Veloso vs. Court of Appeals

A final judgment that has fully adjudicated the rights of the parties over a subject matter bars subsequent relitigation of the same issues under the doctrines of res judicata and the law of the case, regardless of the form the subsequent action takes or the procedural vehicle employed. Petitioners cannot use a petition for annulment of judgment to seek a second review of matters already resolved with finality.

The parties are members of two related families — the Velosos and the Miraflors (Peñalosas) — disputing ownership and possession of portions of Lot No. 8422 in Baybay, Leyte. The lot originally belonged to Filomena Bermoy, great grandmother of the respondents, and passed through several transfers and partitions among descendants. A key sub-lot, Lot No. 8422-F, was covered by TCT No. 22393 in the name of Crispina Peñalosa Miraflor, deceased mother of the respondents. Petitioners are the children of Nicolas Veloso Sr. and Emerenciana Peñalosa, who claimed to have purchased Crispina's share in 1948. The property had been the subject of multiple prior lawsuits — Civil Case No. R-205 and Civil Case No. B-122 — whose decisions petitioners asserted had already settled ownership in their favor.

On September 12, 1988, respondents Corsini Miraflor Avellana, Aureo Peñalosa Miraflor, Eddie Peñalosa Miraflor, and Douglas Peñalosa Miraflor filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages against Nicolas Veloso Sr. and the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, Branch 14, docketed as Civil Case No. B-1043. The subject of the complaint was Lot No. 8422-F, covered by TCT No. 22393 in the name of Crispina Peñalosa Miraflor, the deceased mother of the respondents. Petitioners, for their part, anchored their claim to the property on two earlier decisions: the January 9, 1951 decision in Civil Case No. R-205, which had become final and executory for lack of appeal, and the July 29, 1969 decision in Civil Case No. B-122, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on November 11, 1974 and executed on July 9, 1975. They alleged that those decisions upheld their possession and ownership — and that of their parents Nicolas Veloso Sr. and Emerenciana Peñalosa — over a 3/5 portion of Lot No. 8422, including the 1/5 portion representing the share of Crispina Peñalosa Miraflor, which she had allegedly transferred to her parents by virtue of a deed of sale executed on May 4, 1948.

In Civil Case No. R-205, the administrator of the estate of Filomena Bermoy sought recovery of Lot No. 8422 from the children of spouses Pedro de Veyra and Leopolda Valenzona. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that Lot No. 8422 no longer formed part of Bermoy's estate, as she had sold the land to Gonzalo Varron, who in turn disposed of it to the de Veyra spouses, resulting in the issuance of OCT No. 1652 on March 2, 1936. The lot was later partitioned among their children in Civil Case No. R-5, where Emerenciana P. Veloso, Lourdes P. Bibas, Proculo Peñalosa, and Crispina P. Miraflor were declared absolute owners. The trial court observed that on May 4, 1948, Crispina P. Miraflor disposed of her share and interest in favor of her sister Emerenciana P. Veloso and the latter's husband, Nicolas Veloso Sr. In Civil Case No. B-122, the Veloso spouses filed a complaint for reconveyance of a portion of Lot No. 8422 against Proculo Peñalosa and Lourdes P. Bibas; judgment was rendered against Proculo Peñalosa, with the court again observing in passing that Crispina's share had been purchased by the Veloso spouses in 1948.

On August 31, 1990, the trial court in Civil Case No. B-1043 rendered judgment finding TCT No. T-22393 authentic, valid, and indefeasible; declaring respondents absolute co-owners of Lot No. 8422-F; directing petitioners to deliver physical possession of the lot and improvements; and ordering petitioners to pay solidary attorney's fees of ₱5,000.00 and reimbursement of ₱2,000.00 for litigation expenses. The trial court found, upon the totality of evidence, that what Crispina sold in May 1948 was not her share in Lot No. 8422 but rather her share in the estates of her mother Leopolda Valenzona and her aunt Filomena Bermoy located in Barrio Caridad, Baybay, Leyte. The court noted that the deed of sale did not specifically state that she was alienating her ideal share in Lot No. 8422; that the subdivision survey creating sub-lot 8422-F was performed as a matter of right by a co-owner; that no protest was raised against the survey; that Crispina was not impleaded in Civil Case No. B-122; and that evidence showed the Veloso spouses rendered shares of the produce of Crispina's share to her before her death in 1975. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on May 28, 1992, and the Supreme Court denied the petition for review on October 12, 1992, finding the issues essentially factual and no reversible error. Entry of judgment was issued on March 15, 1993.

Undeterred, petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on September 20, 1993, contending that the trial court had no jurisdiction to amend, alter, or modify the final and executed decisions in Civil Case Nos. R-205 and B-122. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on July 29, 1994, finding that the controversy had already been settled by the Supreme Court and that the jurisdictional objection should have been raised in the previous proceedings. Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via the present petition for review on certiorari.

• Res Judicata: Petitioners argued that the final and executory decisions in Civil Case No. R-205 (rendered January 9, 1951) and Civil Case No. B-122 (rendered July 29, 1969, affirmed November 11, 1974, executed July 9, 1975) had already upheld their possession and ownership over the 3/5 portion of Lot No. 8422, including the 1/5 share of Crispina Peñalosa Miraflor, which she transferred to their parents by deed of sale on May 4, 1948. Those decisions, they claimed, constituted res judicata barring Civil Case No. B-1043.
• Law of the Case: Petitioners maintained that the rulings in the two prior cases established the law of the case, such that the trial court in Civil Case No. B-1043 was bound by them and had absolutely no jurisdiction to amend, alter, or modify those final and executed decisions.
• Lack of Jurisdiction of Co-Equal Court: Petitioners asserted that the trial court had no power or authority to countermand the decisions of a co-equal court — specifically the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branches III and VIII — which had rendered the prior judgments.

• Res Judicata and Law of the Case: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to declare the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. B-1043 void for having been rendered in violation of the doctrines of res judicata and the law of the case.

• Res Judicata and Law of the Case: No. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. The holding in Civil Case No. B-1043 — which had already been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and had become final — itself constitutes res judicata and the law of the case, barring the present annulment petition.

• Res Judicata and Law of the Case: Petitioners invoked the decisions in Civil Case Nos. R-205 and B-122 as res judicata and the law of the case, claiming those decisions had already settled their ownership over Crispina's share of Lot No. 8422. However, in Civil Case No. R-205, the trial court merely observed in passing that Crispina had disposed of her share to the Veloso spouses in 1948; the case itself concerned whether Lot No. 8422 formed part of the estate of Filomena Bermoy, and the complaint was dismissed on the ground that it did not. In Civil Case No. B-122, the Veloso spouses sought reconveyance against Proculo Peñalosa and Lourdes P. Bibas; Crispina was not even impleaded, and the judgment was rendered only against Proculo. The trial court's observations about the 1948 sale were dicta, not binding adjudications of Crispina's rights. When the issue of what Crispina actually sold in 1948 was squarely raised and fully litigated in Civil Case No. B-1043, the trial court found — upon the totality of evidence — that the deed of sale did not refer to her share in Lot No. 8422 but to her shares in the estates of her mother and aunt. That finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, and became final. Petitioners' attempt to relitigate the same matter through an annulment petition was thus an impermissible second cycle of review. The material facts and questions that were in issue and judicially determined in the prior action are conclusively settled and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take, the form of proceeding, or whether the second action is upon the same or a different cause of action. By the same token, whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle continues to be the law of the case between the same parties so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts before the court.

• Res Judicata — Material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were there admitted or judicially determined are conclusively settled by the judgment rendered therein and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent action, whether the subsequent action involves the same or a different form of proceeding, or whether the second action is upon the same or a different cause of action, subject matter, claim, or demand. It is immaterial that the two actions are based on different grounds, tried on different theories, instituted for different purposes, or seek different reliefs. In this case, the Court applied res judicata not as petitioners intended — through the earlier decisions in Civil Case Nos. R-205 and B-122 — but through the final judgment in Civil Case No. B-1043 itself, which had fully adjudicated the same controversy and was now invoked by petitioners in an attempt to relitigate.

• Law of the Case — Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle or decision continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in the same case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. The Court held that the final adjudication in Civil Case No. B-1043, as affirmed by the appellate courts, constituted the law of the case and could not be circumvented through a petition for annulment of judgment.

• "Now under the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment, petitioners in effect are seeking a second cycle of review regarding a subject matter which has already been fully and fairly adjudicate[d]. That cannot be allowed." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: annulment of judgment may not be used as a vehicle for relitigating matters already resolved with finality.

• "Contrary to the circuitous assertion of petitioners that the rulings in Civil Cases Nos. R-205 and B-122 constitute res judicata or the law of the case to Civil Case No. B-1043, it is the holding in the latter case which is now a bar to the present proceeding under the same doctrines invoked by them." — This passage captures the doctrinal inversion central to the decision: the very doctrines petitioners invoked were turned against them because the case they sought to annul had itself become final and preclusive.

• "Material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were there admitted or judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein and that such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent action, whether the subsequent action involves the same or a different form of proceeding, or whether the second action is upon the same or a different cause of action, subject matter, claim or demand, as the earlier action." — This is the canonical formulation of res judicata as applied in the decision, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91797, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 360 — Cited as supporting authority for the doctrine of res judicata as formulated in the decision.
• Gutierrez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82475, January 28, 1991, 193 SCRA 437 — Cited as supporting authority for the doctrine of res judicata.
• Amberti vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79981, April 2, 1991, 195 SCRA 659 — Cited as supporting authority for the doctrine of res judicata.
• Tabaco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100981, December 28, 1994, 239 SCRA 485 — Cited as supporting authority for the law of the case doctrine.

• Article 477, Civil Code — Cited by the trial court in Civil Case No. B-1043 for the proposition that in actions for quieting of title, the plaintiff need not be in possession of the property involved. This supported the trial court's finding that respondents' action could proceed even if they were not in possession of Lot No. 8422-F.
• Act 496 (Land Registration Act) — Cited by the trial court in finding TCT No. T-22393 authentic, valid, indefeasible, and entitled to all faith and credence.

Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concurred.