Velasco vs. Manila Electric Co.

A continuous, monotonous noise from an electrical substation that exceeds the ambient sound level of a residential locality and produces actual physical discomfort to a person of ordinary sensibilities, interfering with sleep and conversation, constitutes an actionable nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code, entitling the affected party to abatement and damages, subject to reduction for the plaintiff's failure to mitigate under Article 2203.

Pedro J. Velasco, a physician, purchased three adjoining lots in 1948 at the corner of South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City, within an area zoned as a "first residence" district by the City Council. He subsequently sold two of the lots to Manila Electric Company (Meralco) and retained the third—the farthest from the street corner—where he built his residence. Meralco later constructed an electrical substation on the lots it had purchased, a facility that reduced high voltage electricity to a current suitable for distribution to at least 8,500 residential homes, over 300 commercial establishments, and about 30 industries, with a rated capacity of two transformers at 5,000 Kva each.

In 1948, Velasco bought three adjoining lots at the corner of South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City, from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. These lots were within an area zoned as a "first residence" district by the Quezon City Council. He subsequently sold two of the lots to Meralco but retained the third—the farthest from the street corner—where he built his house.

In September 1953, Meralco began constructing the substation on the lots it had purchased and finished it in November of that year, without prior building permit or authority from the Public Service Commission. The substation reduced high voltage electricity to a current suitable for distribution to at least 8,500 residential homes, over 300 commercial establishments, and about 30 industries. It had a rated capacity of two transformers at 5,000 Kva each (10,000 Kva total without fan cooling). The facility was constructed at a distance of 10 to 20 meters from Velasco's house. Meralco built a stone and cement wall along the street-facing sides but erected only a sawale wall—later replaced by an interlink wire fence—along the side adjoining Velasco's property.

A sound unceasingly emanated from the substation's transformers. Velasco, himself a physician, contended that subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed his concentration and sleep, impaired his health, and lowered his property's value. He claimed the noise, as a precipitating factor, caused anxiety neurosis, which in turn predisposed him to or was concomitant with pyelonephritis, ureteritis, lumbago, and anemia, resulting in loss of professional income and reduced life expectancy. He sought a judicial decree for abatement of the nuisance and claimed P487,600.00 in total damages, comprising loss of professional earnings (P12,600), damage to life expectancy (P180,000), moral damages (P100,000), loss from frustration of sale of his house (P125,000), exemplary damages (P25,000), and attorney's fees (P45,000).

The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the sound of the substation was unavoidable and did not constitute a nuisance, that it could not have caused the diseases Velasco claimed, and that the items of damage were not adequately proved. Velasco then appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

• Actionable Nuisance: Petitioner contended that the sound constituted an actionable nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code, as it injured or endangered health and safety and annoyed or offended the senses, because subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed his concentration and sleep, impaired his health, and lowered his property value.
• Entitlement to Damages: Petitioner sought compensatory, moral, and other damages under Article 2202 of the Civil Code, claiming loss of professional earnings, damage to life expectancy, moral damages, loss from frustration of sale of his house, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, supported by expert witnesses, medical literature, laboratory findings, and income statistics.
• Liability of City Engineer: Petitioner alleged that City Engineer Anastacio A. Agan (1) did not require Meralco to secure a building permit, (2) defended the construction by not insisting on such permit, and (3) did not initiate removal or demolition or criminal prosecution of Meralco officials.

• Interior Sound Levels: Respondent Meralco argued that Velasco's own evidence showed sound intensity inside his house was only 46–47 decibels at the consultation room and 43–45 decibels at the treatment room, giving him no ground to complain.
• Public Convenience and Unavoidability: Respondent emphasized that the substation was constructed for public convenience and that, as testified by witness Constancio Soria, the humming sound of the transformers could not be avoided given the way they are built.
• Absence of Prior Complaints: Respondent argued that it had operated substations in the area for 50 years without receiving complaints about similar installations.
• Hospital Comparison: Respondent contended that the sound level at North General Hospital, where silence is observed, was even higher than at Velasco's residence, undermining his complaint.

• Actionable Nuisance: Whether the continuous sound emanating from Meralco's substation constitutes an actionable nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code.
• Damages: Whether Velasco is entitled to the damages claimed, and in what amount, considering his failure to mitigate.
• Liability of City Engineer: Whether the City Engineer of Quezon City may be held solidarily liable with Meralco.

• Actionable Nuisance: Yes. The continuous, monotonous noise from the substation, exceeding the ambient sound level of the locality and producing actual physical discomfort to a person of ordinary sensibilities, constitutes an actionable nuisance under Article 694.
• Damages: Yes, but substantially reduced. Velasco was awarded P20,000.00 in moderate and moral damages and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees; exemplary damages were denied for lack of bad faith, and the remaining claims were disallowed as exaggerated, speculative, or unproven.
• Liability of City Engineer: No. The record does not support the allegations against Agan; it was Meralco's duty to apply for a permit, Agan did require Meralco to submit plans, and no law or ordinance imposes on the city engineer the duty to initiate removal or prosecution.

• Actionable Nuisance: The general rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences resulting from the proximity of others, but when prejudice exceeds that level, the neighbor causing the disturbance is liable for nuisance. While no prior Philippine adjudications on this specific issue existed, the law of nuisances is of American origin, and the established test is whether the noise injuriously affects the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. The determining factor is not the intensity or volume of the noise alone but whether it is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. A continuous, monotonous sound—even if not loud—can constitute a nuisance, as the constant drone of a cricket or the drip of a leaking faucet is irritating and disturbing to the average person. Quantitative measurements taken by Dr. Jesus Almonte, an impartial physician not connected with either party, showed sound levels of 52–80 decibels at and near Velasco's property line, well above the ambient sound level of 28–32 decibels. The noise at Velasco's bedrooms was determined to be around 64–65 decibels. Medical evidence established that the incessant noise deprived Velasco of sleep, weakening his constitution and making him susceptible to infection. The fact that the sound cannot be eliminated does not mean it cannot be reduced, and the substation's necessity for public service is no justification for operating it to the detriment and discomfort of others. The absence of prior complaints over 50 years neither lessens Meralco's liability nor weakens the rights of those affected. The comparison to North General Hospital was rejected because it was not shown that the hospital's surroundings were similar to Velasco's residential zone or that the hospital's sounds were similarly monotonous and ceaseless.

• Damages: The medical evidence of Velasco's doctors preponderated over the defense experts because the former had actually treated him while the latter had not, rendering the defense evidence largely conjectural. However, the claimed damages were exaggerated. The alleged loss of earnings at P19,000 per annum was predicated on undeclared income not shown to derive from his medical profession; his gross income from 1951 to 1953 averaged only P7,000 per annum, and part of his higher 1947–1948 income was a salary from the Quezon Memorial Foundation unconnected to his practice. Moral damages of P100,000 were utterly disproportionate to his actual earnings. Claims for shortening of life expectancy were speculative. Exemplary damages had no adequate basis because Meralco's officials and counsel had reasonably interpreted its franchise (as amended by Republic Act No. 150) as not requiring a Public Service Commission permit, and the lack of a Quezon City building permit was subsequently cured; this interpretation, though ultimately ruled incorrect, was compatible with good faith. Two factors further mitigated liability: first, the noise was not an exclusive causative factor, as no one else in Velasco's household or neighborhood became sick, and Velasco had financial worries from an unsuccessful gubernatorial campaign that could adversely affect his disposition; second, Velasco failed to mitigate his damages under Article 2203, as he obstinately stayed in his house despite recognizing the deleterious effects, without taking steps to abate the nuisance, relocate, or even lease his house and rent other premises. The claim for frustration of sale was unproven, as there was no reliable evidence of the property's value, no corroboration of the alleged prior P125,000 offer, and no showing of further attempts to sell. Considering all circumstances, P20,000.00 in moderate and moral damages and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees were deemed reasonable, the latter justified by the intricate factual and legal issues raised for the first time in this jurisdiction.

• Liability of City Engineer: On the first allegation, it was not Agan's duty to require Meralco to secure a permit but Meralco's duty to apply for one, pursuant to Section 1 of Quezon City Ordinance No. 1530. The second allegation was untrue because Agan had written Meralco requiring it to submit plans and pay permit fees. On the third allegation, no law or ordinance was cited specifying that it is the city engineer's duty to initiate removal, demolition, or criminal prosecution. Republic Act 537, Section 24(d), relied upon by Velasco, requires an order by or previous approval of the mayor for the city engineer to cause removal of structures in violation of law, but the mayor could not be expected to act because he testified that the sound "did not have any effect on his body."

• Actionable Nuisance by Noise — A noise constitutes an actionable nuisance when it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. The test is not the intensity or volume of the noise alone but whether it is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. Injury to a person of peculiarly sensitive characteristics does not render noise an actionable nuisance. The continuous, monotonous character of a sound—even if not loud—can itself constitute a nuisance, as the ceaseless drone of machinery interfering with sleep and conversation produces discomfort deemed sufficient to make its cause actionable. Reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all circumstances and conditions, including the locality, the character and magnitude of the activity, and the manner of its conduct. The fact that skill and care have been exercised is no defense. Applied in this case: the substation's 52–80 decibel output, far exceeding the 28–32 decibel ambient level, coupled with its ceaseless, monotonous character and interference with sleep, satisfied the test.

• Duty to Mitigate Damages (Article 2203) — The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. This rule obligates the injured party to undertake measures that will alleviate and not aggravate his condition after the infliction of the injury, and places upon him the burden of explaining why he could not do so. Applied in this case: Velasco's obstinate refusal to relocate or take any remedial action despite recognizing the noise's deleterious effects on his health constituted a failure to mitigate, justifying a substantial reduction in the damages awarded.

• "The determinating factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable." — This passage, quoted from Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. vs. Anderson, articulates the controlling test for when noise constitutes an actionable nuisance, foregrounding the effect on ordinary persons rather than volume alone.

• "Though the noise be harmonious and slight and trivial in itself, the constant and monotonous sound of a cricket on the earth, or the drip of a leaking faucet is irritating, uncomfortable, distracting and disturbing to the average man and woman." — This illustrates the principle that continuous, monotonous noise can constitute actionable nuisance even without being loud, drawing an analogy that distinguishes the substation's ceaseless hum from intermittent, discordant sounds.

• "The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question." — This quotation of Article 2203 of the Civil Code anchors the Court's reduction of Velasco's damages, establishing the affirmative duty of the injured party to alleviate rather than aggravate his condition.

• Meralco vs. Public Service Commission, 109 Phil. 603 — Cited for the fact that the substation was constructed without prior authority from the Public Service Commission, establishing the procedural background of Meralco's permit deficiency.
• Tortorella vs. Traiser & Co., Inc., 90 ALR 1206 — Cited as laying down the basic principles that noise may constitute an actionable nuisance, provided it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people to an unreasonable extent.
• Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. vs. Anderson, 156 S.W. 2d 857 — Cited for the rule that lawful commercial activities may become nuisances if offensive to the senses, that skill and care are no defense, and that the determining factor is the noise's character producing actual physical discomfort to persons of ordinary sensibilities. The Court found Velasco's case stronger, as readings along his property line (52, 54, 55 decibels) exceeded those in Anderson (average of 44 decibels).
• Wheat Culvert Company vs. Jenkins, 246 Ky. 319, 55 S.W. 2d 4 — Cited for the proposition that an injunction was properly decreed to stop noise from a factory interfering with sleep, and that exercise of skill and care is no defense against nuisance liability.
• Stodder vs. Rosen Talking Machine Company, 241 Mass. 245, 135 N.E. 251 — Cited for the principle that continuous, monotonous sound, even from various phonograph records, injuriously affecting nervous systems constitutes a nuisance authorizing injunction and damages.
• De Castelvi vs. Cia. General de Tabacos, 49 Phil. 996; Lasam vs. Smith, 41 Phil. 657; De Guia vs. Manila Electric & Light Co., 40 Phil. 706 — Cited as prior Philippine jurisprudence embodying the duty to mitigate damages, subsequently codified in Article 2203 of the Civil Code.

• Article 694, Civil Code of the Philippines — Defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which injures or endangers the health or safety of others, or annoys or offends the senses. Applied as the statutory basis for finding the substation noise to be an actionable nuisance.
• Article 2202, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. Cited by Velasco as basis for his damages claim.
• Article 2203, Civil Code of the Philippines — Requires the party suffering loss or injury to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize damages. Applied to reduce Velasco's recovery due to his failure to take remedial action despite recognizing the noise's harmful effects.
• Article 2208, No. 11, Civil Code of the Philippines — Cited as statutory basis for the award of attorney's fees, given the intricate factual and legal issues raised for the first time in this jurisdiction.
• Republic Act No. 150 — Meralco's franchise as amended, requiring it to spend within five years not less than forty million pesos for maintenance and additions to its electric system, including substations. Cited in evaluating Meralco's good faith in believing no Public Service Commission permit was required.
• Republic Act 537, Section 24(d) — Requires an order by or previous approval of the mayor for the city engineer to cause or order removal of buildings or structures in violation of law or ordinances. Applied to exonerate City Engineer Agan, as the mayor had not issued such an order.
• Ordinance No. 1530, Quezon City — Provides that it is the duty of the property owner or constructor to apply for a building permit, not the city engineer's duty to require it. Applied to reject the allegation that Agan failed to require Meralco to secure a permit.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concurred. Dizon and Castro, JJ., were on leave.