage between Avera and Domingo. Since Rebuquiao's title to the property in dispute is not subject to the results of the JDRC case, petitioners' title to the same property is also not subject to the results of the JDRC case." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that a notice of lis pendens only binds a transferee when the transferor's title is itself subject to the outcome of the pending litigation.

• "We must stress that until petitioners' title is annulled in a proper proceeding, Avera has no enforceable right over the property in dispute. At this point, petitioners' possession of the subject property must be respected." — This passage underscores the conclusiveness of a Torrens title and the requirement that any challenge to it must be made in a direct proceeding, not collaterally.

• Idolor vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141853, February 7, 2001, 351 SCRA 399 — Cited for the proposition that injunction, as a preservative remedy, aims to protect substantive rights and interests.
• Borbajo vs. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., G.R. No. 152440, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 315 — Cited for the requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction.
• Boncodin vs. National Power Corporation Employees Consolidated Union, G.R. No. 162716, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 611 — Cited for the definition of a clear legal right as one clearly founded in or granted by law or enforceable as a matter of law.
• Lee Tek Sheng vs. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 556 (1998) — Cited for the proposition that a TCT is the best proof of ownership of land.
• Miranda vs. Besa, G.R. No. 146513, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 532 — Cited for the proposition that registered owners have the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership.
• Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106401, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 309 — Cited for the holding that a petition which, in effect, questioned the validity of a deed of sale for registered land constitutes a collateral attack on a certificate of title.
• Yu vs. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897 (1995) — Cited for the doctrine that a notice of lis pendens affects a transferee pendente lite, who is bound by any judgment rendered for or against the transferor.
• Romero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142406, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 483 — Cited for the proposition that a notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien.
• Po Lam vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116220, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 86 — Cited for the proposition that a notice of lis pendens serves to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution.
• Carrascoso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123672, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 666 — Cited for the pronouncement that a purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third party stands in the shoes of his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending litigation.
• Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio vs. Heirs of Teresa Sevilla De Leon, G.R. No. 149570, March 12, 2004, 425 SCRA 447 — Cited for the proposition that the registered owner has the right to possess and enjoy his property without any limitations other than those imposed by law.

• Section 51, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Provides that registration is the operative act that conveys or affects registered land insofar as third persons are concerned. The Court applied this provision to hold that the petitioners, as registered owners, have a clear legal right to the property in dispute.
• Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. The Court applied this provision to hold that the respondents' allegation of the inexistence of the deed of sale constituted a prohibited collateral attack on the petitioners' TCT.
• Section 24, Rule 14, 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that a purchaser of property affected by a notice of lis pendens is deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action only from the time of filing such notice. The Court cited this provision to establish the rule on constructive notice through lis pendens.
• Section 14, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Reiterates the rule that only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action. The Court cited this provision to confirm the continuing validity of the lis pendens rule.

• Carpio, J.
• Corona, J.
• Azcuna, J.
• Leonardo-De Castro, J.