Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

The possessor of an animal is liable for the damage it causes under Article 2183 of the Civil Code regardless of ownership of the animal or the house where it is kept, and liability attaches even if the animal escapes or is lost and even if the animal is tame rather than vicious, provided the damage does not result from force majeure or the fault of the person who suffered it.

Purita Miranda Vestil and her husband Agustin Vestil occupied and administered a house at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City left by Purita's deceased father, Vicente Miranda, who died in 1973, the estate remaining unpartitioned among several heirs. A dog identified as "Andoy" remained in the house after Miranda's death. The private respondents, David Uy and Teresita Uy, were the parents of three-year-old Theness Tan Uy, who was playing with the Vestils' child in the Miranda house when she was bitten by the dog. Article 2183 of the Civil Code imposes liability on the possessor or user of an animal for damage it may cause, with the responsibility ceasing only where the damage results from force majeure or the fault of the person who suffered the damage.

On July 29, 1975, three-year-old Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. The child was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to vomiting of saliva. The following day, August 15, 1975, the child died, with the cause of death certified as broncho-pneumonia.

Seven months later, the Uys sued the Vestils for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed, finding the Vestils in possession of the house and the dog and therefore responsible under Article 2183, and holding that the child had died as a result of the dog bites rather than from independent causes. The appellate court awarded ₱30,000.00 for the death of Theness, ₱12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and ₱2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Purita Vestil testified that she was not in possession of Miranda's house, claiming that the occupants were relatives who maintained themselves out of a common fund or some unspecified arrangement, and that as many as ten such relatives had stayed in the house at one time or another without paying rent. Contrary evidence, however, showed that the occupants were boarders who paid the petitioners for meals and accommodations. Purita had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in the house. Her own mother, Pacita, a nursemaid, declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house. Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was a boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. Documentary evidence of Purita's application for water connection with the Cebu Water District further suggested that she was administering the house. Although she was not the owner — the house remained part of Vicente Miranda's unpartitioned estate — she was the only heir residing in Cebu City, and the house was only six kilometers from her own residence. She and her family regularly visited the house, once or twice weekly, and used it virtually as a second house. Her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the child was bitten. The dog itself had remained in the house from the time of Miranda's death in 1973 until the incident in 1975. The Vestils had also offered to assist the Uys with hospitalization expenses, although Purita said she knew them only casually.

On the issue of causation, Dr. Tautjo testified that upon the child's readmission, she exhibited hydrophobia — she was afraid of water, hiding under the bed when her father tried to give her water, with fright visible in her eyes. He further testified, with reference to a medical textbook, that broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies and that a person who has rabies may die of respiratory failure manifesting as broncho-pneumonia. The death certificate, however, stated broncho-pneumonia as the cause of death.

• Lack of Possession: Petitioner Purita Vestil argued that she was not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her deceased father, as the estate had not yet been partitioned and there were other heirs to the property, and that therefore she could not be held liable as possessor.
• No Causal Connection: Petitioners argued that there was no clear showing that Theness died as a result of the dog bite, since the death certificate declared broncho-pneumonia as the cause of death, which they submitted had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized.
• Absence of Negligence or Control: Petitioners contended that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog.
• Tameness and Provocation: Petitioners argued that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her, implying that liability should not attach.
• No Witness to the Biting: Petitioners originally maintained that there was no proof that it was the dog in the father's house that bit Theness, as no one had witnessed the incident.

• Possession and Liability: Respondents argued that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and should be responsible under Article 2183 for the injuries caused by the dog, regardless of ownership.
• Causal Connection: Respondents maintained that the child died as a result of the dog bites and not from causes independent thereof.

• Possession of the Animal: Whether the petitioners were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness within the meaning of Article 2183 of the Civil Code.
• Causal Connection: Whether the death of Theness was caused by the dog bite, notwithstanding that the death certificate certified broncho-pneumonia as the cause of death.
• Nature of the Animal and Defenses: Whether the possessor of a tame animal may be held liable under Article 2183, and whether the defenses of tameness, provocation, and lack of remote control preclude liability.

• Possession of the Animal: Yes. The petitioners were the possessors of the dog at the time of the incident, possession — not ownership — being the basis of liability under Article 2183, and the evidence showing that Purita administered the house, maintained boarders, hired a maid, applied for water connection, and regularly visited the property.
• Causal Connection: Yes. The link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death was satisfactorily established through medical testimony showing that the child developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, and that broncho-pneumonia was a complication of rabies.
• Nature of the Animal and Defenses: No, the defenses do not preclude liability. Article 2183 holds the possessor liable even if the animal escapes or is lost, and covers even tame animals as long as they cause injury; provocation was not attributable to a three-year-old child.

• Possession of the Animal: The decisive factor under Article 2183 is possession of the animal, not ownership of either the animal or the premises where it is kept. Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house was found hardly credible, given her vague description of the occupants' arrangement and her inability to elaborate on how they maintained themselves. Contrary evidence established that the occupants were boarders who paid the petitioners for meals and accommodations, that Purita hired a maid for the house, that her own mother testified to the maintenance of boarders, and that a boarder himself confirmed the business purpose of the house. Documentary evidence of her water connection application further indicated administration. Although the house remained part of the unpartitioned estate, Purita was the only heir residing in Cebu City, the house was only six kilometers from her own residence, she and her family visited regularly, and her own daughter was playing there when the incident occurred. The dog had remained in the house from Miranda's death in 1973 until the incident in 1975. These facts collectively established possession.

• Causal Connection: The Court found no need for an extended scientific discussion, relying instead on two established facts: first, that Theness developed hydrophobia — a symptom of rabies — as a result of the dog bite, as testified to by Dr. Tautjo, who recounted that the child was afraid of water, hid under the bed when offered water, and exhibited fright in her eyes; and second, that broncho-pneumonia, the certified cause of death, was a complication of rabies, as the doctor testified under oath, corroborated by a medical textbook stating that death from rabies occurs as a result of cardiac or respiratory failure. The Court reiterated its ruling in Sison vs. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. The evidence of the child's hydrophobia was sufficient to establish that she died because she was bitten by the dog, notwithstanding the death certificate's stated cause.

• Nature of the Animal and Defenses: The contention that the petitioners could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog was rejected, Article 2183 expressly holding the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and thus be removed from his control. The defense that the dog was tame was likewise unavailing, as the law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. The claim of provocation was rejected because Theness was only three years old at the time and could hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. The Court noted that these defenses constituted an implied rejection of the petitioners' original posture that there was no proof that the dog in the father's house had bitten Theness. The obligation under Article 2183, according to Manresa, is not based on negligence or presumed lack of vigilance but on natural equity and the principle of social interest — that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure, or service must answer for the damage the animal may cause.

• Possession as Basis of Liability Under Article 2183 — Liability for damage caused by an animal under Article 2183 of the Civil Code attaches to the possessor or user of the animal, not to the owner. The possessor is liable even if the animal escapes or is lost, and the liability covers even tame animals, not only vicious ones. The responsibility ceases only where the damage results from force majeure or the fault of the person who suffered the damage. The obligation is not based on negligence or presumed lack of vigilance but on natural equity and the principle of social interest.

• Death Certificate as Evidence of Cause of Death — A death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Where other evidence — such as medical testimony establishing the symptoms and complications of the underlying condition — satisfactorily establishes the true cause of death, the certified cause may be disregarded. (Following Sison vs. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada.)

• Irrelevance of Provocation by a Child of Tender Years — Provocation as a defense to liability under Article 2183 cannot be attributed to a child of tender years, in this case a three-year-old, who can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

• "The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage." — This is the text of Article 2183 of the Civil Code as quoted in the decision, the controlling provision upon which the entire liability of the petitioners was predicated.

• "The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause." — This passage, attributed to Manresa, articulates the doctrinal basis of Article 2183 liability as one of strict accountability grounded in natural equity and social interest, not in negligence or fault.

• "The death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death." — This statement, reiterating the ruling in Sison vs. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, defines the evidentiary weight of a death certificate and permits contrary proof on the actual cause of death.

• Afialda vs. Hisole, 85 Phil. 67 — Cited as an application of Article 2183, where a caretaker hired to tend a carabao was gored to death by the animal, and the complaint against the owner was dismissed because it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury, including to himself. The case illustrates the scope and limits of possessor liability under the provision.

• Sison vs. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 47 O.G. 1954 — Cited for the proposition that a death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death, allowing other evidence to establish the true cause.

• Article 2183, Civil Code of the Philippines — The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Applied as the controlling provision establishing the petitioners' liability as possessors of the dog that bit and caused the death of Theness, regardless of ownership of the animal or the house.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.