Vargas vs. Cajucom

Once a judgment has become final and executory, the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution as a matter of right, and the issuance of the writ is the trial court's ministerial duty; the writ may not be quashed on grounds that attack the merits of the final judgment. Where the judgment orders compliance with the Local Government Code's alternative duties regarding illegal structures on a public highway, execution may be limited to demolition because that is the only enforceable alternative.

Fortunato Cajucom owned a lot in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, where he intended to establish a gasoline station. Access to the site was obstructed by structures built by Rodel Puno, Vicente Mata, Tony Maderia, Rene Maderia, and German Maderia on the road shoulder. Municipal Mayor Marcial Vargas and Municipal Engineer Raymundo del Rosario were the local officials responsible under Republic Act No. 7160 and its Implementing Rules for requiring owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings, or other structures to obtain permits, make necessary changes, or order demolition or removal. The road shoulder and drainages involved formed part of the road's right-of-way and were considered part of the highway under Presidential Decree No. 17, as amended.

On August 15, 2000, Fortunato Cajucom filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 86, a Complaint for mandamus and abatement of nuisance against Mayor Marcial Vargas, Engr. Raymundo del Rosario, and private persons Rodel Puno, Vicente Mata, Tony Maderia, Rene Maderia, and German Maderia, docketed as Civil Case No. 3776. Cajucom alleged that he intended to start a gasoline station business on his lot in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, but several illegal structures built on the road shoulder by Puno, et al. obstructed access to his site and frustrated his plan. He claimed that demand was made for Puno, et al. to remove their structures, but to no avail. He also alleged that he tried to enlist the help of Mayor Vargas and Engr. del Rosario, but they did not act. Cajucom ultimately prayed that the municipal mayor and engineer be commanded to cause the removal of all buildings and structures built on the concerned road shoulder by Puno, et al.

On February 14, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Cajucom. It held that the mayor and municipal engineer failed to perform their duties under the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, Republic Act No. 7160, among which duties is the duty to order the demolition or removal of illegally constructed houses, buildings, or other structures on the road shoulder. The dispositive portion granted the petition for mandamus and ordered the public defendants to comply with the above-cited provision of law. No appeal was interposed from the Decision.

The Decision became final and executory. Cajucom filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. On May 11, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion and directed that a writ of execution be issued. The clerk of court issued the Writ of Execution on May 25, 2001. On May 28, 2001, the sheriff served a copy of the writ on Mayor Vargas and Engr. del Rosario; the writ was signed as received by the mayor's private secretary and by Engr. del Rosario. In his Return of Service dated July 2, 2001, the sheriff reported that, as of June 13, 2001, the judgment had not been executed.

Meanwhile, on February 8, 2002, Puno, et al. filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment with the Court of Appeals to annul the February 14, 2001 Decision of the RTC, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69035. The grounds alleged included the trial court's lack of jurisdiction and its speculation as to certain facts. The CA, in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 and a Resolution dated March 18, 2005, denied the petition, holding that the allegations were flimsy and unacceptable and that Puno, et al. indeed had no right to build residential and commercial structures on the shoulder of a public road. Puno, et al. then went to the Supreme Court via a Petition for certiorari with injunction and request for TRO dated April 8, 2005. On May 3, 2005, in G.R. No. 167537, the Supreme Court denied the petition; a motion for reconsideration was denied in another Resolution dated July 27, 2005.

On April 13, 2005, Cajucom filed a Motion to Compel Defendants Mayor Marcial Vargas and Engineer Raymundo Del Rosario to Implement the Writ of Execution and to Explain Why They Should Not Be Cited for Contempt of Court. Puno, et al. filed their written Opposition. Mayor Vargas and Engr. del Rosario filed their own Motion to Quash Writ of Execution with Explanation Why Public Defendants Should Not Be Cited for Contempt of Court. Cajucom then filed a Motion to Punish Respondents Mayor Marcial Vargas and Municipal Engineer Raymundo Del Rosario for Contempt of Court, to which the public defendants filed an Opposition. On September 15, 2005, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the motion to quash. It held that the mayor can be compelled to do his duty by writ of mandamus and that issuance of the writ was not premature because Cajucom had previously demanded removal but to no avail. It suspended the resolution of the contempt motion and granted the public defendants thirty days from notice to implement and execute the February 14, 2001 Decision with respect to the private defendants pursuant to Art. 87(b)(3)(VI) of Rule XV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991; it ordered a writ of mandamus to issue for execution.

The trial court found that the areas occupied by the structures were the shoulder and drainages which are part of the road's right-of-way and considered part of the highway under Presidential Decree No. 17, as amended. It recognized that removal of the structures was what was called for in the case, as the Decision noted the failure of the public defendants to act on Cajucom's letter-complaint to cause the removal of the structures on the road shoulder, and Cajucom had prayed for removal or demolition in the complaint. Petitioners claimed that Mayor Vargas had left office after the May 2001 elections before being elected again in May 2004, and that the writ would require them to demolish the houses of the other defendants although the judgment merely ordered compliance with their duties under the implementing rules. The Supreme Court rejected these claims.

• Municipal Engineer's Authority: Petitioners argued that the writ of execution was being enforced to compel Engineer Raymundo del Rosario to exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of Mayor Marcial Vargas under Rule XV, Art. 87(3)(VI) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991, Republic Act No. 7160.
• Discretionary Duty: Petitioners maintained that the writ was being enforced to compel Mayor Vargas to perform a discretionary duty, contrary to law and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Petitioners contended that respondent had not exhausted all administrative remedies before filing the petition, so the writ of mandamus should not have been granted and the writ of execution issued to enforce it should be quashed.
• No Clear Legal Right: Petitioners argued that respondent did not have a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of mandamus, so the writ should not have been granted and the writ of execution issued to enforce it should be quashed.
• Enforceability: Petitioners claimed that the writ of execution was not capable of being enforced and should not have been issued in the first place; they asserted that Mayor Vargas had left office after the May 2001 elections before being elected again in May 2004.
• Variance from Judgment: Petitioners alleged that the writ was being enforced in a way that not only varied the judgment but was contrary to law and jurisprudence, because it would require them to demolish the houses of the other defendants although the judgment merely ordered them to comply with their duties under the implementing rules.

• Grounds to Quash Writ of Execution: Whether grounds exist to quash the subject writ of execution issued to enforce the final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 3776.
• Finality and Immutability: Whether petitioners may raise, through a motion to quash the writ of execution, issues attacking the merits of the final judgment, such as lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies, absence of a clear legal right, and the alleged discretionary nature of the mayor's duty.
• Enforceability: Whether the writ of execution is incapable of enforcement because Mayor Vargas left office after the May 2001 elections and was later re-elected in May 2004.
• Variance from Judgment: Whether the writ of execution varies the judgment by requiring the demolition of the structures of the other defendants when the judgment merely ordered compliance with the public defendants' duties under the implementing rules.

• Grounds to Quash Writ of Execution: No. Execution issues as a matter of right upon a final and executory judgment, and the trial court's duty to issue the writ is ministerial; none of the exceptions to objections against execution was shown.
• Finality and Immutability: No. A final and executory judgment is immutable and unalterable and becomes the law of the case; issues on the merits cannot be relitigated at the execution stage.
• Enforceability: No. The writ was directed to Mayor Vargas in his official capacity, not personally, and was served during his terms and within the five-year period for enforcement; his failure to implement it was his own disobedience.
• Variance from Judgment: No. The writ faithfully reproduced the dispositive portion and merely commanded compliance with the Local Government Code and its implementing rules; enforcement was limited to demolition because that was the only alternative capable of execution given the illegal structures on a public highway.

• Grounds to Quash Writ of Execution: Under Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, execution shall issue as a matter of right upon a judgment or final order that disposes of the action upon expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been perfected. Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution as a matter of right, and its issuance is the trial court's ministerial duty; the writ must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment, especially the dispositive portion. The trial court cannot refuse to issue, quash, or stay a writ of execution for a final judgment, except in recognized exceptions such as when the writ varies the judgment, there is a change in the parties' situation making execution inequitable, the property is exempt, the controversy has been submitted to judgment, the terms are unclear, or the writ was improvidently issued, defective, issued against the wrong party, satisfied, or issued without authority. Here, the RTC Decision dated February 14, 2001 became final because petitioners did not appeal; no allegation was made that the judgment was void, and the annulment petition of Puno, et al. was denied by the CA and the Supreme Court. Petitioners' grounds—that the writ compels the municipal engineer to exercise the mayor's powers, forces the mayor to perform a discretionary duty, involves failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and assumes a right not clearly established—attack the merits of the final judgment, not the validity of the writ's issuance. They cannot be raised at the execution stage.
• Finality and Immutability: A final and executory judgment is immutable and unalterable; it may no longer be modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors, make nunc pro tunc entries, or when the judgment is void. Outside these exceptions, the court has only the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution. A decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous, and any amendment or alteration substantially affecting it is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC Decision had become final, and petitioners did not appeal. The issue of the judgment's validity had already been litigated by Puno, et al. in their annulment petition, which was denied and became final. Allowing petitioners to attack the judgment through the motion to quash would be indirect relitigation and would violate fair play, justice, and due process.
• Enforceability: Petitioners argued that the writ could not be enforced because Mayor Vargas left office after the May 2001 elections before being re-elected in May 2004. This argument failed. The statement itself admitted that Mayor Vargas could have implemented the writ during his two incumbencies, since he was served with the writ well within each term and within the five-year period for enforcing the February 14, 2001 Decision. The writ was directed at Mayor Vargas in his capacity as municipal mayor, not in his personal capacity, so service during either term was not irregular. Mayor Vargas had the time and opportunity to perform but refused without valid or legal reason. His failure to enforce the writ during both terms indicated his own disobedience to the final judgment; the conduct of the other mayor who served between his terms was immaterial. Thus, the writ was not incapable of enforcement; it was petitioners who refused to enforce it.
• Variance from Judgment: The writ did not alter or vary the judgment. It merely commanded the sheriff to execute and make effective the February 14, 2001 Decision and faithfully reproduced its dispositive portion. The judgment ordered the public defendants to comply with the law, specifically Section 444(b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code and Article 87(b)(3)(vi) of Rule XV of its Implementing Rules. These provisions enumerate three alternative duties: (1) require owners of illegally constructed structures to obtain the necessary permit, subject to fines and penalties; (2) make necessary changes in construction when it violates law or ordinance; or (3) order the demolition or removal of the structure within the prescribed period. The word "or" is disjunctive, indicating a choice of alternatives, with one excluding the others. Two alternatives—requiring permits or making changes—are not enforceable because the structures were built on public areas and no permit or change could legitimize them. The trial court found that the occupied areas were the shoulder and drainages, part of the road's right-of-way and considered part of the highway under Presidential Decree No. 17, as amended. Puno, et al. could not acquire the public property by prescription, as prescription does not run against the State or its subdivisions on non-patrimonial property, and the structures obstructing free passage would not attain legality by lapse of time. Thus, enforcement was limited to demolition, not because the writ varied the judgment, but because the situation of the parties and practicalities of enforcement required it. The Decision itself noted that Cajucom's letter-complaint sought removal of the structures, and the complaint prayed for removal or demolition. A decision must be read in its entirety to grasp its true intent, and a judgment extends to matters necessarily included in or necessary to it. Demolition was the only and necessary way to effectuate the judgment, and a companion writ of demolition would be a natural consequence.

• Finality and Immutability of Judgment; Law of the Case — Once a judgment becomes final and executory, it is immutable and unalterable, may not be modified except to correct clerical errors, make nunc pro tunc entries, or when the judgment is void, and becomes the law of the case regardless of claims of error. The Court applied this doctrine to bar petitioners from attacking the February 14, 2001 RTC Decision through a motion to quash the writ of execution.
• Execution as a Matter of Right; Ministerial Duty of the Court — Under Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, execution issues as a matter of right upon a final judgment or order, and the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue the writ, which must conform substantially to the dispositive portion. The Court applied this to affirm the writ issued in favor of Cajucom.
• Exceptions to the Rule Against Objecting to Execution — A party generally cannot object to execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except when: (1) the writ varies the judgment; (2) a change in the parties' situation makes execution inequitable or unjust; (3) execution is sought against exempt property; (4) the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (5) the terms of the judgment are unclear and require interpretation; or (6) the writ was improvidently issued, defective in substance, issued against the wrong party, the judgment debt has been paid or satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority. The Court found petitioners did not establish any exception.
• Disjunctive "Or" in Statutory Construction — The word "or" is a disjunctive article indicating a choice of either, with the enumerated alternatives taken separately and independently, so that a choice of one excludes the others. The Court applied this to Section 444(b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code and Article 87(b)(3)(vi) of its Implementing Rules, concluding that the public defendants had to perform one of three alternative duties.
• Non-Patrimonial Public Property; Prescription Does Not Run Against the State — Prescription does not run against the State or its subdivisions on non-patrimonial property, such as public roads and their shoulders. The Court used this to hold that the illegal structures on the road shoulder could not become legal through lapse of time and that only demolition was enforceable.
• Interpretation of the Dispositive Portion in Light of the Entire Decision — The dispositive portion of a judgment must be interpreted together with the findings and conclusions in the whole decision, and a judgment extends to matters necessarily included in or necessary to it. The Court applied this to read the RTC Decision as calling for removal or demolition of the structures.
• Writ of Demolition as Ancillary to Execution — A writ of demolition, when the case calls for it, is ancillary to the process of execution and is logically issued as a consequence of the writ of execution. The Court recognized that a companion writ of demolition would be a natural consequence of enforcing the final judgment.

• "It is a consistent practice that once a judgment has become final and executory, a writ of execution is issued as a matter of course, in the absence of any order restraining its issuance." — States the general rule on execution of final judgments and frames the Court's rejection of the motion to quash.
• "Stated differently, once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution." — Articulates the prevailing party's right to execution and the trial court's corresponding duty.
• "And equally settled is the rule that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable." — States the immutability doctrine applied to bar relitigation of the merits at the execution stage.
• "The said limitation is not because the writ "altered" the judgment; it is because the situation of the parties and the practicalities of such enforcement require it." — Explains why limiting enforcement to demolition did not vary the final judgment.

• De Leon vs. Public Estates Authority, 640 Phil. 594, 609 (2010) — Cited for the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, a writ of execution issues as a matter of course, and that a writ of demolition is ancillary to execution; also cited for the principle that a judgment extends to matters necessarily included therein.
• Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163286, August 22, 2012, 678 SCRA 622, 634-636 — Cited to support the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of execution and that holding its issuance in abeyance may constitute abuse of discretion.
• Anama vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187021, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 293, 302-303 — Quoted for the principle that a court cannot refuse to issue, quash, or stay a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment except in recognized situations, and that execution is a ministerial phase of adjudication.
• Abrigo vs. Flores, G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013, 698 SCRA 559, 570-571 — Cited for the immutability of a final and executory judgment.
• Ramos vs. Ramos, 447 Phil. 114, 119 (2003) — Cited for the exceptions to immutability: correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, or void judgments.
• Victorio vs. Rosete, 603 Phil. 68, 78-79 (2007) — Cited for the rule that any amendment or alteration substantially affecting a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and an order of execution varying the judgment is a nullity.
• Reburiano vs. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 294, 304 (1999) — Cited for the rule that parties cannot raise for the first time on appeal from a denial of a motion to quash a writ of execution issues they could have raised during trial and on appeal from the decision.
• Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Borreta, 519 Phil. 637, 642-643 (2006) — Cited for the exceptions to the general rule that parties may not object to execution by raising new issues of fact or law.
• Hacienda Luisita Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011, 660 SCRA 525, 550-551 — Cited for the disjunctive interpretation of the word "or" in statutory construction.
• Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan, 633 Phil. 369, 378 (2010) — Cited for the rule that "or" connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either, signifying disassociation and independence of the enumerated items.
• San Miguel Corporation vs. Teodosio, 617 Phil. 399, 420-421 (2009) — Cited for the rule that the dispositive portion of a judgment must be interpreted in light of the entire decision to grasp its true intent and meaning.
• East Asia Traders Inc. vs. Republic, 477 Phil. 848, 863 (2004) — Cited for the rule that prescription does not run against the State or its subdivisions on non-patrimonial property.
• Province of Zamboanga vs. City of Zamboanga, 131 Phil. 446, 454 (1968) — Cited for the classification of public roads as non-patrimonial property of the State.
• Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 95, 108-109 (2000) — Cited for the rule that a writ of demolition is sufficient to constitute a writ of execution if the latter was not issued.
• Spouses Golez vs. Spouses Navarro, G.R. No. 192532, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 689, 701 — Cited for the requirement that a writ of execution must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment, particularly the dispositive portion.
• Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Virginia D. vda. De Hernandez, G.R. No. L-30359, October 3, 1975, 67 SCRA 256, 260-261 — Quoted in Anama for the principle that the prevailing party may have a writ of execution within five years after entry of judgment and that the court has a ministerial duty to issue it.

• Rule 39, Section 1, Rules of Court — Execution shall issue as a matter of right upon a judgment or final order disposing of the action upon expiration of the period to appeal if no appeal has been perfected. The Court applied this to hold that Cajucom was entitled to the writ as a matter of right.
• Section 444(b)(3)(vi), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — The municipal mayor shall require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings, or other structures to obtain the necessary permit, subject to fines and penalties, or make necessary changes in construction when it violates law or ordinance, or order demolition or removal within the prescribed period. The Court used this to define the duties the public defendants were ordered to perform.
• Rule XV, Article 87(b)(3)(vi), Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7160 — Almost a verbatim reproduction of Section 444(b)(3)(vi); cited as the provision the RTC ordered the public defendants to comply with and as the basis for the writ of mandamus and execution.
• Presidential Decree No. 17, as amended (Revised Philippine Highway Act of 1972) — Cited to establish that the road shoulder and drainages occupied by the structures formed part of the road's right-of-way and were considered part of the highway, making the structures illegal.
• Civil Code, Articles 1108(4) and 1113 — Cited for the rule that prescription does not run against the State or its subdivisions on non-patrimonial property.
• Civil Code, Articles 420 and 424 — Cited to classify public roads and their shoulders as non-patrimonial property of the State.
• Civil Code, Articles 694(4) and 698 — Cited in relation to structures obstructing free passage to the road and their inability to attain legality by lapse of time.
• Sections 7 and 8, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Mentioned in the RTC Order suspending the resolution of Cajucom's motion to punish petitioners for contempt until after the 30-day period to execute. The Supreme Court did not resolve the contempt issue.
• Department Order No. 52, series of 2003, Department of Public Works and Highways — Cited in footnote as considering right of way to include the travelway, curb and gutter, sidewalks, shoulders, canals, and other portions.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson); Martin S. Villarama, Jr.; Bienvenido L. Reyes; Francis H. Jardeleza.