Velasco vs. Court of Appeals

The right to appeal is a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law, and failure to file the printed record on appeal within the reglementary period — coupled with a deliberate effort to mislead the appellate court through falsified registry receipts — justifies dismissal of the appeal. Additionally, a definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale, and the absence of such agreement means no contract was perfected.

Petitioners Lorenzo Velasco and Socorro J. Velasco were lessees of a parcel of residential land owned by respondent Magdalena Estate, Inc. in New Manila, Quezon City. The Velasco family had been leasing the property since December 29, 1961. Sometime in 1962, the Velascos expressed interest in purchasing the lot, and negotiations ensued, with Socorro Velasco acting as intermediary for her brother-in-law Lorenzo. The dispute arose from whether those negotiations ripened into a perfected contract of sale, which became the subject of a specific performance action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.

The Velasco family had been leasing a parcel of residential land — Lot 15, Block 7, Psd-6129, located at No. 39 corner 6th Street and Pacific Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, with an area of 2,059 square meters — from Magdalena Estate, Inc. since December 29, 1961. Sometime in 1962, the Velascos expressed interest in purchasing the lot. Socorro Velasco, sister-in-law of Lorenzo Velasco, acted as intermediary in the negotiations with the respondent, as Lorenzo did not understand English well and had authorized her to negotiate on his behalf.

According to the petitioners, on November 29, 1962, the parties entered into a contract of sale for the property at a total price of ₱100,000.00, with a down payment of ₱30,000.00 and the balance of ₱70,000.00 payable in installments over ten years. On that date, Lorenzo Velasco paid ₱10,000.00 as initial down payment, evidenced by a receipt (Exhibit A) stating "Earnest money for the purchase of Lot 15, Block 7, Psd-6129, Area 2,059 square meters including improvements thereon — P10,000.00," with the notation "Agreed price: P100,000.00, P30,000.00 down payment, bal. in 10 years" at the bottom. The receipt was issued in Lorenzo's name at Socorro's request. The respondent, however, contended that it had agreed to sell the property to Socorro Velasco on the condition that a down payment of ₱30,000.00 be made, ₱20,000.00 of which was to be paid on or before December 31, 1962, and that the ₱10,000.00 was accepted merely as a deposit because it fell short of the agreed amount.

On January 8, 1964, Socorro Velasco tendered payment of ₱20,000.00 to complete the ₱30,000.00 down payment, but the respondent refused to accept it, having considered the offer to sell rescinded on account of the failure to complete the down payment on or before December 31, 1962. Lorenzo Velasco thereafter filed a complaint for specific performance against Magdalena Estate, Inc. in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, demanding that the respondent execute a formal deed of sale and claiming ₱25,000.00 exemplary damages, ₱2,000.00 actual damages, and ₱7,000.00 attorney's fees. The trial court dismissed the complaint on November 3, 1968, holding that the alleged purchase and sale agreement "was not perfected" because the minds of the parties did not meet "in regard to the manner of payment."

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and received notice on November 18, 1968 requiring them to file their printed record on appeal within sixty days, a period expiring on January 17, 1969. Petitioners claimed to have mailed a motion for extension of time on January 15, 1969, citing mechanical failures of printing machines and voluminous pending printing jobs. On February 10, 1969, they filed their printed record on appeal. The Court of Appeals initially granted the extension and admitted the record on appeal on February 25, 1969, but upon the respondent's motion for reconsideration supported by official post office certifications and the affidavit of mail carrier Flaviano Malindog, the appellate court found that the motion for extension had not been mailed on January 15, 1969 but only on February 7, 1969, and that falsified registry receipts had been used to create a false appearance of timely mailing. The Court of Appeals granted the reconsideration and dismissed the appeal on June 28, 1969.

• Jurisdiction and Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the motion for extension was not mailed on January 15, 1969, when in fact it was so mailed, and in finding that the printed record on appeal was filed only on February 10, 1969 beyond the authorized period.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioners argued that the appellate court's adverse conclusions were not supported by the records because it ignored the affidavit of the mailing clerk Juanito D. Quiachon, the registry receipts, and the postmarked envelopes, citing Henning vs. Western Equipment and Caltex Phil., Inc. vs. Katipunan Labor Union, and instead relied on Malindog's affidavit, which was prepared by counsel for the respondent and which the fiscal's office had found insufficient to warrant criminal liability for Quiachon.
• Rule 50, Section 1 Does Not Authorize Dismissal: Petitioners maintained that Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates the grounds upon which the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal, does not include failure to file a printed record on appeal, nor does it state that mismailing of a motion to extend time may be a basis for dismissal.
• Revocation of Extension Not Authorized: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to revoke the extension of time it had already granted based on a ground not specified in Section 1, Rule 50.
• Waiver of Objection to Appeal: Petitioners contended that the objection to an appeal may be waived, as when the appellee has allowed the record on appeal to be printed and approved, citing Moran, Vol. II, p. 519.
• Merits Favor Petitioners: Petitioners asserted that on the merits, the equities of the case were in their favor.

• Falsified Mailing: Respondent argued that the Court of Appeals had been misled by the petitioners' "deceitful allegation" that they filed the printed record on appeal within the reglementary period, presenting a certification from the postmaster of Makati that no registered letters numbered 0215 and 0216 from the petitioners' counsel were posted at the Makati Post Office on January 15, 1969.
• Abandonment of Appeal: Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on February 8, 1969, on the ground that petitioners had not yet filed their record on appeal and must be considered to have abandoned their appeal.

• Jurisdiction and Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal upon finding that the motion for extension was not mailed on January 15, 1969.
• Sufficiency of Evidence on Mailing Date: Whether the appellate court erred in relying on the post office certifications and Malindog's affidavit over the petitioners' registry receipts and Quiachon's counter-affidavit.
• Dismissal for Failure to File Printed Record on Appeal: Whether the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure to file the printed record on appeal within the reglementary period, given that Section 1, Rule 50 does not specifically enumerate this as a ground for dismissal.
• Timeliness of Motion for Extension: Whether a motion for extension of time filed after the expiration of the period to be extended may be given retroactive effect.
• Perfection of Contract of Sale: Whether a contract of sale was perfected between the parties despite the absence of a definite agreement on the manner of payment.

• Jurisdiction and Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Court of Appeals did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or gravely abuse its discretion in promulgating the questioned resolution, the certifications of the postmasters and Malindog's sworn declaration against interest providing ample basis for the finding that the motion for extension was not mailed on January 15, 1969.
• Sufficiency of Evidence on Mailing Date: No. The appellate court did not err in crediting the post office certifications and Malindog's affidavit over Quiachon's counter-affidavit, the former being official records and a declaration against penal interest, while the latter was self-serving.
• Dismissal for Failure to File Printed Record on Appeal: Yes. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege, and failure to comply with the 60-day period under Section 5, Rule 46 warrants dismissal; jurisprudence has upheld dismissal of appeals on grounds not specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 50.
• Timeliness of Motion for Extension: No. A motion for extension of the period for filing pleadings must be made before the expiration of the period to be extended; a belatedly filed motion is as though non-existent.
• Perfection of Contract of Sale: No. No contract of sale was perfected because the parties had not reached a definite agreement on the manner of payment, an essential element under Article 1482 of the Civil Code.

• Jurisdiction and Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court found that the appellate court's findings were supported by substantial evidence. The official certifications from the postmasters of Makati explained in clear detail why it was improbable that the petitioners' counsel had mailed the motion on January 15, 1969 in the ordinary course of official business — the registered letters posted on that date were numbered consecutively from 1001 to 2225, and none was addressed to the Court of Appeals or to respondent's counsel. The Acting Postmaster of the Commercial Center Post Office likewise certified that the registry receipts in question did not appear in the Registry Record Book. These certifications, even without Malindog's affidavit, sufficed to justify reconsideration of the initial extension grant.

• Sufficiency of Evidence on Mailing Date: The Court gave greater weight to Malindog's sworn statement, which constituted a declaration against penal interest since he could be criminally prosecuted for falsification on the basis thereof, over Quiachon's self-serving counter-affidavit. The fact that Malindog failed to identify Quiachon at the preliminary investigation was of no moment, since the information for falsification filed by the fiscal indicated that someone did induce Malindog to issue false registry receipts. The cases cited by petitioners — Henning and Caltex — were distinguished as inapplicable, because those cases resolved whether the date of mailing a pleading should be considered the date of its filing, whereas the issue here was whether the motion was in fact mailed on the date claimed.

• Dismissal for Failure to File Printed Record on Appeal: The right to appeal is not a natural right nor part of due process but a statutory privilege exercisable only in the manner provided by law. Section 5, Rule 46 expressly imposes upon the appellant the duty to file forty printed copies of the record on appeal within sixty days from receipt of notice. Petitioners failed to comply with this duty, and the finding that there was a deliberate effort to mislead the appellate court through falsified registry receipts reinforced the propriety of dismissal. Jurisprudence is replete with cases where appeals were dismissed on grounds not specifically enumerated in Section 1, Rule 50, citing De la Cruz vs. Blanco, Government of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, and Ferinion vs. Sta. Romana.

• Timeliness of Motion for Extension: Citing Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated that a motion for extension of the period for filing pleadings must be made before the expiration of the period to be extended. Since the petitioners' motion for extension was belatedly filed, it was as though it were non-existent. The petitioners' argument that the objection to the appeal could be waived was likewise rejected, because the respondent had filed a motion to dismiss on February 8, 1969 — before the printed record on appeal was filed — thus preserving its objection.

• Perfection of Contract of Sale: The Court affirmed the lower court's finding that no contract of sale was perfected because the parties had not agreed on the manner of payment. The petitioners' own complaint admitted that the time within which the full down payment of ₱30,000.00 was to be completed was not specified and that the equal monthly amortization for the balance had yet to be determined. A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale, citing Navarro vs. Sugar Producers Corp. Marketing Association, Inc. The delivery of ₱10,000.00 as part of the down payment could not suffice as proof of perfection under Article 1482 of the Civil Code, since the parties themselves admitted that essential terms — the manner of payment — still had to be mutually covenanted.

• Right to appeal as a statutory privilege — The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner provided by law. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the dismissal of the appeal for failure to comply with the 60-day period for filing the printed record on appeal under Section 5, Rule 46.

• Timeliness of motions for extension — A motion for extension of the period for filing pleadings and papers in court must be made before the expiration of the period to be extended. A belatedly filed motion for extension is treated as non-existent. The Court relied on this rule to hold that the petitioners' motion for extension, having been filed after the expiration of the original 60-day period, could not serve as a basis for extending the period.

• Essential elements of a contract of sale — agreement on manner of payment — A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. Where the parties have not yet agreed on how and when the down payment and installment payments are to be made, no perfected contract of sale exists, notwithstanding the delivery of earnest money. The Court applied this principle under Article 1482 of the Civil Code to affirm the dismissal of the complaint for specific performance.

• Declaration against interest as evidence — A sworn statement that constitutes a declaration against penal interest — such as an affidavit admitting participation in falsification — is given greater weight and credit than a self-serving counter-affidavit. The Court relied on this principle in upholding the appellate court's preference for Malindog's affidavit over Quiachon's counter-affidavit.

• "The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner provided by law." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for the Court's insistence on strict compliance with procedural rules governing appeals, and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the nature of the right to appeal.

• "The motion for extension of the period for filing pleadings and papers in court must be made before the expiration of the period to be extended." — This formulation, quoting Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, states the rule on timeliness of extension motions and is the controlling principle applied to defeat the petitioners' claim of timely filing.

• "A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the substantive issue, establishing that absence of agreement on payment terms precludes perfection of a contract of sale.

• Bello vs. Fernando, L-16970, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 135 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right or part of due process.
• Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, L-14551, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 873 — Cited for the rule that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period to be extended; a belated motion is treated as non-existent.
• Navarro vs. Sugar Producers Corp. Marketing Association, Inc., L-12888, April 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 1180 — Cited for the doctrine that a definite agreement on the manner of payment is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale.
• De la Cruz vs. Blanco, 73 Phil. 596 (1942) — Cited as an example of a case where the Court dismissed an appeal on a ground not specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
• Government of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 108 Phil. 86 (1960) — Similarly cited as precedent for dismissal of appeals on grounds beyond those enumerated in Rule 50.
• Ferinion vs. Sta. Romana, L-25521, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 370 — Similarly cited as precedent for dismissal of appeals on non-enumerated grounds.
• Henning vs. Western Equipment, 62 Phil. 579 — Distinguished as inapplicable; that case resolved whether the date of mailing a pleading should be considered the date of its filing, not whether a pleading was in fact mailed on the date claimed.
• Caltex Phil., Inc. vs. Katipunan Labor Union, 52 O.G. 6209 — Similarly distinguished as inapplicable for the same reason as Henning.

• Section 5, Rule 46, Rules of Court — Imposes the duty on the appellant to file forty printed copies of the record on appeal within sixty days from receipt of notice. The Court held that petitioners' failure to comply with this provision warranted dismissal of their appeal.
• Section 1, Rule 50, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds upon which the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal. The Court held that dismissal may be ordered even on grounds not specifically enumerated therein, as supported by jurisprudence.
• Article 1482, Civil Code of the Philippines — Governs the perfection of contracts of sale. The Court held that delivery of earnest money does not prove perfection where the parties have not yet agreed on essential terms such as the manner of payment.

• Makalintal, J. — Concurred in the majority opinion.
• Makasiar, J. — Concurred in the majority opinion.
• Esguerra, J. — Concurred in the majority opinion.
• Barredo, J. — Concurred in the result, voting to deny the petition on the ground that petitioners had clearly and without sufficient justification failed to prosecute their appeal within the period allowed by the rules. He noted that any discussion of the merits of the appeal was unwarranted, particularly where the same did not appear beyond doubt upon cursory examination.

• Teehankee, J. — Dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that the 60-day period for submitting the printed record on appeal under Section 5, Rule 46 is a procedural, directory period — not a mandatory, jurisdictional one — distinguishable from the 30-day period for perfecting an appeal under Rule 41, Section 3, failure to observe which is fatal. Citing Ever Ice Drop Factory vs. Court of Appeals, he contended that the printing requirement is "not indispensable to the jurisdiction of the appellate courts," its sole purpose being convenience in handling, keeping, and reading the record. He argued that since the appeal had been timely perfected, the late submission of the printed record by 24 days — attributable not to the petitioners or their counsel but to an unknown person who induced the mail carrier to issue falsified receipts — should not result in the "capital penalty" of dismissal. He invoked the liberal construction mandate of the Rules of Court and the principle of substantial justice articulated in Concepcion vs. Payatas Estate Improvements Co., Inc. and Sonora vs. Tongoy, stressing that no substantial right of the respondent was prejudiced by the late submission. He further noted that the appellate court itself had exonerated petitioners' counsel of any complicity in the deception, and that the specific rule (Rule 46, Section 5) does not provide for dismissal for failure to submit the printed record on appeal, unlike Section 7 of the same rule which expressly prescribes dismissal for unauthorized alterations or omissions in the printed record. He voted to grant the petition and remand the appeal to the Court of Appeals for disposition on the merits.