Vicente Manzano, Jr. vs. Marcelino Garcia

A forged contract of sale is void ab initio for want of consent, an essential requisite of a valid contract under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, and forgery may be established by visual comparison of signatures without resort to expert testimony when the dissimilarity is palpable, especially if corroborated by credible witnesses including the notarizing officer whose own testimony rebuts the presumption of regularity of the notarized document.

Marcelino Garcia owned a 6,951-square meter property covered by TCT No. T-25464 in Cagayan de Oro City. On May 26, 1992, a deed of pacto de retro sale purportedly executed by Garcia in favor of Constancio Manzano conveyed the property for P80,500.00, with a three-month repurchase period. Constancio Manzano died shortly after; his heirs adjudicated his estate to themselves and named his brother, petitioner Vicente Manzano, Jr., as administrator. Garcia did not redeem the property within the stipulated period. When Vicente Manzano, Jr. sought consolidation of ownership, Garcia countered that the document was a forgery, claiming he and his wife were abroad when it was executed.

• The Property and the Alleged Sale: The subject parcel, covered by TCT No. T-25464, was owned by respondent Marcelino D. Garcia. A deed of pacto de retro sale dated May 26, 1992 indicated that Garcia sold the land to Constancio Manzano for P80,500.00, reserving the right to repurchase within three months. Constancio Manzano died on July 12, 1992, and his heirs executed an extrajudicial partition naming petitioner Vicente Manzano, Jr. as administrator.
• Garcia’s Claim of Forgery: Garcia alleged that he and his wife were in the United States from June 1, 1988 to November 14, 1992, making it impossible for them to have executed the deed. He learned of the document only when petitioner’s counsel demanded repurchase in January 1993. Garcia discovered that the deed bore the wrong middle initial (“G.” instead of “D.” or “C.”) and that a certain Mr. P. Pacot had impersonated him, using a residence certificate showing a different address.
• Trial Court Evidence and Testimonies: At trial, petitioner presented the title and tax declaration. Garcia introduced his passport and driver’s license displaying signatures markedly different from the one on the disputed deed. The notary public, Atty. Demosthenes Mediante, Jr., testified that the person who appeared before him and signed as “Marcelino G. Garcia” was not the same Marcelino Garcia present in court. Perla Babano, a witness to the deed, likewise stated that the signatory was not the respondent. Atty. Mediante explained that two weeks before the notarization, the impostor had approached him seeking a P200,000.00 loan, and he later observed the impostor at Cagayan de Oro Divisoria.
• RTC Ruling and Rationale: The trial court dismissed Garcia’s complaint and declared the pacto de retro sale valid. It held that Garcia failed to prove forgery because no handwriting expert was presented. It doubted Atty. Mediante’s testimony given his admission that he notarized 25 to 30 documents monthly and could not remember all parties. The court found it unnatural for an impersonator to show a stranger the title. The low sale price was deemed insignificant because of the vendor’s right to repurchase.

• Physical Impossibility of Execution: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Garcia and his wife could not have executed the deed simply because they were in the United States.
• Necessity of Expert Testimony: Petitioner argued that forgery must be proved by expert testimony, citing Rivera v. Turiano, and that the dissimilarities in signatures were insufficient without an expert showing that the variations were due to a different writer and not mere natural variation.
• Insufficient Proof of Forgery: Petitioner maintained that Garcia failed to present clear, positive, and convincing evidence of forgery, as the appellate court purportedly relied on a hasty comparison of signatures.
• Presumption of Regularity: Petitioner insisted that the notarized deed of pacto de retro sale carried a presumption of regularity that deserved great weight and was not adequately rebutted.

• Forgery Established by Visual and Testimonial Evidence: Respondent countered that the dissimilarity between his customary signatures (on his passport, driver’s license, and court pleadings) and the one on the deed was patent and could be determined by visual comparison without expert testimony. He relied on Section 50, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which permits opinion testimony on handwriting by a witness familiar with it, and on the court’s authority under Section 22, Rule 132 to make its own comparison.
• Presumption of Regularity Overcome: Respondent argued that the notary public’s own admission that the person who appeared before him was an impostor completely destroyed the presumption of regularity. The wrong middle initial on the residence certificate and the testimony of the instrumental witness further corroborated the forgery.
• Absence of Consent: Respondent asserted that because his signature was forged, no consent existed, rendering the contract void ab initio under Article 1318 of the Civil Code.

• Proof of Forgery: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found that Garcia’s signature on the pacto de retro sale was forged without requiring expert testimony.
• Presumption of Regularity: Whether the notarial presumption of regularity was sufficiently rebutted by the evidence on record.
• Nullity of the Contract: Whether the forged deed of sale was void ab initio for lack of consent under Article 1318 of the Civil Code.

• Proof of Forgery: Forgery was established by clear and convincing evidence. The omission of handwriting expert testimony was not fatal because the dissimilarity between the questioned signature and Garcia’s customary signatures was enormous and obvious upon visual inspection. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the trial court and appellate courts are authorized to make an independent comparison of disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine. Jurisprudence has consistently held that expert testimony is not indispensable when the question involves mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity perceptible to the naked eye. The trial court’s disregard of the credible and consistent testimonies of the notary public and the witness was erroneous; their positive identification of the impostor, the wrong middle initial on the residence certificate used, and the gross difference in signature strokes collectively compelled a conclusion of forgery.
• Presumption of Regularity: The presumption of regularity attaching to a notarized document is not absolute and was rebutted here by clear and convincing evidence. The notary public himself testified in open court that the person who appeared before him and executed the deed was not respondent Garcia. Such an admission from the very officer who attested to the due execution of the instrument completely shattered the reliability of the acknowledgment and overcame the presumption. The irregularity was further confirmed by the instrumental witness who likewise identified the impostor.
• Nullity of the Contract: The forged pacto de retro sale was void ab initio, not merely under Article 1409 in relation to Article 1505 of the Civil Code as the Court of Appeals stated, but because it lacked the essential requisite of consent under Article 1318. A conveyance by virtue of a forged signature is an inexistent contract; the total absence of consent renders it void from the beginning.

• Proof of forgery without expert testimony — A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. The court may determine forgery by its own independent examination of documentary evidence, especially when the question involves mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity that can be resolved through visual comparison. Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court to compare disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the opposing party.
• Rebutting the presumption of regularity of notarized documents — While a notarized document enjoys a presumption of regularity, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The testimony of the notary public himself that the person who appeared before him was not the person named in the acknowledgment is sufficient to overcome the presumption. Once the notary admits the falsity of the acknowledgment, the document’s reliability is completely shattered.
• Effects of a forged contract — Conveyances executed under a forged signature are void ab initio for lack of consent, an essential requisite of a valid contract under Article 1318 of the Civil Code. Such contracts are inexistent and produce no legal effect.

• “It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its own independent examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without necessarily resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.” — The Court reiterated the rule dispensing with expert testimony when the dissimilarity is self-evident.
• “[C]onveyances by virtue of a forged signature x x x are void ab initio. The absence of the essential [requisites] of consent and cause or consideration in these cases rendered the contract inexistent.” — The Court clarified the proper legal basis for the nullity of a forged deed, correcting the Court of Appeals’ reliance on inapplicable provisions.
• “Since the very official who attested to the crucial facts in the notarization – i.e., that the persons who personally appeared before him are the same persons who executed the deed of conveyance – admitted in open court the falsity of said manifestation, the reliability of the Acknowledgment that clothes the document with a presumption of regularity is completely shattered.” — The admission by the notary public destroyed the presumption of regularity.

• Estacio v. Jaranilla, 462 Phil. 723 (2003) — Followed; affirmed that the trial court may determine forgery from its own independent examination of documentary evidence without resort to experts.
• Pontaoe v. Pontaoe, G.R. No. 159585, April 22, 2008 — Followed; reiterated that handwriting experts are not mandatory and that the judge must conduct an examination of the questioned signature.
• Rivera v. Turiano, G.R. No. 156249, March 7, 2007 — Distinguished; petitioner invoked the criteria requiring a showing of material differences, but the Court found that the variance in the present case was enormous and obvious, making those criteria inapplicable.
• Eulogio v. Apeles, G.R. No. 167884, January 20, 2009 — Followed; held that the notary’s admission that a document was notarized without the presence of the party overcomes the presumption of regularity.
• Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, 456 Phil. 569 (2003) — Followed; cited for the principle that conveyances under a forged signature are void ab initio for absence of consent and cause.

• Article 1318, Civil Code — Enumerates the essential requisites of a valid contract: consent, object, and cause. Applied to declare the pacto de retro sale void for total absence of consent due to forgery.
• Article 1409, Civil Code — Lists inexistent and void contracts. Erroneously cited by the Court of Appeals as the basis for nullity; the Supreme Court clarified that the proper basis was Article 1318, though the outcome was correct.
• Article 1505, Civil Code — Rules on sale by a non-owner of goods. Held inapplicable by the Supreme Court because it pertains to goods and unenforceable contracts, not void contracts arising from forgery of a real property deed.
• Section 22, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Authorizes the court to compare disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine. Applied to uphold the visual comparison method used by the appellate court.
• Section 50, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Permits a witness with sufficient familiarity to give an opinion regarding handwriting. Mentioned as an alternative basis for accepting Garcia’s testimony that the signature was not his.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chairperson), Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.