Vda. de Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals

An owner of an estate surrounded by other immovables without adequate outlet to a public highway is entitled to demand a compulsory right of way after establishing the four requisites under Articles 649 and 650, namely surrounding without adequate outlet, payment of proper indemnity, isolation not due to the proprietor's own acts, and location at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate where distance to the highway is shortest.

Loreto Vda. de Baltazar and Nestor Baltazar owned residential Lot 1026-A fronting Braulio Street, a provincial road in Sta. Ines, Bulacan. Daniel Panganiban owned adjacent Lot 1027, a 117-square-meter interior parcel bounded on the south by petitioners' lot, on the east and west by lots of other neighbors, on the north by the Sta. Ana River, and formerly part of petitioners' larger holding. Braulio Street, running across the frontage of the outer lots, was the only accessible public road for the interior lot.

Daniel Panganiban owned Lot 1027, a 117-square-meter residential parcel in Sta. Ines, Bulacan. Immediately in front was Lot 1026, with an area of 119 square meters, owned by Loreto Vda. de Baltazar and Nestor Baltazar and occupied by their residential house fronting the provincial road. Immediately behind Panganiban's lot was the Sta. Ana River, while on either side were Lots 1025 and 1028 owned by Ricardo Calimon and Jose Legaspi, respectively. Braulio Street ran along the frontage of Lots 1025, 1026 and 1028 and was the only accessible road from Lot 1027.

Running along one side of petitioners' property was a 1.20-meter wide and 10.40-meter long passageway, designated as Lot 1026-B, with steel gates, which Panganiban claimed to have used as ingress and egress to Braulio Street. According to Panganiban, the passage had been existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used by him for thirty years during the lifetime of petitioners' grandfather Fidel and father Onisimo Baltazar, until some three years before he instituted the action when petitioners prevented its use. Petitioners closed the gate, placed plants across it, and constructed their present residence, compelling Panganiban to request temporary passage first on the eastern side over Lot 1025 and, when that was closed, on the western side over Lot 1028.

Sometime in 1989, Panganiban filed a complaint for establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of right of way over petitioners' property, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners opposed the writ, asserting that two other rights of way adjacent to respondent's property existed and that respondent had abandoned the claimed right of way.

The trial court, after ocular inspection and hearings, found that respondent's property was accessible via two other passageways: one running alongside the concrete fence over the properties of Loreto Bernardo and Jose Legaspi and ending in a gate into respondent's property, and another on the opposite side over the properties of Encarnacion Calimon and Ricardo Calimon, then presently used by respondent and likewise ending in a gate. Although viewing the claimed passage as the shortest and least prejudicial, the trial court declined the easement because of strained relations, indicating it would be granted only if the other two passageways became unavailable. The Court of Appeals, by contrast, found the two other routes were not simultaneous alternatives but successive temporary pathways granted upon request after petitioners closed Lot 1026-B, a finding stated to be supported by the evidence on record.

• Existence of Other Passageways: Petitioners argued that the prayer for preliminary injunction and for a permanent easement should be denied because two other rights of way adjacent to private respondent's property existed and were being used by him for ingress to and egress from his property to the provincial road.
• Abandonment: Petitioners argued that private respondent had abandoned the alleged right of way through their property.

• Violation of Articles 649 and 650: Respondent countered that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for reasons of pragmatic considerations, particularly strained relations, in flagrant and clear violation of Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

• Adequate Outlet and Other Passageways: Whether an easement of right of way can be granted to a person who has two other existing passageways adjacent to his property which he is using in going to and from his property.
• Continuous Use and Discontinuous Character: Whether an easement of right of way can be established through alleged continuous use thereof in light of the doctrine in Ronquillo vs. Roco that an easement of right of way is discontinuous in nature.

• Adequate Outlet and Other Passageways: Yes. The compulsory easement was granted because the two other routes were merely successive temporary pathways, leaving the estate without adequate outlet, and the claimed strip was the shortest and least prejudicial access upon payment of indemnity.
• Continuous Use and Discontinuous Character: Yes, as a compulsory easement. Entitlement was sustained under Articles 649 and 650 upon proof of the four requisites, with thirty years of tolerated use showing the isolation was not due to respondent's act and confirming the least prejudicial location.

• Adequate Outlet and Other Passageways: The four requisites for a compulsory right of way had to be established: (1) estate surrounded by other immovables without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) isolation not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) claim at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and where distance to the highway is shortest if consistent with that rule. The first requisite was undisputed, respondent's lot being surrounded by immovables on three sides and a river on the fourth. The Court of Appeals' finding that the eastern and western routes were not simultaneous alternatives but temporary pathways successively requested from neighbors after closure of Lot 1026-B was supported by the evidence, so no adequate outlet existed. Both parties agreed the claimed passage was the shortest distance to Braulio Street, and the records showed it was separate and distinct from petitioners' own gate, establishing the fourth requisite.
• Continuous Use and Discontinuous Character: The thirty-year existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used passage through Lot 1026-B during the lifetime of petitioners' predecessors, followed by its closure and obstruction when petitioners closed the gate, placed plants across it, and built their residence, established that isolation was not due to respondent's own act, respondent having merely bought Lot 1027 formerly part of petitioners' Lot 1026-A. Advance payment was not required to create the easement because the suit itself, in addition to creating the easement, precisely fixes the indemnity; remand to fix proper indemnity was therefore proper. The easement was thus demandable as a compulsory right of way upon compliance with the statutory requisites, not defeated by strained relations or by reliance on temporary neighborly tolerance.

• Compulsory easement of right of way; four requisites — The owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after establishing: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Applied here, all requisites were found present, so respondent was entitled to the easement over Lot 1026-B.
• Proper indemnity; fixation in the easement suit — A strict advance payment of proper indemnity is not required before filing, because the action to create the easement is itself the proceeding to fix the amount of indemnity to be paid. Applied here, remand to the trial court to determine proper indemnity after grant of the right of way was sustained, following Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court.

• "By express provision of Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest." — States the controlling four-part test for a compulsory easement, cited from Locsin vs. Climaco, upon which entitlement was measured.
• "There would indeed be some point in looking askance at a reading of the law which would impute to it a strict requirement to pay "proper indemnity" in advance of a suit the purpose of which, in addition to creating an easement, is precisely to fix the amount of the indemnity to be paid therefor." — Defines why prior payment is not a condition precedent, justifying remand to fix indemnity after granting the easement.

• Locsin vs. Climaco, 26 SCRA 836 — Followed as controlling statement of the four requisites for a compulsory right of way under Articles 649 and 650.
• Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 536 — Followed to hold that proper indemnity need not be paid in advance because the easement suit itself fixes the amount.
• Ronquillo vs. Roco, 103 Phil. 84 — Raised by petitioners for the proposition that an easement of right of way is discontinuous; the decision resolved entitlement instead under the statutory requisites for a compulsory easement.
• Angela Estate, Inc. vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 24 SCRA 500 — Cited through Locsin vs. Climaco as basis for the four-requisite rule.
• Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. vs. Capitol Subdivision, 17 SCRA 731 — Cited through Locsin vs. Climaco as basis for the four-requisite rule.

• Articles 649 and 650, New Civil Code of the Philippines — Govern when the owner of an estate surrounded by other immovables without adequate outlet to a public highway may demand a right of way through neighboring estates upon payment of proper indemnity at the least prejudicial point and shortest distance; applied to sustain respondent's demand over Lot 1026-B.

Feliciano, J., Melo, J., Vitug, J., Francisco, J.