Vencilao vs. Vano

A final judgment in a land registration proceeding is res judicata and bars a subsequent action for reconveyance concerning the same land where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action, including as parties persons notified of the registration and their successors-in-interest. A writ of possession may issue not only against defeated oppositors but against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land during registration proceedings up to the final decree; contempt for refusal to vacate lies only after dispossession and re-entry or disturbance, because the sheriff has the exclusive duty to execute delivery; and a writ of demolition is a complement of the writ of possession.

Leopoldo Vencilao, Mauro Renoblas, and the other plaintiffs-appellants/petitioners were occupants or claimants of parcels of land in Bohol that the heirs of the late Juan Reyes sought to register. In Land Registration Case No. 76, LRC Record No. N-4251, the heirs of Juan Reyes filed an application over parcels they claimed to have inherited; after hearing, the land was registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400. Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3561 was issued to Pedro R. Luspo and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562 to several persons, including Mariano Ogilve. Some of the occupants had been notified of the registration proceedings or had opposed them; others claimed as heirs or successors-in-interest of those notified persons or oppositors.

The cases stemmed from the registration of parcels in Bohol claimed by the heirs of the late Juan Reyes. On April 1, 1950, those heirs filed an application for registration in Land Registration Case No. 76, LRC Record No. N-4251, and administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo filed an amended application on July 26, 1951. After hearing, the land was registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400. The occupants in the present consolidated cases—plaintiffs-appellants in the reconveyance suit and petitioners in the later proceedings—claimed distinct parcels within the registered land by purchase or inheritance and alleged public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse possession of more than thirty years, tacked with the possession of their predecessors-in-interest.

According to the occupants, those parcels were included in the Reyes registration either by mistake or fraud, with the intention of depriving them of ownership and possession without their knowledge; they allegedly learned of the adverse claim only in the latter part of 1960, when respondents or their agents attempted to enter the parcels claiming that the land belonged to the heirs of Juan Reyes. On October 9, 1962, they filed Civil Case No. 1533 in the Court of First Instance of Bohol for reconveyance of real properties with damages and preliminary injunction. The defendants-appellees sought dismissal on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment.

The registration record identified several occupants or their predecessors as notified parties or oppositors. The surveyor’s certificate, Exhibit B, listed adjoining owners and claimants notified when the land was surveyed, and the notice of initial hearing, Exhibit J, likewise named numerous claimants, including Alejandro Renoblas and others. Among the formal oppositors were Daniel Itaoc, Marcos Haganas, Mauricio Matela, Enerio Amosora, and Andres Reambonancia. Fausto Cabaisan was notified by the surveyor and by the notice of initial hearing. Alejandro Renoblas was notified of the initial hearing and by the surveyor, although he was not an oppositor. The trial court traced the dismissed claimants’ interests: Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio Renoblas were children of Alejandro Renoblas, and Telesforo Balanda was his son-in-law; Gregorio, Teresita, Faustino, and Fortunato Itaoc were children of oppositor Daniel Itaoc; Roberto, Felisa, Fermin, and Victoriano Haganas were children of oppositor Marcos Haganas; Julia Sevilla and her children Ramon, Marcela, Delfin, and Roberta Matela claimed through the land declared in the name of Mauricio Matela; Procopia Cabanas was the wife of oppositor Andres Reambonancia; and Vicente Amosora was the son of oppositors Enerio Amosora and Florencia Gahil. Tax Declaration No. R-4452 was in Marcos Haganas’s name, the land under Tax Declaration No. R-8456 had been bought by the spouses Marcos Haganas and Tomasa Sevilla from Gertrudis Sevilla, an oppositor, Tax Declaration No. R-8121 was in Andres Reambonancia’s name, Tax Declaration No. R-6107 was in Enerio Amosora’s name, and the Matela claim corresponded to land under Tax Declaration No. 5099.

After the registration titles passed to successors, writs of possession were issued against the occupants on November 6, 1959, January 6, 1961, and July 2, 1966. The occupants resisted; a deputy sheriff’s official report dated January 21, 1960, a certification dated July 22, 1966, and a sheriff’s return dated October 25, 1966 reflected their refusal to vacate or sign the sheriff’s return. On March 29, 1967, Mariano Ogilve, one of the registered owners under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562, filed a petition for contempt against the petitioners for refusing to vacate the land they occupied and refusing to sign the sheriff’s return. The petitioners maintained that their names did not appear in the amended application for registration, that they had occupied the parcels for more than thirty years beginning before the application, and that they continued in possession after the registration hearing.

On March 22, 1971, Ogilve filed a motion for a writ of demolition against those who had been adjudged guilty of contempt. Petitioners sought reconsideration, and on June 2, 1971, the trial court ordered Deputy Provincial Sheriff Pedro Aparece to take Philippine Constabulary soldiers and carpenters with him to effect the demolition at the expense of the Luspo. The petitioners challenged the demolition orders while their earlier petition—G.R. No. L-32065—was pending.

• Res Judicata/Lack of Notice: Plaintiffs-appellants argued that no evidence was presented by defendants-appellees that they were notified of the trial date in the registration case or given copies of the decision, and contended that res judicata is not applicable in an action for reconveyance.
• Default: Plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were not dismissed argued that defendants-appellees should be declared in default for failing to file their answer within the time prescribed by law.
• No Separate Possession Action: Petitioners contended that the respondent judge erred in issuing a writ of possession without any complaint for forcible entry and detainer or for recovery of ownership and possession of the parcels.
• Not Parties/Defeated Oppositors: Petitioners argued that the writ of possession was improperly issued against them because they were not parties to the registration proceeding and were not defeated oppositors in the application for registration.
• Demolition Pending Certiorari: Petitioners alleged that the respondent judge could not issue a writ of demolition pending resolution of G.R. No. L-32065.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners asserted that the demolition orders excluded them from the use and enjoyment of their right and that the judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

• Dismissal for Prior Judgment: Defendants-appellees moved to dismiss the reconveyance complaint on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment.
• Broader Dismissal: In opposing the motion for reconsideration of the non-dismissed plaintiffs, defendants-appellees prayed that the complaint as to the remaining plaintiffs-appellants likewise be dismissed.
• Contempt for Refusal to Vacate: Mariano Ogilve claimed that petitioners refused to vacate the land occupied by them and refused to sign the sheriff’s return, warranting a contempt charge.
• Demolition: Mariano Ogilve sought a writ of demolition against those who had been adjudged guilty of contempt.

• Res Judicata: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the cases of certain plaintiffs-appellants on the ground that their causes of action were barred by the prior judgment in the land registration case.
• Default: Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to declare defendants-appellees in default for failing to file their answer within the time prescribed by law.
• Validity of Writs of Possession: Whether the respondent judge erred in issuing writs of possession without a complaint for forcible entry and detainer or recovery of ownership and possession, and against persons who were not parties or defeated oppositors in the registration proceeding.
• Contempt: Whether the trial court erred in finding petitioners guilty of contempt and ordering execution of that contempt resolution.
• Demolition: Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the demolition orders pending resolution of G.R. No. L-32065.

• Res Judicata: No. The dismissal of certain plaintiffs-appellants’ cases on res judicata was proper, as a final land registration judgment bars a later reconveyance action over the same land.
• Default: Not cognizable on appeal. The order denying the motion to declare defendants-appellees in default was interlocutory and therefore not appealable.
• Validity of Writs of Possession: No. The writs of possession were properly issued even without a separate action and even against persons who were not defeated oppositors, as long as they were unlawfully and adversely occupying the land during the registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.
• Contempt: Yes. The trial court erred in finding contempt because the sheriff had the exclusive duty to deliver possession; the occupants’ refusal did not constitute contempt absent post-dispossession re-entry or disturbance.
• Demolition: No. The writ of demolition was validly issued and was not barred by G.R. No. L-32065, it being a complement of the writ of possession.

• Res Judicata: The final registration judgment in LRC Case No. 76 was rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, was a judgment on the merits, and became final after termination in the Court of Appeals in December 1958. The subject parcels and the cause of action—ownership—were the same in the registration and reconveyance cases, although the forms of action differed. Identity of parties includes not only the same parties but also their successors-in-interest and heirs. The record showed that the dismissed plaintiffs were either notified of the survey or initial hearing, or were children, spouses, or successors of registered oppositors or notified persons; their claimed parcels were declared in the names of those predecessors. Res judicata applies to land registration and cadastral proceedings, and a party cannot defeat it by varying the form of action. The belated absence-of-notice claim was a new issue not raised below and could not be entertained on appeal except as to jurisdiction.

• Default: The order denying the motion to declare defendants-appellees in default was interlocutory and not final; thus, it was not appealable. The Supreme Court had earlier dismissed that aspect of the appeal on August 12, 1966.

• Validity of Writs of Possession: A judgment confirming title and ordering registration necessarily carries with it delivery of possession, an inherent element of ownership. A writ of possession may issue not only against a person defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. The petitioners’ claim of possession for more than thirty years beginning before the filing of the application and continuing after the registration hearing was a virtual admission of lack of defense, so the writs were properly issued.

• Contempt: Under Section 8(d) of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the writ for delivery of real property directs the sheriff to deliver possession to the party entitled thereto. The sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party, and the petitioners had nothing to do with that delivery. Their refusal to effectuate the writ was officious and impertinent and could not prevent delivery if the sheriff performed his duty; the sheriff could have availed himself of public force. Contempt lies only if, after dispossession or ejectment, the losing party re-enters, attempts to execute acts of ownership or possession, or disturbs the possession of the person adjudged entitled thereto. Since no such post-dispossession conduct was shown and the failure to execute was attributed to the sheriff’s fault, the contempt order could not be sustained, and the May 14, 1970 execution order was set aside.

• Demolition: G.R. No. L-32065 did not bar the demolition order because its subject matter was the May 14, 1970 order directing execution of the contempt resolution, not the writs of possession themselves. A writ of demolition is a complement of the writ of possession; without it, the writ of possession would be ineffective. Its issuance was reasonably necessary to do justice to the party deprived of possession by the occupants’ continued refusal to remove their houses. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion was shown.

• Res Judicata — A final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and their successors-in-interest litigating the same thing and issue. The requisites are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the first and second actions. The doctrine applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration and cadastral proceedings, and from this case it bars a later reconveyance action over the same land by notified persons and their successors.

• Identity of Parties in Res Judicata — Identity of parties means the parties in the second case must be the same parties in the first case, their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the first action, or their heirs. Here, plaintiffs who were notified of the registration proceedings, even if not formal oppositors, and the children, spouses, or successors of oppositors or notified persons were bound by the final registration judgment.

• Writ of Possession in Land Registration — A judgment confirming title and ordering registration necessarily carries with it delivery of possession. A writ of possession may issue not only against a person defeated in the registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land during the registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. No separate action for forcible entry and detainer or recovery of possession is required.

• Contempt in Execution for Delivery of Real Property — Under Section 8(d) of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff has the exclusive duty to execute a judgment for delivery of possession of real property. A losing party’s refusal to vacate does not by itself constitute contempt because the sheriff can use public force; contempt lies only after dispossession or ejectment, if the losing party re-enters, attempts to exercise acts of ownership or possession, or disturbs the prevailing party’s possession.

• Writ of Demolition as Complement of Writ of Possession — If a writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies delivery of possession to the successful litigant, a writ of demolition must likewise issue, being a complement of the former without which the writ of possession would be ineffective. A pending certiorari petition assailing a contempt execution order, not the writs of possession themselves, is not a bar to demolition.

• "In order, therefore, that there may be res judicata, the following requisites must be present: (a) The former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692, Nov. 26,1986, 146 SCRA 24)." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of the elements of res judicata applied to affirm the dismissal of the reconveyance claims.

• "A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree (Demorar vs. Ibañez, et al., 97 Phil 72 [1955])." — This defines the reach of a writ of possession in registration proceedings and supports the validity of the writs issued against the petitioners.

• "If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing party enters or attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the person adjudged to be entitled thereto, then and only then may the loser be charged with and punished for contempt (Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et. al., 85 Phil. 459)." — This states the limited circumstances under which contempt may lie in execution of judgments for delivery of real property.

• "[I]f the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein (Demorar vs. Ibanez, 97 Phil. 72; Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil. 391; Manlapas vs. Llorente 48 Phil. 298), a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective." — This is the controlling ratio for affirming the demolition order.

• Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532 — Applied for the rule that, except questions of jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it was raised in the court below and is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings.
• Republic vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 65 — Cited as controlling authority that res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration and cadastral proceedings.
• Paz vs. Inandan, 75 Phil. 608 — Followed for the rule that a final judgment in land registration proceedings may constitute res judicata.
• Penaloza vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303 — Followed for the same res judicata principle in registration proceedings.
• San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281 — Cited for the elements of res judicata.
• Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692, November 26, 1986, 146 SCRA 24 — Cited for the same elements of res judicata.
• Demorar vs. Ibañez, 97 Phil. 72 (1955) — Followed for the rule that a writ of possession may issue against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land during registration proceedings up to final decree.
• Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, 85 Phil. 459 — Followed for the rule that contempt after a judgment for delivery of real property lies only after dispossession and re-entry or disturbance.
• Meralco vs. Mencias, 107 Phil. 1071 — Followed for the rule that a writ of demolition is a complement of a writ of possession in land registration proceedings.
• United States vs. Ramayrat, 22 Phil. 183 — Cited for the sheriff’s authority to avail himself of public force in executing a judgment.

• Section 3-b, Rule 71, Rules of Court — The provision under which the trial court found the 22 respondents guilty of contempt and imposed a fine of one hundred pesos each. The Supreme Court ruled that contempt was not available on the record because the occupants’ refusal to vacate did not constitute contempt before dispossession.

• Section 8(d), Rule 19, Rules of Court — Governs execution of a judgment for delivery of possession of real property. It directs the sheriff to deliver possession and places the duty of dispossessing the losing party exclusively on the sheriff; it also limits contempt to subsequent re-entry or disturbance after dispossession. This provision was the basis for setting aside the contempt execution order.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.