Vasco-Tamaray vs. Daquis

A lawyer who pretends to be counsel for a party without authority and allows the use of a forged signature on a court pleading violates Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and merits the penalty of disbarment.

Leomarte Tamaray, husband of Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray, introduced Atty. Deborah Daquis to his wife in October 2006 as his personal lawyer during a meeting at East Cafe in Rustan's Makati. During this meeting, Leomarte informed Cheryl that he had decided to file a case to annul their marriage. Atty. Daquis subsequently met with Cheryl at McDonald's-Greenbelt to convince her not to oppose the annulment proceedings. In December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed Cheryl that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage had already been filed before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, ostensibly on Cheryl's behalf as the petitioner, when in fact Atty. Daquis had been engaged by Leomarte to pursue the annulment.

• In October 2006, Leomarte Tamaray introduced Atty. Deborah Daquis to his wife Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray as his lawyer during a meeting at East Cafe, Rustan's Makati, where Leomarte announced his decision to file a case to annul their marriage.
• Atty. Daquis subsequently met with Vasco-Tamaray at McDonald's-Greenbelt to persuade her not to oppose Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled.
• In December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed Vasco-Tamaray that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage had been filed before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.
• In February 2007, Atty. Daquis requested Vasco-Tamaray to appear before the City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City.
• On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's Office and requested a copy of the Petition from Atty. Daquis, who refused to provide it.
• Vasco-Tamaray subsequently obtained a copy of the Petition from Branch 207 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City and discovered that it bore her purported signature "CVasco" and indicated her address as "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City," which was the residence of her husband's family, not her actual residence in Quezon City.
• Vasco-Tamaray alleged that her signature on the Petition was forged and that she never resided at the Muntinlupa address, supported by Certifications from the Sangguniang Barangay of Putatan and Barangay Talipapa.
• Comparison of the signature on the Petition with Vasco-Tamaray's genuine signatures on her identification cards and other documents revealed discrepancies in the stroke of the letters "c" and "o" and in the height of the letters.
• Atty. Daquis filed an Answer claiming that Vasco-Tamaray was her client, not Leomarte Tamaray, and that the community tax certificate number on the jurat was supplied by Vasco-Tamaray herself.
• Atty. Daquis submitted a Joint Affidavit from her staff members claiming they knew Vasco-Tamaray as a client and never witnessed any forgery.

• Vasco-Tamaray alleged that Atty. Daquis filed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on her behalf without her consent and forged her signature on the document.
• She asserted that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but rather the counsel for her husband, Leomarte Tamaray, and therefore had no authority to represent her.
• She claimed that the address indicated in the Petition was not her actual residence but that of her husband's family, and that she never received any court processes or notices.
• She argued that the Petition was actually Atty. Daquis' idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray, to make it appear that she was the petitioner when in fact her husband wanted the marriage annulled.

• Atty. Daquis countered that her client was Vasco-Tamaray herself, not Vasco-Tamaray's husband, and that Vasco-Tamaray had knowledge of the Petition as early as October 2006.
• She alleged that the community tax certificate number appearing on the jurat was supplied by Vasco-Tamaray when she notarized the Petition, as supported by the Joint Affidavit of her staff members.
• She claimed that Vasco-Tamaray had conceived an illegitimate son with another man, implying to impugn her credibility.
• She argued that Vasco-Tamaray had requested her to call and demand money from Leomarte Tamaray, which she refused to do.
• She explained that when Vasco-Tamaray requested a copy of the Petition on March 5, 2007, she was unable to provide it because she did not have a copy with her at that time.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court is bound by the recommendatory findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to dismiss the complaint.
  • Whether the amendments to Rule 139-B by Bar Matter No. 1645 affect the procedure for reviewing administrative complaints against lawyers.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether Atty. Daquis violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by pretending to be counsel for Vasco-Tamaray and filing a Petition without her consent.
  • Whether Atty. Daquis violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 by allowing the use of a forged signature on a pleading she prepared and notarized.
  • Whether Atty. Daquis violated Canon 17 by failing to uphold fidelity to her client's cause.
  • Whether Atty. Daquis violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 by representing conflicting interests.

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court is not bound by the factual findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which are merely recommendatory and subject to review by the Court.
  • The amendments to Rule 139-B by Bar Matter No. 1645 reiterate that only the Supreme Court has the power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar, and the Board of Governors may only recommend dismissal or the imposition of disciplinary action.
• Substantive:
  • Atty. Daquis violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 by engaging in deceitful conduct when she pretended to be counsel for Vasco-Tamaray and filed the Petition making it appear that Vasco-Tamaray was the petitioner when in fact she was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray, thereby committing a falsehood against the court and the complainant.
  • Atty. Daquis violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 because, while there was no direct evidence that she forged the signature, she allowed a forged signature to be used on a petition she prepared and notarized, demonstrating a lack of moral fiber and constituting consent to the doing of a falsehood in court.
  • Atty. Daquis violated Canon 17 by failing to protect the interests of her actual client (Leomarte Tamaray) when she represented Vasco-Tamaray, the opposing party, in the same case.
  • The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 was dismissed because there was no evidence on record showing that Atty. Daquis was actually engaged as counsel by Vasco-Tamaray; hence, no conflict of interest technically existed.

• Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct; applied here to penalize the lawyer for pretending to represent a party without authority and deceiving the court about the true petitioner.
• Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law or behaves in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the profession; applied to penalize the lawyer for allowing a forged signature on a legal document she notarized.
• Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits a lawyer from doing any falsehood or consenting to the doing of any in court, or misleading or allowing the court to be misled by any artifice; applied here to penalize the lawyer's acquiescence to the use of a forged signature.
• Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — Mandates that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him; applied here to penalize the lawyer for representing the opposing party instead of her actual client.
• Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure; the Court found no violation here because no evidence showed the lawyer was engaged by the complainant.

• "Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in a pleading merit the penalty of disbarment."
• "When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth was otherwise, she committed a falsehood against the trial court and complainant."
• "While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's signature, the fact remains that respondent allowed a forged signature to be used on a petition she prepared and notarized."
• "The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client's interest."

• Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy — Cited for the discussion on Canon 1, Rule 1.01 regarding the prohibition against misconduct and the gravity of misconduct depending on factual circumstances.
• Embido v. Pe, Jr. — Cited as precedent for disbarment under Canon 7, Rule 7.03 for falsification of a court decision, establishing that fraudulent transactions and acts reflecting moral turpitude justify disbarment.
• Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera — Cited for the importance of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and the Lawyer's Oath regarding the prohibition against falsehoods in court.
• Penilla v. Alcid, Jr. — Cited for the discussion on Canon 17 regarding the lawyer's obligation of fidelity and the highest degree of zeal in protecting client interests.
• Samson v. Era — Cited for the rationale behind Canon 15, Rule 15.03 regarding conflict of interest and the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
• Hornilla v. Salunat — Cited for the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests.
• Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo — Cited regarding the procedure under Rule 139-B and the Supreme Court's exclusive power to discipline lawyers.

• Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court (as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645) — Governs the procedure for disbarment and discipline of attorneys, specifically Section 12 regarding the review and recommendation by the Board of Governors and the transmittal to the Supreme Court for final action.
• Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
• Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law.
• Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits falsehoods in court.
• Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits representation of conflicting interests.
• Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — Mandates fidelity to the client's cause.
• Lawyer's Oath — Referred to regarding the duty to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court.