Veran vs. Court of Appeals

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust arising from fraud in securing title may be brought within ten years from issuance of the title; the one-year period from issuance of the Original Certificate of Title does not bar it. The SC also affirmed that the CA did not commit reversible error in admitting Apolonia Glodoveza’s deposition and in relying on the 1921 letter and subdivision survey plan.

Petitioners are the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza, while private respondent Primitiva Villareal is a cousin and the daughter of Leocadia Glodoveza. The Glodoveza sisters—Leocadia, Aleja, and Ladislawa—were children of Cornelio Glodoveza and Filomena Padilla, and the dispute involves Lot No. 1744 in Atimonan, Quezon.

Petitioners, the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza, brought an action to recover possession of a parcel of land in Atimonan, Quezon registered in the name of Aleja Glodoveza, their mother and grandmother, against Primitiva Villareal, who died during the pendency of the action and was substituted accordingly. The complaint alleged that petitioners merely allowed Villareal, a cousin, to erect her house on a portion of the land in dispute, which they inherited from Aleja Glodoveza, who in turn received it as her share from her mother’s estate. Villareal refused to vacate when repeatedly demanded, claiming co-ownership by inheritance from their common ancestor, the mother of Aleja Glodoveza.

In her amended answer, Villareal alleged that the land was originally owned pro-indiviso and in common by Leocadia Glodoveza, her mother; Aleja Glodoveza, petitioners’ predecessor; and Ladislawa Glodoveza, all children of Cornelio Glodoveza and Filomena Padilla. According to Villareal, after the death of Cornelio and Filomena, their children orally partitioned the land, by virtue of which the portion occupied by Villareal was given and received by her from her predecessor, while the other portion went to petitioners and other co-heirs. She further alleged that in the oral extrajudicial partition, Lot No. 1744 was adjudicated to the three children for the special purpose of enabling each to own roadside land suited for residential use; that Aleja received a portion of Lot No. 1744 consisting of residential and rice land and a part of Lot No. 1832, while Leocadia received only two parcels; and that the registration in petitioners’ favor was secured through fraud, deceit, representation, and illegal means, for which she and the heirs of Ladislawa filed a protest with the Director of Lands after learning of the free patent, supported by two affidavits.

Because of the pending administrative case, the trial of the case was suspended indefinitely on petition of both parties. After petitioners changed counsel, their new counsel moved to set the case for trial after almost four years from December 5, 1955, when the complaint was filed; the motion was granted, but because the defendants failed to appear on the date set for hearing, petitioners were allowed to present their evidence ex parte, and a decision was rendered on December 15, 1959 in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the decision was set aside to allow the defendant to present her evidence after filing an amended answer, on the advice of the trial court itself, so as to include a prayer for reconveyance of the disputed portion of Lot No. 1744, which had already been registered in the name of Aleja Glodoveza, petitioners’ predecessor.

Villareal offered as part of her evidence the deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza, but the trial court denied admission on the ground that no proof was submitted to show that the witness was so old and infirm as not to be able to come to court to testify, as petitioners contended in their opposition to the deposition-taking. The deposition had been taken on January 21, 1961, after the answer had been filed and served; notice of the deposition-taking was received by petitioners well before the intended date, and although petitioners filed an opposition, it was not acted upon by the trial court before the taking. Before the deposition was formally offered, respondent had already testified that Apolonia Glodoveza was very old, more or less ninety years.

The CA found no irregularity in the execution of the deposition; the reason for taking it was disclosed in the notice and in the deposition itself, petitioners’ counsel was notified sufficiently in advance, and the opposition was not acted upon favorably before the date set for taking, so failure to appear was at petitioners’ own risk. With the admission of the deposition, the CA found the significant fact that the assignment of the lot in question was to the three sisters, not to Aleja alone, and that the segregation or apportionment among the sisters was made by their eldest sister, Ruperta Glodoveza, in 1905, a conclusion buttressed by the testimony of Enrique Glodoveza and documentary evidence. The CA also found that the February 25, 1921 letter of Francisco Veran to private respondent, seeking a P1.00 yearly contribution for taxes, showed that as early as that date private respondent was already in possession of the disputed portion of Lot No. 1744, and gave credence to Enrique Glodoveza’s testimony that private respondent had occupied the lot since 1910, not only since 1950. The subdivision survey plan, Exhibit 4, divided the disputed lot into three portions assigned to Leocadia, Aleja, and Ladislawa, corroborating the testimony on the lot’s apportionment among the three sisters. The Bureau of Lands decision was still pending appeal before the Department of Agriculture at the time the trial court decision was rendered and was never offered in evidence, but was merely attached to petitioners’ urgent ex parte petition to render judgment.

• Deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in finding the trial court’s rejection of Apolonia Glodoveza’s deposition erroneous, because the trial court’s conclusion was in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.
• Probative Value of the Deposition: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in giving undue appreciation to matters in the irregularly accepted deposition when those matters, standing alone, were hardly adequate to belie the contrary evidence presented by petitioners.
• February 25, 1921 Letter: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in concluding that the February 25, 1921 letter of Federico Veran, husband of petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, addressed to private respondent and seeking a P1.00 yearly contribution for taxes, could give rise to a presumption that private respondent had been in possession of the disputed portion since 1921.
• Subdivision Survey Plan (Exhibit 4): Petitioners argued that the CA erred in attaching misplaced significance to Exhibit 4, the subdivision survey plan, because whatever probative value it had was rendered practically useless since it was prepared almost one year after Aleja Glodoveza obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-1589, which laid to rest any doubt as to ownership of the disputed portion.
• Bureau of Lands Proceedings: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in concluding that no evidentiary worth could be attached to what transpired in the administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Lands, when those proceedings were precisely designed to lay at rest the conflicting claims over the property.
• Reversal of the Trial Court: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.

• Deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza: Respondent pointed out that before the deposition was formally offered, respondent had already testified as to the age of the deponent, who was very old, more or less ninety years.
• February 25, 1921 Letter: Respondent claimed that the letter referred to the disputed lot, a view sustained by the CA.

• Admissibility and Probative Value of the Deposition: Whether the CA erred in admitting the deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza despite the trial court’s rejection and petitioners’ claim of denial of cross-examination, and in giving it probative value.
• February 25, 1921 Letter: Whether the CA erred in concluding that the February 25, 1921 letter of Francisco Veran seeking a P1.00 yearly contribution for taxes gave rise to a presumption that private respondent had been in possession of the disputed portion since 1921.
• Reconveyance/Prescription: Whether the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title in favor of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza barred private respondent’s action for reconveyance.
• Subdivision Survey Plan: Whether the CA erred in giving significance to Exhibit 4, the subdivision survey plan, when it was prepared almost one year after Aleja Glodoveza obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-1589.
• Administrative Proceedings: Whether the CA erred in concluding that no evidentiary worth could be attached to the administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Lands.
• Reversible Error: Whether the CA committed reversible error in reversing the trial court’s decision.

• Admissibility and Probative Value of the Deposition: No. The CA did not commit reversible error in admitting the deposition; no leave was needed after answer served, notice was sufficient, and the claim of denial of cross-examination was unfounded. Its admission also brought in the significant fact that the lot was assigned to the three sisters, not Aleja alone.
• February 25, 1921 Letter: No. The SC respected the CA’s factual finding that Exhibit 2 referred to the disputed lot and supported private respondent’s possession since 1921, the facts not being clear enough to disturb it.
• Reconveyance/Prescription: No. The one-year period from issuance of the OCT did not bar reconveyance; the counterclaim filed on March 4, 1961 was within the ten-year prescriptive period for an action based on an implied or constructive trust resulting from fraud in securing title.
• Subdivision Survey Plan: No. The plan’s preparation a year after the title did not render the CA’s reliance misplaced; it merely corroborated testimony that the disputed lot was apportioned among Leocadia, Aleja, and Ladislawa.
• Administrative Proceedings: No. The Bureau of Lands decision had no evidentiary worth because it was still pending appeal before the Department of Agriculture when the trial court decision was rendered and was never formally offered in evidence.
• Reversible Error: No. The CA committed no reversible error in reversing the trial court; the SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

• Admissibility and Probative Value of the Deposition: The deposition was taken on January 21, 1961, when the old Rules of Court governed. Under Section 1 of Rule 18, after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories without leave of court; notice is sufficient. Because the deposition was taken long after the answer had been filed and served, no approval of the trial court for the taking was needed. Leave to take a deposition is distinct from approval of its use; under Section 4 of Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court exercises discretion when the deposition is formally offered, and may allow use if the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment. The trial court denied the deposition on the ground that petitioners were denied cross-examination, but the CA found no irregularity: the reason for taking was disclosed in the notice and the deposition, petitioners’ counsel was notified sufficiently in advance, and the opposition was not acted upon before the taking, so failure to appear was at petitioners’ own risk. The SC agreed, especially since before the deposition was formally offered, respondent had already testified that Apolonia Glodoveza was very old, more or less ninety years, which the trial court overlooked. With the deposition admitted, the CA could consider the significant fact that the lot was assigned to the three sisters, not Aleja alone, and that Ruperta Glodoveza made the segregation in 1905, supported by Enrique Glodoveza’s testimony and documentary evidence. Thus no reversible error.

• February 25, 1921 Letter: Exhibit 2 is the February 25, 1921 letter of Francisco Veran to private respondent seeking a P1.00 yearly contribution for taxes. The letter does not specify which parcel of land is referred to. Private respondent claimed it referred to the disputed lot, and the CA sustained that view. Petitioners contended it referred to a different lot owned by Francisco Veran. The SC found the facts relative to this matter not quite clear and was inclined to respect the CA’s findings. The CA found that Exhibit 2 showed that as early as February 25, 1921, private respondent was already in possession of the disputed portion of Lot No. 1744, because Francisco Veran was asking Mr. and Mrs. Celso Villacruel (nee Primitiva Villareal) for a P1.00 contribution for payment of the yearly tax on the property in question. This gave credence to Enrique Glodoveza’s testimony that private respondent had occupied the lot since 1910, not only since 1950. No reversible error.

• Reconveyance/Prescription: The expiration of the one-year period from issuance of the Original Certificate of Title covering the disputed lot in favor of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza did not bar private respondent’s action for reconveyance. Private respondent’s counterclaim for reconveyance was made in her amended answer filed on March 4, 1961, some seven and a half years after the issuance of the title in the name of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza on December 3, 1953, but well within the ten-year prescriptive period for bringing an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust resulting from fraud in securing title. The SC cited Diaz vs. Gorricho, J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, and Alzona vs. Capunitan, and quoted Gonzales vs. Jimenez: where land is obtained through fraudulent representations by means of which a patent and title are issued in the defendants’ name, they are deemed to hold it in trust for the benefit of the person prejudiced, and the action to recover the property prescribes after ten years. Since the period had not elapsed, the action was timely.

• Subdivision Survey Plan: The CA did not err in appreciating the significance of the subdivision survey plan, Exhibit 4. The fact that it was prepared a year after the title was issued in the name of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza did not per se render the CA’s reliance upon it misplaced. The division of the disputed lot in the subdivision survey plan into three portions assigned to Leocadia, Aleja, and Ladislawa respectively merely served to corroborate testimony as to the lot’s apportionment among the three sisters.

• Administrative Proceedings: The CA did not err in concluding that no evidentiary worth could be attached to what transpired in the administrative case before the Bureau of Lands. The decision rendered by the Bureau of Lands was still pending appeal before the Department of Agriculture at the time the trial court decision was rendered. Further, the Bureau of Lands decision was never offered in evidence; it was merely attached to petitioners’ “Urgent Ex-parte Petition to Render the Much Awaited and Long Overdue Judgment.” Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Thus the decision could not be considered.

• Reversible Error: The SC concluded that no reversible error was committed by the CA when it reversed the decision of the lower court. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

• Deposition Pending Action; Leave to Take vs. Approval for Use — After an answer has been served, a deposition may be taken without leave of court; notice is sufficient. Leave to take a deposition is distinct from the court’s approval of its use, which is exercised when the deposition is formally offered. The SC applied this in holding that the deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza, taken after the answer had been filed and served, needed no prior court approval, and the trial court’s later denial based on alleged denial of cross-examination was not reversible because petitioners were notified and could have appeared.
• Use of Deposition of a Witness Unable to Attend Due to Age, Sickness, Infirmity, or Imprisonment — Under Section 4(c)(3), Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court, a deposition may be used if the court finds that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment. The SC upheld the CA’s admission of the deposition because the deponent was very old, more or less ninety years, and the trial court had overlooked the testimony on her age.
• Implied or Constructive Trust from Fraud in Securing Title; Ten-Year Prescriptive Period for Reconveyance — Where land is obtained through fraudulent representations by means of which a patent and title are issued in the defendants’ name, the defendants are deemed to hold the land in trust for the benefit of the person prejudiced; the action to recover the property prescribes after ten years. The SC applied this rule because private respondent’s counterclaim for reconveyance was filed on March 4, 1961, within ten years from the issuance of the title on December 3, 1953, so the one-year period from issuance of the OCT did not bar it.
• Formal Offer of Evidence — Under Section 35, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The SC applied this in disregarding the Bureau of Lands decision, which was never offered in evidence but merely attached to an urgent ex parte petition.
• Respect for the CA’s Factual Findings — Where the facts are not quite clear, the SC is inclined to respect the factual findings of the CA. The SC applied this to the February 25, 1921 letter, sustaining the CA’s finding that it referred to the disputed lot and supported private respondent’s possession since 1921.

• “Considering that the deposition was taken long after the answer had been filed and served, there was therefore no need to seek the approval of the trial court for the taking of the deposition, notice of such taking being sufficient.” — Distinguishes leave to take a deposition from the court’s approval of its use and supports the CA’s admission of Apolonia Glodoveza’s deposition.
• “Since it appears that the land in question was obtained by defendants thru fraudulent representations by means of which a patent and a title were issued in their name, they are deemed to hold it in trust for the benefit of the person prejudiced by it. Here this person is the plaintiff. There being an implied trust in this transaction, the action to recover the property prescribes after the lapse of ten years. Here this period has not yet elapsed.” — States the implied-trust rule and the ten-year prescriptive period for reconveyance.
• “Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court is quite clear that ‘the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.’” — Explains why the Bureau of Lands decision, never formally offered, could not be considered.
• “The division in the subdivision survey plan of the disputed lot into three portions assigned to Leocadia, Aleja and Ladislawa respectively, merely served to corroborate testimony as to the lot’s apportionment among the three sisters.” — Defines the limited corroborative value of Exhibit 4.

• Diaz vs. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261 [1958] — Cited as authority for the ten-year prescriptive period for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust resulting from fraud in securing title.
• J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, G.R. No. L-15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84 — Cited for the same ten-year prescriptive period for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust.
• Alzona vs. Capunitan, G.R. No. L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450 — Cited for the same ten-year prescriptive period for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust.
• Gonzales vs. Jimenez, G.R. No. L-19073, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80 — Quoted and applied: land obtained through fraudulent representations by means of which a patent and title are issued in the defendants’ name is held in trust for the prejudiced person, and the action to recover prescribes after ten years.

• Section 1, Rule 18, old Rules of Court — A deposition pending action may be taken by leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property, or without leave after an answer has been served; the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. Applied because the deposition was taken after the answer had been filed and served, so no prior court approval was needed.
• Section 4(c)(3), Rule 24, Revised Rules of Court — The deposition of a witness may be used if the court finds that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment. Applied because the deponent was very old, more or less ninety years, and the CA admitted the deposition.
• Section 35, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Applied because the Bureau of Lands decision was never formally offered in evidence and was merely attached to an urgent ex parte petition.