Veloso vs. China Airlines, Ltd.

A motion for reconsideration of an NLRC resolution is a jurisdictional prerequisite before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; failure to file it within the ten-day reglementary period renders the NLRC resolution final and executory, barring judicial review.

Petitioner Rebecca R. Veloso was employed as supervisor of the ticketing section at the Manila branch office of respondent China Airlines, Ltd. (CAL), assisted by a senior ticketing agent and two ticketing agents. Respondent K.Y. Chang was the district manager of CAL's Manila branch. The case arose from CAL's decision to close its ticketing section due to financial losses, resulting in the retrenchment of petitioner and her staff.

Petitioner Rebecca R. Veloso was employed as supervisor of the ticketing section at the Manila branch office of respondent China Airlines, Ltd. (CAL). She was assisted by a senior ticketing agent, Eleanor Go, and two ticketing agents, Julie Chua and Josephine Lobendino. On October 29, 1986, respondent K.Y. Chang, then district manager of CAL's Manila branch, informed petitioner that management had decided to temporarily close its ticketing section to prevent further losses. Petitioner's three assistants were likewise notified that they would be temporarily laid off effective October 30, 1986.

Thereafter, CAL decided to permanently close the ticketing section. On November 5, 1986, petitioner and her staff were informed that their lay-off would be considered permanent, effective one month from receipt of such notice. A notice of retrenchment was filed with the labor department on November 11, 1986. Petitioner was later advised to claim her retirement pay and other benefits. Feeling aggrieved, she sent a letter to respondent Chang assailing the validity of her termination.

On July 1, 1987, petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC Arbitration Branch for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, praying for reinstatement, backwages, damages, and attorney's fees. On June 8, 1990, the Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor, declaring respondents guilty of unfair labor practice, finding the dismissal illegal, and ordering reinstatement with backwages and damages totaling ₱4,326,520.00. Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the NLRC. On January 2, 1992, the NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision, finding no factual or legal basis for the unfair labor practice charge — noting that petitioner was merely a union adviser without formal designation and that only ticketing section employees, not elective union officers, were affected by the retrenchment. The NLRC declared the retrenchment valid and ordered respondents to pay petitioner ₱428,895.04 as retrenchment pay. Petitioner received a copy of the NLRC resolution on January 7, 1992. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, she filed the instant petition for certiorari, claiming that a motion for reconsideration would be futile and would only prejudice her right to a speedy judgment.

• Futility of Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner averred that a recourse to the NLRC via a motion for reconsideration would be futile and would only further injure her rights to a speedy and unbiased judgment, as she did not expect the labor tribunal to rectify itself.

• Procedural Prerequisite: Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may prosper without first filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC.

• Procedural Prerequisite: No. The petition was dismissed because a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable and jurisdictional prerequisite before resort to the courts can be had; without it, the NLRC resolution became final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt.

• Procedural Prerequisite: Certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a motion for reconsideration of the impugned NLRC resolution, to be made under oath and filed within ten days from receipt — a procedure which is jurisdictional. A motion for reconsideration affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts can be had. Petitioner's bare assertion that such a motion would be futile did not excuse compliance. Because no motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed within the ten-day reglementary period, the NLRC resolution became final and executory on January 17, 1992, ten calendar days after petitioner's receipt on January 7, 1992. Consequently, the merits of the case could no longer be reviewed, and the petition could not be given due course.

• Indispensability of Motion for Reconsideration in NLRC Cases — A motion for reconsideration is a jurisdictional prerequisite before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail an NLRC resolution. It affords the labor tribunal the opportunity to correct its own errors before judicial intervention is sought. Failure to file within the ten-day reglementary period renders the NLRC decision final and executory, precluding further judicial review. The Court applied this doctrine strictly, dismissing the petition outright despite petitioner's claim that filing a motion would be futile.

• "This precipitate filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration of the assailed resolution warrants the outright dismissal of this case." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the procedural default that doomed the petition, regardless of the merits of the underlying labor dispute.

• "It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against acts of public respondent." — This articulates the controlling principle governing the availability of certiorari, anchoring the dismissal on the existence of an adequate remedy via motion for reconsideration.

• "Hence, the resolution of the NLRC had become final and executory on January 17, 1992, insofar as petitioner is concerned, because she admits under oath having received notice thereof on January 7, 1992." — This establishes the factual consequence of the procedural lapse: the NLRC resolution attained finality, foreclosing any review of the merits.

• Escorpizo vs. University of Baguio, G.R. No. 121962, April 30, 1999 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before filing a petition for certiorari against NLRC rulings.
• Manila Midtown Hotels & Land Corp. vs. NLRC, 288 SCRA 259 — Followed for the same proposition regarding the necessity of a motion for reconsideration.
• ABS-CBN Employees Union vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 123 — Followed for the same proposition.
• Gonpu Services Corporation vs. NLRC, 266 SCRA 657 — Followed for the same proposition.
• Building Care Corporation vs. NLRC, 268 SCRA 666 — Cited for the principle that certiorari lies only when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• Interorient Enterprises Inc. vs. NLRC, 261 SCRA 757 — Cited for the same principle regarding the availability of certiorari.

• Rule VIII, Section 2(a), New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC — Provides that without a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within the ten-day reglementary period, an order, decision, or resolution of the NLRC becomes final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof. The Court applied this provision to hold that the NLRC resolution became final on January 17, 1992.
• Rules of Court, Rule 65 (Certiorari) — Governs the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which lies only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court found that an adequate remedy existed — a motion for reconsideration — which petitioner failed to exhaust.

Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concurred.