Vicario vs. Court of Appeals

A fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings not of a confidential nature constitutes a qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, and a person who repeats or distributes such report cannot be held liable for libel absent positive proof of express malice on the part of the accused.

Petitioner Roque Vicario y Mendez had previously filed a criminal charge for graft and corruption against Judge Proceso Sidro before the Ombudsman and an administrative complaint for dishonesty against the same judge before the Supreme Court, both arising from the latter's unjustified refusal and failure to return petitioner's P1,000.00 cash bond after the accused who posted it had been acquitted. The Ombudsman, after investigation, filed graft charges against Judge Sidro with the Sandiganbayan, an event reported in the 20 March 1992 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Judge Sidro thereafter filed a libel complaint against petitioner, alleging that petitioner had distributed photocopies of the news article in the vicinity of the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman.

Petitioner Roque Vicario y Mendez had posted a P1,000.00 cash bond in a case pending before the sala of Judge Proceso Sidro of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mondragon-San Roque, Northern Samar. After the accused who filed the bond was acquitted, Judge Sidro failed to deposit the cash bond with his clerk-of-court and refused to return the money. Petitioner thereupon filed a criminal charge for graft and corruption against Judge Sidro before the Ombudsman and an administrative complaint for dishonesty with the Supreme Court. Following its investigation, the Ombudsman filed graft charges against Judge Sidro with the Sandiganbayan. This development was reported in the 20 March 1992 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer under the headline "SAMAR JUDGE WHO POCKETED BOND CHARGED WITH GRAFT," which identified Judge Sidro by name and described the circumstances of his failure to return the cash bond.

Judge Sidro thereafter filed a criminal complaint for libel against petitioner, alleging that on 22 May 1992 petitioner distributed and circulated photocopies of page 7 of the said newspaper issue in the vicinity of the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman, thereby prejudicing his reputation as a member of the bench. In his criminal complaint, Judge Sidro stated that it was his court messenger, Romeo Pinangay, who gave him a copy of the newspaper and informed him that petitioner had distributed clippings of the news item to persons in the hospital premises. The affidavit attached to the complaint was executed not by Amador Montes—who would later testify for the prosecution—but by a certain Hermito Pahimnayan, who was never presented in court. Pahimnayan's affidavit described not the incident of 22 May 1992 but an earlier occasion in 1991 when petitioner had shown him a copy of his administrative complaint against Judge Sidro. Montes was not mentioned in Judge Sidro's affidavit and was not among the original witnesses listed in the complaint for preliminary investigation.

At trial, the prosecution presented Amador Montes, described as an acknowledged subaltern or "batos" of Judge Sidro, to testify that petitioner had given him a photocopy of the news article. No other witness was offered to establish the fact of distribution. The trial court found that no evidence showed petitioner was the source of the statements in the news item, nor that he had distributed copies to several persons; it nevertheless convicted him on the basis that he gave at least one photocopy to Montes, which amounted to publication, and that this act was tainted with malice arising from his "intense hatred" against Judge Sidro, as evident from the manner he delivered his testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto, additionally holding that the news item was "patently culled from the Affidavit-Complaint" of petitioner filed with the Ombudsman, and that by furnishing Montes a photocopy, petitioner had endorsed and adopted the news item.

• Privileged Matter: Petitioner argued that the news item in question was a privileged matter—a fair and true report of official proceedings published in a nationally circulated newspaper without any intervention on his part—and that his act of giving a copy to Amador Montes was therefore not a libelous act.
• Insufficient Evidence of Distribution: Petitioner maintained that the respondent court gravely erred in concluding that Montes saw petitioner distributing copies of the newspaper issue, when the testimony on the matter was hearsay and no other witness corroborated Montes.
• Immateriality of the Affidavit-Complaint: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in considering his affidavit-complaint filed with the Ombudsman, which was completely immaterial and impertinent to the issue of whether his act of giving a copy of the newspaper to Montes constituted libel.
• Inapplicable Authorities: Petitioner contended that the appellate court erred in citing American authorities that were not applicable to the facts of the case.
• Insufficient Evidence of Malice: Petitioner maintained that the conclusion that his act was motivated by intense hatred against Judge Sidro was based on inadequate evidence, as the manner of delivering testimony could not retroactively supply malice at the time of the alleged distribution.
• Reasonable Doubt: Petitioner argued that, in the final analysis, he should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

• Endorsement and Adoption: Respondent Court of Appeals countered that by having the news item photocopied and furnishing prosecution witness Montes a copy thereof, petitioner thereby endorsed and adopted the news item and was answerable therefor, relying on American citations in support.
• Source of the News Item: Respondent argued that the news item was "patently culled from the Affidavit-Complaint" of petitioner imputing a criminal act on Judge Sidro filed with the Ombudsman, thereby linking petitioner to the publication.
• Malice from Hatred: Respondent maintained that petitioner's intense hatred against Judge Sidro, manifested by the very manner he gave testimony, demonstrated malice that attended the distribution of the article, removing it from the protection of privileged communication.

• Publication: Whether the act of merely distributing a photocopy of a newspaper article reporting that graft charges had been filed against a judge named therein constitutes libelous publication.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether petitioner's act of distributing the photocopy was proved beyond reasonable doubt, including whether malice was sufficiently established.

• Publication: No. The news article was a fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments or remarks, of official proceedings not of a confidential nature, constituting a qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code; absent positive proof of express malice, its repetition could not constitute libel.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The prosecution failed to establish publication and malice beyond reasonable doubt; the evidence was insufficient and the equipoise doctrine warranted acquittal.

• Publication: The elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. The trial court itself found that no evidence showed petitioner was the source of the statements in the news item, and that the article was merely a factual report about the filing by the Ombudsman of graft charges against the judge with the Sandiganbayan—nothing defamatory therein. The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that the news item was "patently culled from the Affidavit-Complaint" of petitioner, when the affidavit-complaint's contents never appeared in the news article, which made no specific reference to petitioner. It would have been more accurate to state that the article was culled from the Ombudsman's resolution directing the filing of charges. No evidence was offered to show that petitioner himself photocopied the article or distributed copies to numerous persons; the testimony of Judge Sidro and Montes on widespread distribution was ruled hearsay by the trial court itself. Montes was not even mentioned in Judge Sidro's original affidavit-complaint and was not among the original witnesses listed for preliminary investigation. Granting arguendo that petitioner gave a photocopy to Montes, the article qualified as a fair and true report of official proceedings under Article 354, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code—a qualifiedly privileged communication. Once privileged character is established, the onus of proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff. The prosecution failed to adduce positive proof of express malice, and the privilege defense remained available.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The malice attending the dissemination of an alleged libelous article must attend the distribution itself; it cannot be merely a resentment manifested unconnectedly several months earlier or displayed at a much later date. The trial court's finding of malice rested on petitioner's "intense hatred" as discerned from the manner he delivered his testimony—a reasoning the Supreme Court characterized as a non sequitur. A fine-tooth dissection of Montes's testimony revealed nothing indicating petitioner's attitude or mental frame at the time he allegedly handed over the photocopy; if anything, petitioner's attitude could only be described as noncommittal. Ill will must be personal to constitute malice, but if the ill will is engendered by one's sense of justice or other legitimate motive, such feeling negates actual malice. The anger petitioner displayed on the witness stand could have stemmed from frustration at Judge Sidro's continued refusal to return his cash bond, or from being criminally sued for an act he believed was not imputable to him. This state of mind cannot be retroactively applied to the time of distribution absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, which the prosecution did not produce. Because the evidence of the prosecution and the defense was so evenly balanced, the equipoise doctrine required tilting the scales in favor of the accused, and the constitutional presumption of innocence prevailed.

• Qualifiedly Privileged Communication — Article 354, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from the presumption of malice a fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings not of a confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. The character of qualified privilege is a matter of defense that may be lost by positive proof of express malice. Once the privileged character of the article is established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove actual malice. In this case, the news article reporting the Ombudsman's filing of graft charges against Judge Sidro was a fair and true report of official proceedings; the prosecution failed to prove express malice, so the privilege defense remained intact and petitioner could not be held liable for libel.

• Equipoise Doctrine — When the evidence of the prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced, appreciation of such evidence calls for tilting the scales in favor of the accused; the evidence for the prosecution must be heavier to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The constitutional basis is the Bill of Rights, finding expression in Section 1, paragraph (a), Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In this case, because the cause of petitioner's displayed "intense hatred" was unexplained and the prosecution's evidence on publication and malice was insufficient, the Court granted petitioner the benefit of the doubt under this doctrine.

• Malice in Libel — The malice that attends the dissemination of an alleged libelous article must attend the distribution itself; it cannot be merely a resentment against a person manifested unconnectedly several months earlier or displayed at a later date. Ill will must be personal to constitute malice, but ill will engendered by one's sense of justice or other legitimate or plausible motive negatives actual malice. Anger displayed by an accused on the witness stand during trial cannot be retroactively applied to the time of distribution absent clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the trial court's inference of malice from petitioner's demeanor while testifying was held to be a non sequitur.

• "In order to constitute malice, ill will must be personal. So if the ill will is engendered by one's sense of justice or other legitimate or plausible motive, such feeling negatives actual malice." — This passage articulates the standard for actual malice in libel cases, distinguishing personal ill will from legitimate grievance, and was central to the Court's reversal of the conviction.

• "The anger observed by trial court to have been shown by the petitioner towards private complainant at the time the former offered his testimony in defense of libel cannot be properly considered as malice, either in fact or in law, that accompanied the dissemination of an alleged libelous publication." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the temporal requirement of malice: it must attend the act of distribution, not be inferred from later conduct.

• "Since the prosecution failed to establish express malice on the part of petitioner by positive proof, its cause perforce must fail." — This sentence crystallizes the dispositive reasoning: once the article's privileged character was established, the prosecution's failure to prove express malice by positive proof was fatal to the libel charge.

• Daez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47971, October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 61 — Cited for the enumeration of the elements of libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-45031, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 110 — Cited for the proposition that once the privileged character of an article is established, the onus of proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff, who must convince the court that the offender was prompted by malice or ill will; when accomplished, the defense of privilege becomes unavailing.

• People vs. Argawamon, 215 SCRA 652 — Cited in support of the equipoise doctrine, which requires tilting the scales in favor of the accused when prosecution and defense evidence are evenly balanced.

• Article 353, Revised Penal Code — Defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Applied to identify the elements of the crime charged against petitioner.

• Article 354, Revised Penal Code — Presumes every defamatory imputation to be malicious even if true, unless good intention and justifiable motive are shown, except in enumerated cases including paragraph 2: a fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings not of a confidential nature. Applied to classify the subject news article as a qualifiedly privileged communication, shifting the burden to the prosecution to prove express malice, which it failed to do.

• Section 1, paragraph (a), Rule 115, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (as amended) — Recognized as the procedural expression of the constitutional presumption of innocence underlying the equipoise doctrine, which the Court invoked to grant petitioner the benefit of the doubt.

Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concurred.