Velasco vs. COMELEC

A candidate who makes a material misrepresentation under oath in a certificate of candidacy cannot cure the defect by winning the election; the mandatory and substantive requirements of election laws prevail over the will of the electorate in any given locality. A false statement in a certificate of candidacy regarding a material fact — such as one's status as a registered voter — constitutes a ground for cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the election victory of the candidate does not render the requirement merely directory.

Nardo M. Velasco was born in San Antonio, Sasmuan, Pampanga on June 22, 1952. He married Evelyn D. Castillo in 1975 at the Roman Catholic Church of Sasmuan. In 1983, he moved to the United States of America where he subsequently became a citizen. In 2006, Velasco applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003). His application was approved on July 31, 2006, and he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco on the same day. He returned to the Philippines on September 14, 2006.

On October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga. The Election Registration Board denied his application. He then filed a petition for inclusion of his name in the list of voters with the Municipal Trial Court of Sasmuan, which granted the petition on February 9, 2007. On appeal, Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga reversed the MTC decision on March 1, 2007, finding that Velasco had lost his domicile of origin when he became a United States citizen and had not met the residency requirement under the Constitution.

Velasco appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. While this appeal was pending, Velasco filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Sasmuan on March 28, 2007. He stated in his COC that he was a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan. He also executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship on the same day.

Mozart P. Panlaqui, another candidate for Mayor of Sasmuan, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course To and/or To Cancel Velasco's COC the following day, alleging that Velasco was not a registered voter, that the RTC had denied his petition for inclusion, and that Velasco failed to meet the constitutional residency requirement. Velasco won the May 14, 2007 mayoralty election with 7,822 votes and was proclaimed Mayor on May 16, 2007. The COMELEC Second Division subsequently issued a Resolution on July 6, 2007 cancelling Velasco's COC and declaring his proclamation null and void. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this resolution on October 15, 2007.

• Velasco's Citizenship and Absence from the Philippines: Velasco was born in San Antonio, Sasmuan, Pampanga on June 22, 1952. He married Evelyn D. Castillo in 1975. In 1983, he moved to the United States and subsequently acquired American citizenship.

• Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship: In 2006, Velasco applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. His application was approved on July 31, 2006, and he took his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco on the same day. He returned to the Philippines on September 14, 2006, and remained there except for a three-day trip to Hong Kong.

• Voter Registration and Inclusion/Exclusion Proceedings: On October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for voter registration in Sasmuan, Pampanga. The Election Registration Board denied his application. Velasco filed a petition for inclusion with the MTC of Sasmuan, which granted the petition on February 9, 2007. On appeal, the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga reversed the MTC decision on March 1, 2007, holding that Velasco lost his domicile of origin when he became a US citizen; under Philippine immigration laws, he could only stay as a visitor or resident alien; and he only reacquired Philippine residency on July 31, 2006. The RTC relied on Caasi v. Court of Appeals for the proposition that naturalization in a foreign country results in abandonment of Philippine domicile. The RTC decision was final and executory under Section 138 of the Omnibus Election Code. Velasco appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 98259) under Rule 42.

• Filing of Certificate of Candidacy: On March 28, 2007, while his appeal was pending with the CA, Velasco filed his COC for Mayor of Sasmuan. His COC stated that he was a registered voter of Precinct No. 103-A of Sasmuan, Pampanga. He also executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship on the same day. At the time of filing, the RTC decision excluding him from the voters' list had already been issued and was, by operation of law, final and executory.

• Panlaqui's Petition to Cancel COC: On March 29, 2007, respondent Mozart P. Panlaqui, who also filed a COC for Mayor of Sasmuan, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course To and/or To Cancel Velasco's COC (SPA Case No. 07-148). Panlaqui alleged that Velasco was not a registered voter of Sasmuan; that the RTC had denied Velasco's petition for inclusion; that Velasco lacked the one-year residency requirement; and that Velasco was ineligible to run since he was not a qualified voter. Velasco filed an Answer denying the allegations and asserting that he possessed all qualifications of a voter and candidate, that his renunciation of American citizenship rendered him eligible, and that no final judgment had been rendered against him.

• Election Results and COMELEC Resolutions: Velasco received 7,822 votes (the highest number) for Mayor of Sasmuan in the May 14, 2007 elections and was proclaimed Mayor on May 16, 2007. He took his oath and assumed office on June 30, 2007. The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution on July 6, 2007 cancelling Velasco's COC and declaring his proclamation void, finding him guilty of material misrepresentation for claiming to be a registered voter when the RTC had already finally ruled otherwise. The COMELEC en banc affirmed on October 15, 2007, noting that in the absence of a writ from the CA enjoining enforcement of the RTC decision, Section 138 of the OEC had to be applied.

• Subsequent CA Action: The CA rendered an Amended Decision on August 19, 2008 dismissing Velasco's Rule 42 petition for lack of jurisdiction, explicitly stating that Section 138 of the OEC provides that RTC decisions in inclusion/exclusion cases are immediately final and executory and that the CA therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Velasco argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by deciding the issue of his right to vote despite its lack of jurisdiction over that question and despite the pendency of that prejudicial issue before the Court of Appeals.

• Finality of RTC Decision: Velasco contended that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the March 1, 2007 RTC decision was already final and executory, given that an appeal was pending with the CA.

• Denial of Due Process: Velasco maintained that the COMELEC annulled his proclamation as Mayor without notice and hearing, in violation of his right to due process.

• Absence of Material Misrepresentation: Velasco argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by finding material misrepresentation based solely on Panlaqui's baseless allegations, without considering that Velasco possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter.

• Forum Shopping: Panlaqui asserted that Velasco committed forum shopping because another case involving the same issues was on appeal and pending resolution with the Court of Appeals. He also argued that not all requisites for a petition for certiorari were present.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Panlaqui maintained, in the alternative, that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion because the RTC decision was final, executory, and non-appealable under Section 138 of the OEC.

• Jurisdiction over COC Cancellation: The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the COMELEC, argued that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course and/or cancel a COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and that there was no denial of due process because Velasco filed an Answer and was fully heard.

• Abandonment of Philippine Domicile: The OSG argued that Velasco's immigration to the United States and subsequent acquisition of US citizenship constituted an abandonment of his Philippine domicile and residence.

• Material Misrepresentation Established: The OSG contended that Velasco committed misrepresentation in declaring his residence at Sasmuan in his COC — a ground for cancellation under Section 78 of the OEC — and that the real issue was not Velasco's right to vote but the misrepresentation he committed when he filed his COC.

• Forum Shopping: Whether Velasco committed forum shopping by pursuing both an appeal with the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court involving related issues.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Material Misrepresentation: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling Velasco's COC on the ground that he made a material misrepresentation by claiming to be a registered voter of Sasmuan despite a final and executory RTC ruling excluding him from the voters' list.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Finality of RTC Decision: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in treating the RTC decision as final and executory under Section 138 of the OEC despite the pendency of an appeal with the Court of Appeals.

• Jurisdiction over Right to Vote: Whether the COMELEC improperly ruled on Velasco's right to vote — a matter allegedly within the exclusive province of the courts in inclusion/exclusion proceedings — when it cancelled his COC.

• Due Process: Whether Velasco was denied due process when the COMELEC annulled his proclamation as Mayor without notice and hearing.

• Effect of Electoral Victory on COC Defects: Whether Velasco's victory in the mayoralty election cured the defect in his COC, applying the principle that mandatory requirements before elections become directory after the people have spoken.

• Forum Shopping: The issue of forum shopping was not resolved as a separate basis for the decision. The petition was dismissed on the merits, the Court finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Material Misrepresentation: The COMELEC's conclusion that Velasco committed material misrepresentation was not legally erroneous, much less tainted by grave abuse of discretion. The false representation under Section 78 of the OEC must pertain to a material fact — one referring to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as citizenship, residence, and status as a registered voter. A candidate's registered voter status is a material fact because it is a requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC; the candidate will work for and represent the local government under which he or she is running. Additionally, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible — that is, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate. Velasco's COC statement that he was a registered voter was false because the RTC had already issued a final and executory judgment excluding him from the voters' list. His active misrepresentation was compounded by his deliberate concealment of the RTC ruling, as disclosure would have rendered him unqualified to be a candidate.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Finality of RTC Decision: The COMELEC did not err in relying on the RTC ruling, as Section 138 of the OEC is clear and categorical: decisions of the MTC may be appealed to the RTC within five days, and the RTC's decision "shall become final and executory." No motion for reconsideration is entertained. Velasco's recourse to the Court of Appeals by way of appeal under Rule 42 was not available to him because an RTC ruling in an inclusion/exclusion case is final and executory. The CA itself later recognized in its Amended Decision of August 19, 2008 that it had no jurisdiction to entertain Velasco's appeal.

• Jurisdiction over Right to Vote: The COMELEC did not improperly rule on Velasco's right to vote. The tribunals given authority by law to determine whether Velasco should have the right to vote in Sasmuan were the ERB, the MTC, and subsequently the RTC. The COMELEC merely recognized the RTC's final and executory ruling on the matter. While inclusion/exclusion proceedings and COC denial/cancellation proceedings are distinct in purpose, issues, reliefs, and remedies, they may converge on factual matters such as residence and voter registration. A ruling on the right to vote by the trial court for a specific election is binding on the COMELEC. By clear implication, the COMELEC does not itself rule on the right to vote when it recognizes in a Section 78 proceeding a final and executory court ruling from an inclusion/exclusion case. Citing Domino v. COMELEC, factual findings of a trial court in inclusion/exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive on and do not rise to the level of res judicata with respect to the COMELEC; however, the ruling on the right to vote itself is binding.

• Due Process: Velasco's due process argument was without merit. The nullification of his proclamation was a necessary legal consequence of the cancellation of his COC pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. A COC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case. Velasco filed an Answer to Panlaqui's petition and was afforded the opportunity to be heard. Under the combined application of Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 6646, if the disqualification or COC cancellation/denial case is not resolved before election day, proceedings shall continue even after the election, and the candidate may be voted for and proclaimed if he or she wins, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel the COC continues. The essence of due process — the opportunity to be heard — was fully given to Velasco.

• Effect of Electoral Victory on COC Defects: Velasco's electoral victory could not cure the material misrepresentation in his COC. The principle that mandatory provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are construed as directory after the elections to give effect to the will of the people, as articulated in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC, is qualified. A blanket and unqualified application of this ruling would be fraught with dangerous implications for the rule of law and the integrity of elections: it would render Section 39 of the LGC and Sections 74 and 78 of the OEC toothless, as candidates could risk falsifying their COC qualifications knowing that an election victory would cure any defect. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, violating both election and criminal laws, the Court is faced with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials and the will of the electorate in any given locality, the balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of the rule that COC mandatory requirements before elections are merely directory after the people have spoken.

• Material Misrepresentation under Section 78 of the OEC — A false representation in a certificate of candidacy must satisfy two requisites to warrant cancellation: (1) the false representation must pertain to a material fact, defined as one that refers to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as citizenship, residence, and status as a registered voter; and (2) the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible — that is, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office. The candidate's status as a registered voter is a material fact because it is a requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC. Applied here, Velasco's sworn statement that he was a registered voter when a final and executory RTC ruling had excluded him from the voters' list constituted a material misrepresentation done with deliberate intent to conceal his ineligibility.

• Distinction Between Voters' Inclusion/Exclusion Proceedings and COC Denial/Cancellation Proceedings — Inclusion/exclusion proceedings and COC denial/cancellation proceedings are different in terms of purpose (application to vote versus application to be a candidate), issues, and available reliefs, although they may share common factual bases. Inclusion/exclusion cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of MTCs, with appeal to the RTC; the RTC decision is immediately final and executory under Section 138 of the OEC, correctible only by the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari based on grave abuse of discretion. COC denial/cancellation cases fall under the COMELEC's jurisdiction, with the Division's decision reviewable by the COMELEC en banc, and the en banc decision reviewable by the Supreme Court under Rule 64. A ruling on the right to vote by a trial court in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding is binding on the COMELEC in a subsequent Section 78 proceeding.

• Effect of Electoral Victory on Material Misrepresentation — The doctrine that mandatory provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are construed as directory after the elections to give effect to the will of the people does not apply to COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, the balance must tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law; to rule otherwise would slowly gnaw at the rule of law. This doctrine qualifies and fine-tunes the rulings in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC.

• Dual Citizens and the Right to Vote in Local Elections — Dual citizens who vote as absentee voters under Republic Act No. 9189 (the Overseas Absentee Voting Law) may vote only for national officials (president, vice-president, senators, and party-list representatives). Absentee voters are exempted from the constitutional residency requirement for regular Philippine voters. A dual citizen who does not register as an absentee voter and who lacks the residency requirement of one year in the Philippines and six months in the locality cannot validly register as a regular voter for local elections.

• Continuation of COC Cancellation Proceedings After Elections — Under the combined application of Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 6646, if a disqualification or COC cancellation/denial case is not resolved before election day, proceedings shall continue even after the election, and the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel the COC persists. The candidate may be voted for and proclaimed if he or she wins, but the subsequent cancellation of the COC results in the nullification of the proclamation as a necessary legal consequence. The only exception applies to congressional or senatorial candidates, where the COMELEC loses jurisdiction in favor of the respective electoral tribunals after the candidates take their oath of office.

• "The false representation that these provisions mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The candidate's status as a registered voter similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC."

• "Separately from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a 'deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.' In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office."

• "We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by the clarification that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law."

• "Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal legal command, framed by a Congress representing the national will, is rendered inutile because the people of a given locality has decided to vote a candidate into office despite his or her lack of the qualifications Congress has determined to be necessary."

• Caasi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88831, November 8, 1990 — Cited by the RTC and discussed for the proposition that naturalization in a foreign country results in the abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. The Court noted this as part of the factual backdrop but did not directly affirm or overturn its application to Velasco.

• Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003 — Cited for the principle that absentee voters are exempted from the constitutional residency requirement for regular Philippine voters. The CA had cited this case in initially granting Velasco's appeal. The Supreme Court discussed it to explain why Velasco could not have qualified as a regular voter.

• Domino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999 — Controlling precedent establishing that factual findings of a trial court in inclusion/exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive on and do not rise to the level of res judicata with respect to the COMELEC. Applied to support the conclusion that the COMELEC properly relied on the final and executory RTC ruling on Velasco's right to vote.

• Coquilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002 — Followed and applied. The Court drew a direct comparison: like Coquilla, Velasco had lost his residency and domiciliary status in the Philippines, entered the Philippines on a visitor's visa, and never established permanent residence; thus, he could not have validly registered as a regular voter for local elections. Also cited for the rule that COC cancellation proceedings continue even after the election and proclamation.

• Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008, and Saya-ang, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 155807, November 28, 2003 — Distinguished and qualified. These cases established that mandatory provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are construed as directory after the elections to give effect to the will of the people. The Court limited their application to COC defects involving matters of form, excluding cases of material misrepresentation.

• Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006 — Cited for the proposition that dual citizens possess the right to vote in Philippine elections through the absentee voting scheme under Republic Act No. 9189.

• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) — Governs petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false. Applied as the substantive basis for cancelling Velasco's COC.

• Section 74, Omnibus Election Code — Prescribes the required contents of a certificate of candidacy, including residence and a sworn statement that the facts stated are true to the best of the candidate's knowledge. Non-compliance through false representation triggers Section 78.

• Section 138, Omnibus Election Code (as amended by Section 33 of R.A. No. 8189) — Provides that MTCs have original and exclusive jurisdiction over inclusion and exclusion cases; decisions may be appealed to the RTC within five days; the RTC decision "shall become final and executory"; no motion for reconsideration is entertained. Applied to hold that the RTC decision excluding Velasco was final and executory and could not be appealed to the CA.

• Section 39, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Specifies the qualifications for elective local government officials, including residency requirements and the requirement of being a registered voter in the locality where the candidate intends to run. Applied to establish that registered voter status is a material qualification for local elective office.

• Section 9, Republic Act No. 8189 (Voters' Registration Act) — Requires that voters shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. Applied to show that Velasco did not meet the residency requirement for regular voter registration.

• Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003) — The law under which Velasco reacquired his Philippine citizenship and obtained dual citizenship status. The Court noted that dual citizenship status confers voting rights only through the absentee voting scheme for national elections.

• Republic Act No. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Law), Section 4 — Limits the coverage of absentee voting to elections for president, vice-president, senators, and party-list representatives. Applied to explain that Velasco could not have voted for local officials as an absentee voter.

• Sections 6 and 7, Republic Act No. 6646 — Provide that candidates disqualified by final judgment before election shall not be voted for and votes cast for them shall not be counted; if the disqualification case is unresolved before election, proceedings continue and the COMELEC retains jurisdiction. Applied to affirm the validity of cancelling Velasco's COC after his proclamation.

• Section 7, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution — Provides that decisions of the COMELEC en banc are reviewable by the Supreme Court. This was the jurisdictional basis for Velasco's petition for certiorari.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, and Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (on leave), Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Ruben T. Reyes, and Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.