Verdad vs. Court of Appeals

A surviving spouse who succeeds to the decedent’s undivided interest in property held in common by intestate heirs becomes a co‑owner with the right to exercise legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code; the 30‑day redemption period prescribed by Article 1623 is triggered only by a written notice from the vendor, and actual knowledge of the sale, without more, does not start the running of that period.

Macaria Atega died intestate on 8 March 1956, leaving a 248‑square‑meter residential lot in Butuan City. Her surviving heirs included a son from her first marriage, Ramon A. Burdeos, and children from her second marriage, among them David Rosales. The property was held in common by all the heirs. In 1982 the heirs of Ramon Burdeos sold their undivided interest to petitioner Zosima Verdad. Private respondent Socorro C. Rosales, the widow of David Rosales, sought to redeem that interest after discovering the sale nearly five years later. Dispute centered on whether Socorro, as a mere daughter‑in‑law, could assert the right of a co‑owner, and whether her redemption was timely.

• The Common Ancestor’s Estate: Macaria Atega died intestate on 8 March 1956. She had been married twice: first to Angel Burdeos, with whom she had Ramon A. Burdeos and Felicidad A. Burdeos (the latter predeceased, survived by daughter Estela Lozada); and second to Canuto Rosales, with whom she had David, Justo, Romulo, and Aurora Rosales. Her estate included Lot 529, Ts‑65 of the Butuan Cadastre, a 248‑square‑meter residential lot. Upon her death, her surviving children became co‑owners of the lot.
• David Rosales’s Death and Socorro’s Interest: David Rosales, a son of the second marriage, survived Macaria and thus acquired an undivided interest in the lot. He later died intestate without issue. His widow, private respondent Socorro C. Rosales, inherited his entire estate by operation of law, thereby stepping into his shoes as a co‑owner of the property.
• The Sale to Petitioner: On 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos—his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon Jr.—sold their undivided interest in Lot 529 to petitioner Zosima Verdad for P55,460.00. A second, notarized deed dated 14 November 1982 reflected a consideration of only P23,000.00, which petitioner claimed was meant to reduce capital gains tax. No written notice of the sale was given to the other co‑owners.
• Discovery and Attempted Redemption: Socorro Rosales learned of the sale on 30 March 1987 while at the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City. The following day, 31 March 1987, she sought the intervention of the Lupong Tagapayapa and tendered P23,000.00 to petitioner. Petitioner refused the amount, insisting the lot’s current value was P80,000.00. No settlement was reached.
• Judicial Action: The complaint for legal redemption was filed on 16 October 1987. The trial court dismissed the case for lapse of the redemption period. The Court of Appeals reversed and declared Socorro entitled to redeem within eleven days from finality, based on the P23,000.00 deed, unless written notice was meanwhile given.

• Lack of Capacity to Redeem: Petitioner argued that Socorro Rosales, as a daughter‑in‑law, is not an intestate heir of Macaria Atega and therefore cannot exercise the right of legal redemption over property inherited from Macaria.
• Laches and Actual Knowledge: Petitioner maintained that private respondents had actual knowledge of the sale for years, making their belated redemption barred by laches. She further contended that actual knowledge should be considered equivalent to the written notice required by Article 1623, invoking Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
• Invalid Tender: Petitioner insisted that the tender of P23,000.00 was insufficient because it did not reflect the true purchase price and was not made in legal tender.
• Effect of Barangay Proceedings: Petitioner assigned as error the appellate court’s ruling that the running of the statutory redemption period is stayed upon commencement of barangay conciliation proceedings.

• Right as Successor‑Co‑owner: Respondents countered that Socorro Rosales was not claiming as an intestate heir of Macaria but as the legal heir of her husband David Rosales, who was a co‑owner of the property. By inheriting David’s undivided share, she became a co‑owner entitled to redeem under Article 1620.
• No Written Notice Given: Respondents contended that the 30‑day period under Article 1623 never began to run because the vendors did not furnish the mandatory written notice of the sale to the other co‑owners.
• Timely Exercise of Redemption: Respondents asserted that they exercised the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, one day after discovery, and that the complaint was timely filed. They distinguished Alonzo on the ground that the delay there exceeded thirteen years.
• Sufficient Tender: Respondents maintained that the P23,000.00 tender matched the price in the notarized deed of sale and was rejected not because of partial payment but because petitioner deemed the amount “unconscionable” relative to the current market value, which is not a valid ground for refusal.

• Right of Redemption of Surviving Spouse: Whether Socorro Rosales, as the widow of a deceased co‑heir, could exercise the right of legal redemption over the share sold by the Burdeos heirs.
• Commencement of the Redemption Period: Whether the 30‑day period for legal redemption under Article 1623 had commenced and expired in the absence of written notice.
• Effect of Actual Knowledge: Whether private respondents’ actual knowledge of the sale substituted for written notice, thereby starting the redemption period and potentially barring the claim through laches.
• Tender of Payment: Whether the tender of P23,000.00 constituted a valid exercise of the right of redemption.
• Barangay Proceedings and Tolling: Whether the referral to barangay conciliation had the effect of suspending the running of the redemption period.

• Right of Redemption of Surviving Spouse: Socorro Rosales was entitled to redeem. While a daughter‑in‑law is not an intestate heir of her parents‑in‑law, Socorro’s right did not spring from Macaria’s estate directly but from her husband David’s estate. David survived Macaria and became a co‑owner of the lot; upon his death without descendants or ascendants, his widow inherited his entire estate under Articles 995 and 1001 of the Civil Code. She thus stepped into the shoes of a co‑owner and could invoke Article 1620.
• Commencement of the Redemption Period: The 30‑day period never commenced. Article 1623 requires written notice by the vendor to all possible redemptioners, and no such notice was ever given by the Burdeos heirs. The redemption sought on 31 March 1987, and the complaint filed on 16 October 1987, were therefore timely.
• Effect of Actual Knowledge: Actual knowledge cannot substitute for written notice. The mandatory nature of the written notice aims to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms, and its status. The narrow exception recognized in Alonzo—where the plaintiff waited more than thirteen years—did not apply; here, the redemption was pursued immediately upon discovery. The claim of laches was accordingly rejected.
• Tender of Payment: The tender was sufficient. An amount was offered during barangay conciliation, consistent with the purchase price stated in the notarized deed. Petitioner refused the tender not because it deviated from the contract price but because she considered it unconscionable in light of the lot’s present value. Under established doctrine, such a refusal cannot defeat the redemption. The appellate court’s reliance on Sempio v. Del Rosario and Daza v. Tomacruz was sustained.
• Barangay Proceedings and Tolling: The question was effectively moot. Because the redemption period had not yet begun to run, there was no need to rule on whether barangay proceedings toll the statutory period. Timeliness was established solely by the absence of written notice.

• Co‑ownership by Succession and Legal Redemption — A surviving spouse who inherits an undivided interest in property from a deceased co‑heir becomes a co‑owner and may exercise the right of legal redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code when the shares of other co‑owners are sold to a third person.
• Mandatory Written Notice under Article 1623 — The 30‑day period for legal redemption commences only upon written notice from the vendor. Actual knowledge of the sale by a co‑owner, standing alone, does not satisfy the statutory requirement, which is intended to remove all uncertainty regarding the sale, its terms, and its validity. An exception for extreme delay (as in Alonzo) does not apply where redemption is sought immediately upon discovery.
• Sufficiency of Tender in Legal Redemption — A tender of the purchase price as stated in the deed of sale, rejected by the vendee on grounds unrelated to the conformity of the amount with the contract price, constitutes a valid exercise of the right of redemption.

• “It is true that Socorro, a daughter‑in‑law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents‑in‑law; however, Socorro’s right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria’s estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother’s inheritance.”
• “The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co‑owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co‑owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.”
• “In Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was invoked several years, not just days or months, after the consummation of the contracts of sale. The complaint for legal redemption itself was there filed more than thirteen years after the sales were concluded.”
• (Quoting the Court of Appeals with approval) “… an amount was offered, as required in Sempio vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 1 and Daza vs. Tomacruz, 58 Phil. 414, by the redemptioner‑appellant during the barangay conciliation proceedings … but was flatly rejected by the appellee, not on the ground that it was not the purchase price … nor that it was offered as partial payment thereof, but rather that it was ‘unconscionable’ based upon its ‘present value.’”

• Conejero v. Court of Appeals, 16 SCRA 775 — The established doctrine, together with Buttle, that written notice is mandatory and actual knowledge does not suffice; followed.
• Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 259 — Distinguished. The Court recognized a narrow exception where redemption was sought after more than thirteen years, a circumstance absent here; the prevailing doctrine was not abandoned.
• Rosales v. Rosales, 148 SCRA 69 — Cited for the rule that a daughter‑in‑law is not an intestate heir of her parents‑in‑law, but this did not preclude Socorro’s claim as her husband’s successor.
• Sempio v. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 1; Daza v. Tomacruz, 58 Phil. 414 — Applied on the requisites of tender in legal redemption; tender of the deed price that is rejected on extraneous grounds satisfies the requirement.

• Article 995, Civil Code — In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and of illegitimate children and their descendants, the surviving spouse inherits the entire estate, subject to the rights of brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces under Article 1001. Applied to establish that Socorro inherited David’s entire estate, including his undivided interest in the lot.
• Article 1001, Civil Code — When brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow, the widow is entitled to one‑half of the inheritance. Together with Article 995, it confirmed Socorro’s status as an heir of David Rosales.
• Article 1619, Civil Code — Defines legal redemption as the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions, in place of one who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment. The provision framed the nature of the right exercised.
• Article 1620, Civil Code — A co‑owner may exercise the right of redemption when the shares of all other co‑owners, or any of them, are sold to a third person. The statutory basis for Socorro’s right to redeem.
• Article 1623, Civil Code — The right of legal redemption shall be exercised within thirty days from written notice by the vendor; the deed of sale shall not be recorded without an affidavit that such notice has been given to all possible redemptioners. Applied to hold that the period had not commenced because no written notice was given.

Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.