Vasco vs. Court of Appeals

A trial court loses jurisdiction over a case upon the perfection of an appeal, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal, and to permit the prosecution of pauper's appeals; an order for execution pending appeal does not fall within these exceptions because it involves the very matter litigated by the appeal.

The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City had jurisdiction over a civil case for recognition and support filed by Angelina Reyes on behalf of her two children against Antonio Vasco. The case involved the application of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which governs the trial court's retained jurisdiction after an appeal is perfected. The provisional remedy of support pendente lite under Rule 61 of the Rules of Court was available to the plaintiffs but was not availed of before judgment was rendered.

Antonio Vasco was sued in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City by Angelina Reyes, who sought recognition and support for Reynaldo Vasco and Lolita Vasco, born on April 8, 1952 and April 27, 1954, respectively, whom she alleged to be Antonio's illegitimate children. In a decision dated October 5, 1976, the trial court found that the two were indeed Antonio's illegitimate children and ordered him to pay them P200 as monthly allowance for support beginning October 1976, plus P500 as attorney's fees.

Antonio Vasco appealed to the Court of Appeals, perfecting his appeal on January 6, 1977. The lower court approved his record on appeal on April 21, 1977 and ordered the elevation of the record to the Court of Appeals. Two months later, on June 22, 1977, Reynaldo and Lolita filed a motion for execution of the judgment pending appeal. Antonio opposed the motion, invoking Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, arguing that the lower court had no jurisdiction to grant execution. The lower court nevertheless granted the motion in its order of July 13, 1977.

Antonio assailed the order of execution in a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals upheld the order of execution pending appeal in the "interest of substantial justice" and on the theory that the judiciary is an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, reasoning that if the order was erroneous, the error was only an error of judgment and not a grave abuse of discretion or an act in excess of jurisdiction. Antonio then filed the instant petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court on August 26, 1977.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the lower court had no jurisdiction to grant execution pending appeal because, after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case except for the limited purposes enumerated in Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and execution pending appeal is not among those exceptions.

• Error of Jurisdiction, Not Judgment: Petitioner maintained that the trial court's error was not merely an error of judgment but an act without jurisdiction, and therefore certiorari lies to annul the order of execution pending appeal.

• Substantial Justice and Parens Patriae: Respondents argued that the order of execution pending appeal should be upheld in the interest of substantial justice and on the theory that the judiciary is an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, protecting the interests of minors.

• Error of Judgment Only: Respondents contended that even if the order was erroneous, the error was only an error of judgment and not a grave abuse of discretion or an act in excess of jurisdiction, and thus certiorari was not the proper remedy.

• Jurisdiction to Execute Pending Appeal: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order execution of the judgment pending appeal after the appeal had been perfected.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari lies to annul the trial court's order of execution pending appeal, or whether the error was merely an error of judgment not reviewable by certiorari.

• Jurisdiction to Execute Pending Appeal: No. The trial court had no jurisdiction to issue an order for execution pending appeal long after the perfection of the appeal, because execution pending appeal is not among the exceptions enumerated in Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Yes. Certiorari lies to annul the order of execution pending appeal because the trial court acted without jurisdiction, and the error was not merely an error of judgment.

• Jurisdiction to Execute Pending Appeal: After the perfection of the appeal, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court, and to permit the prosecution of pauper's appeals. An order for execution pending appeal does not fall within these exceptions because it is a proceeding involving the very matter litigated by the appeal, as held in Cabilao vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The general rule is that an appeal stays the execution of the judgment, citing Araneta vs. Gatmaitan and Caragao vs. Maceren and Sebellino. The plaintiffs could have availed themselves of the provisional remedy of support pendente lite under Rule 61 of the Rules of Court before judgment, but they did not do so.

• Propriety of Certiorari: The cases relied upon by the lower court, Garcia vs. Court of Appeals and Hamoy vs. Batingolo, are distinguishable. The Garcia case refers to support pendente lite, which is immediately executory, while the Hamoy case refers to execution pending appeal against a person who was not a party to the case. The instant case is governed by the rule that a trial court, in ordering the execution of a judgment requiring the husband to pay support to his wife after the approval of the record on appeal, acted without jurisdiction, and therefore the order of execution is illegal and void, citing Marcelo vs. Estacio and Estacio vs. Provincial Warden of Rizal. Contrary to the impression of the Court of Appeals, the trial court's error is not merely an error of judgment; it is clear that the trial court acted without jurisdiction, hence certiorari lies to annul its order.

• Parens Patriae: The doctrine of parens patriae is of doubtful relevancy to this case because the recipients of the support granted by the lower court are no longer minors. The doctrine refers to the inherent power and authority of the state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui juris, under which the state has the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability. While courts should endeavor to do substantial justice and eschew technicalities, procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice, and justice has to be administered according to the rules to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.

• Loss of Trial Court Jurisdiction Upon Perfection of Appeal — Upon the perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court, and to permit the prosecution of pauper's appeals. An order for execution pending appeal does not fall within these exceptions because it involves the very matter litigated by the appeal.

• Parens Patriae — The doctrine refers to the inherent power and authority of the state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui juris, under which the state has the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability. The Court found the doctrine's relevancy doubtful in this case because the recipients of the support were no longer minors.

• Error of Judgment vs. Lack of Jurisdiction — An error of judgment is not reviewable by certiorari, but an act without jurisdiction is. The trial court's order of execution pending appeal after the perfection of the appeal was an act without jurisdiction, not a mere error of judgment, and therefore certiorari lies to annul it.

• "The petition is meritorious because the trial court had no jurisdiction (long after the perfection of the appeal) to issue an order for execution pending appeal It had no jurisdiction because, after the perfection of the appeal, 'the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal to prove compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court, and to permit the prosecution of pauper's appeals' (Sec. 9, Rule 41, Rules of Court.)" — This passage states the core ratio decidendi: the trial court's loss of jurisdiction upon perfection of appeal and the limited exceptions thereto.

• "An order for execution pending appeal does not fall within the said exceptions because it is a proceeding involving the very matter litigated by the appeal (Cabilao vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, L-18454, August 29, 1966, 17 SCRA 992, 997)." — This passage articulates the controlling rule that execution pending appeal is not among the exceptions to the trial court's loss of jurisdiction.

• "Contrary to the impression of the Court of Appeals, the trial court's error is not merely an error of judgment. It is clear that the trial court acted without jurisdiction. Hence, certiorari lies to annul its order of execution pending appeal." — This passage distinguishes an error of judgment from an act without jurisdiction and establishes the propriety of certiorari as the remedy.

• "As to the doctrine of parens patriae (father of his country), its relevancy to this case is doubtful because the recipients of the support granted by the lower court are no longer honors." — This passage limits the application of the parens patriae doctrine to persons under disability, such as minors, and finds it inapplicable where the recipients are no longer minors.

• Cabilao vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, L-18454, Aug. 29, 1966, 17 SCRA 992 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that an order for execution pending appeal does not fall within the exceptions to the trial court's loss of jurisdiction because it involves the very matter litigated by the appeal.

• Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328 — Cited for the general rule that an appeal stays the execution of the judgment.

• Caragao vs. Maceren and Sebellino, 92 Phil. 121 — Cited for the general rule that an appeal stays the execution of the judgment.

• Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 114 Phil. 619 — Distinguished; the case refers to support pendente lite, which is immediately executory, unlike the instant case.

• Hamoy vs. Batingolo, 116 Phil. 115 — Distinguished; the case refers to execution pending appeal against a person who was not a party to the case, unlike the instant case.

• Marcelo vs. Estacio, 69 Phil. 145 — Cited as governing authority for the rule that a trial court ordering execution of a judgment requiring the husband to pay support to his wife after the approval of the record on appeal acted without jurisdiction, making the order illegal and void.

• Estacio vs. Provincial Warden of Rizal, 69 Phil. 150 — Cited together with Marcelo vs. Estacio for the same rule.

• Government of the P. I. vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728 — Cited in the discussion of the parens patriae doctrine.

• Section 9, Rule 41, Rules of Court — The provision governing the trial court's retained jurisdiction after the perfection of an appeal. The Court applied it to hold that the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except for the enumerated purposes, none of which includes execution pending appeal.

• Rule 61, Rules of Court — The provision governing the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The Court noted that the plaintiffs could have availed themselves of this remedy before judgment but did not do so.

• Article 290, Civil Code — Cited in the concurring opinion for the proposition that support includes the education of the person to be supported until he completes his education or training for some profession, trade, or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.

Justice Antonio, concurring, expressed the view that private respondents should now file with the appellate court a petition for support pendente lite under Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, reasoning that if the trial court may provisionally grant alimony pendente lite before rendition of judgment, with more reason may an appellate court grant such support after the trial court has conducted a full dress trial and rendered judgment finding that the claims of filiation and support have been adequately proven, citing Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 45 SCRA 604. Justice Antonio also noted that on the basis of the decision, there appears to be prima facie evidence of the right of Reynaldo and Lolita for support pendente lite, and that even if they are over 21 years old, they are still entitled to support for education under Article 290 of the Civil Code, citing Javier vs. Lucero, 94 Phil. 634.