Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Jocelyn Catubig

A complaint for damages need not be verified unless a law or rule specifically requires verification; the absence of verification does not warrant dismissal where a certificate against forum shopping is attached. An employer’s vicarious liability under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code does not arise unless the employee’s fault or negligence is first established; where the proximate cause of the injury is solely the victim’s own negligence, no presumption of employer negligence arises.

Vallacar Transit, Inc. is engaged in the transportation business and owns the Ceres Bulilit bus with Plate No. T-0604-1348; Quirino C. Cabanilla was its regular bus driver. Respondent Jocelyn Catubig is the widow of Quintin Catubig, Jr., whose death in a vehicular collision led her to seek damages under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code. The case concerns whether an employer may be held civilly liable for the alleged negligence of its employee driver when the victim’s own negligence is asserted as the proximate cause.

Vallacar Transit, Inc. is engaged in the transportation business and is the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus with Plate No. T-0604-1348; Quirino C. Cabanilla was its regular bus driver. On January 27, 1994, respondent Jocelyn Catubig’s husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr., was on his way home from Dumaguete City riding in tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado. Catubig was driving the motorcycle. While approaching a curve at kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow-moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing over to the opposite lane, which was then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla in the opposite direction. The two vehicles collided, throwing Catubig and Emperado from the motorcycle; Catubig died on the spot where he was thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the hospital.

On February 1, 1994, Cabanilla was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon, Negros Oriental. After preliminary investigation, the MCTC issued a Resolution on December 22, 1994 dismissing the criminal charge against Cabanilla, finding that he was not criminally liable for the deaths because there was no negligence, not even contributory, on his part. Thereafter, on July 19, 1995, respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint for Damages against petitioner, seeking actual, moral, and exemplary damages in the total amount of P484,000.00 for Catubig’s death based on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code. She alleged that petitioner was civilly liable because its employee driver, Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in driving the bus that collided with Catubig’s motorcycle. Petitioner answered that the proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of Catubig when he imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and traversed the opposite lane; as special and affirmative defenses, petitioner sought dismissal for lack of verification and/or failure to state a cause of action, as there was no allegation that petitioner was negligent in the selection or supervision of its employee driver. The parties stipulated during pre-trial that the primary issue for trial was whether petitioner should be held liable for Catubig’s death.

At trial, respondent presented PO2 Robert B. Elnas, Emilio Espiritu, Dr. Norberto Baldado, Jr., Peter Cadimas, and herself. PO2 Elnas, who investigated the collision, testified that the bus was running fast at about 100 kilometers per hour when it collided with the motorcycle that was trying to overtake a truck; that the collision occurred on the bus’s lane; that Catubig was flung 21 meters and Emperado 11 meters from the point of impact; that the motorcycle was totaled, its chassis broke into three parts, and its front wheel and steering wheel with shock absorbers were found 26 meters and 38 meters, respectively, from the collision point; and that only the front bumper of the bus was damaged. Cadimas testified that he personally witnessed the collision while waiting for a ride to Dumaguete City; he saw the Ceres Bulilit bus making a turn at a curve, signaled it to halt, but it was running fast; there was a cargo truck running slow in the opposite direction; he then heard a thud and saw that the bus had collided with a motorcycle. Espiritu, the photographer, identified five photographs he took of Catubig lying bloodied on the ground, broken motorcycle parts, and the truck Catubig tried to overtake. Dr. Baldado, the medico-legal doctor, reported Catubig’s injuries—laceration and fracture of the right leg; laceration and fracture of the left elbow; multiple abrasions in the abdominal area, left anterior chest wall, posterior right arm, and at the back of the left scapular area; and contusion-hematoma just above the neck—and confirmed that Catubig was already dead when brought to the hospital and that the accident could have caused instantaneous death. Respondent testified to Catubig’s earning capacity, expenses for the wake and burial of Catubig and Emperado, the cost of the motorcycle, and legal services and fees. Her documentary exhibits included the marriage contract dated August 21, 1982, their two children’s certificates of live birth, Catubig’s college diploma dated March 24, 1983, burial expense receipts, PO2 Elnas’s sketch of the collision site, police blotter excerpts, photographs, and Dr. Baldado’s post-mortem report; the RTC admitted all of this evidence on October 6, 1998.

Petitioner presented Rosie C. Amahit and Nunally Maypa. Amahit, a court stenographer at the MCTC, verified the transcript of stenographic notes of the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 held on May 25, 1994, and the MCTC Resolution dated December 22, 1994 dismissing that case. Maypa, the Administrative and Personnel Manager at petitioner’s Dumaguete branch, testified on petitioner’s hiring and supervision procedures. He started working for petitioner on September 22, 1990 as a clerk at the Human Resources Development Department in Bacolod City, became an Administrative Assistant at the Dumaguete branch in November 1993, and was promoted to his current position in August 1995. While an Administrative Assistant, he was responsible for hiring personnel including drivers and conductors. He explained that driver applicants had to be 35 to 45 years old, have at least five years’ experience driving big trucks, submit police, court, and medical clearances, possess a professional driver’s license with restriction code 3, pass an initial interview, actual driving and maintenance skills tests, and a written psychological examination on defensive driving, and undergo a 15-day familiarization with the bus and road conditions before deployment. He admitted, however, that when he became Administrative Assistant at Dumaguete, Cabanilla was already an employee driver. Maypa also recounted that Cabanilla was placed on preventive suspension after the January 27, 1994 accident and that petitioner’s internal investigation declared him not guilty of causing it because he had not been negligent. Petitioner’s documentary exhibits consisted of the May 25, 1994 TSN of the preliminary investigation, the December 22, 1994 MCTC Resolution, and the Minutes dated February 17, 1994 of the grievance proceeding involving Cabanilla; the RTC admitted all of petitioner’s evidence on November 12, 1999.

On January 26, 2000, the RTC ruled in petitioner’s favor. Based on PO2 Elnas’s sketch, which showed that the point of impact occurred beyond the center lane near a curve within the lane of the Ceres bus, and on the testimonies of PO2 Elnas and Cadimas that the motorcycle recklessly tried to overtake a truck near a curve and encroached on the opposite lane, the RTC found that the proximate cause of the collision was Catubig’s negligence. It was also convinced through Maypa’s testimony that petitioner had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee drivers, including Cabanilla. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that both Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent: Catubig failed to use reasonable care for his own safety and ignored the hazard when he tried to overtake a truck at a curve, while Cabanilla was running his vehicle at a high speed of 100 kilometers per hour. The appellate court brushed aside petitioner’s due-diligence defense because Maypa was not in a position to testify on the procedures followed in hiring Cabanilla, who had been hired a year before Maypa assumed his post at the Dumaguete branch. The Supreme Court later found the testimonies of Cadimas and PO2 Elnas on the bus’s speed to lack probative value: Cadimas merely said the bus was “running very fast,” while PO2 Elnas had refused during the preliminary investigation to give testimony as to the speed of either vehicle or an opinion on fault but during trial claimed he was told by Cabanilla that the bus was running around 100 kilometers per hour. The point of impact within the bus’s lane and the motorcycle’s encroachment on that lane made it more reasonable to conclude that Catubig was driving at high speed to overtake the truck and that Cabanilla was driving along the proper lane.

• Verification and Forum Shopping: Petitioner asserted that respondent’s complaint for damages should be dismissed for failure to verify; the certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint, signed by respondent, was not a valid substitute for verification that she had read the pleading and that the allegations were true and correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic records. Petitioner cited jurisprudence that a pleading lacking proper verification is treated as an unsigned pleading producing no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
• Vicarious Liability under Article 2180: Petitioner denied any vicarious or imputed liability under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code, arguing that respondent failed to prove the culpability of Cabanilla. It pointed to two trial court decisions—the MCTC Resolution dated December 22, 1994 in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 and the RTC Decision dated January 26, 2000 in the civil suit—which explicitly ruled that the proximate cause of the collision was Catubig’s reckless and negligent act. Without fault or negligence of its employee driver, no liability could be imputed to petitioner.
• Damages: Petitioner additionally argued, without conceding fault or liability, that the Court of Appeals’ award of the lump sum of P250,000.00 as total death indemnity lacked factual and legal basis. Respondent’s evidence to prove actual or compensatory damages was self-serving, either inadmissible or devoid of probative value, and the award of moral and exemplary damages was contrary to the appellate court’s ruling that Catubig should be equally liable for his own death.

• Affirmance of the Court of Appeals: Respondent maintained that the Court of Appeals correctly adjudged petitioner liable for Catubig’s death and that the appellate court had already duly passed upon all the issues raised in the petition.

• Verification of the Complaint: Whether respondent’s complaint for damages should be dismissed for lack of verification despite the attached certificate against forum shopping.
• Employer Liability under Article 2180: Whether petitioner is vicariously liable under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code for Catubig’s death based on the alleged negligence of its employee driver, Cabanilla.
• Proximate Cause: Whether the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Catubig or of Cabanilla.
• Damages: Whether the Court of Appeals’ award of P250,000.00 as death indemnity is proper.

• Verification of the Complaint: No. A complaint for damages need not be verified unless a law or rule specifically requires verification; the attached certificate against forum shopping satisfied the separate requirement, and lack of verification is a formal, non-jurisdictional defect.
• Employer Liability under Article 2180: No. Vicarious liability under Article 2180 requires prior establishment of the employee’s fault or negligence; no such negligence was proven against Cabanilla.
• Proximate Cause: Catubig’s own negligence. The evidence showed Cabanilla was driving along the proper lane while Catubig overtook a truck at a curve and encroached on the oncoming lane; the testimonies on the bus’s speed lacked probative value.
• Damages: No. Because petitioner bears no liability, the Court of Appeals’ award of P250,000.00 was set aside and the RTC’s dismissal was reinstated.

• Verification of the Complaint: Under Rule 7, Section 6 of the 1964 Rules of Court, then in effect when the complaint was filed on July 19, 1995, a pleading was verified by an affidavit stating that the affiant read the pleading and that the allegations were true of his own knowledge; verification based on information and belief was insufficient. The 1997 Rules of Court, as later amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10, retained the rule that a pleading lacking proper verification is treated as unsigned, but also provided that, except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified, or accompanied by affidavit. No law or rule specifically required respondent’s complaint for damages to be verified. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement intended to assure that allegations are true and filed in good faith; the court may order correction or waive strict compliance. The certificate against forum shopping, which is required for initiatory pleadings and must be signed by the party, is distinct from verification and was attached to respondent’s complaint. Thus, no procedural defect warranted dismissal.
• Employer Liability under Article 2180: Article 2176 defines a quasi-delict as damage caused by act or omission where there is fault or negligence and no pre-existing contractual relation. Article 2180 makes the obligation demandable not only for one’s own acts but also for those for whom one is responsible, including employers for damages caused by employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, unless the employer proves all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 flows from the negligence of their employees. Here, the totality of evidence showed that the proximate cause of the collision was solely Catubig’s negligence and that Cabanilla was not at fault. Because no employee negligence was established, the presumption of fault or negligence on the part of petitioner as Cabanilla’s employer did not arise, and it was unnecessary to delve into petitioner’s defense of due diligence in selection and supervision.
• Proximate Cause: Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, it is the cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under circumstances where the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that injury to some person might probably result. The RTC found that Catubig’s overtaking of a slow-moving truck while approaching a curve was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. Overtaking is not allowed while approaching a curve under Section 41(b) of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction should be resorted to only if the highway is free from incoming vehicles to permit safe overtaking under Section 41(a); such conduct is reckless driving penalized under Section 48 of Republic Act No. 4136 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The testimonies of Cadimas and PO2 Elnas that Cabanilla was driving at reckless speed lacked probative value: Cadimas merely said the bus was “running very fast,” and PO2 Elnas gave inconsistent statements, refusing during the preliminary investigation to testify as to speed or fault but later claiming during trial that Cabanilla told him the bus was running around 100 kilometers per hour. The point of impact occurred within the bus’s lane, and the motorcycle had encroached on that lane while overtaking near a curve. It was more reasonable to infer that Catubig was driving at high speed to overtake the truck and that Cabanilla was driving along the proper lane. Thus, the proximate cause was Catubig’s own negligence.
• Damages: The Court of Appeals’ award of P250,000.00 as full compensation for Catubig’s death was premised on petitioner’s equal liability. Because the proximate cause was Catubig’s own negligence and no fault or negligence was attributable to Cabanilla or petitioner, the award had no basis and was set aside; the RTC’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 11360 was reinstated.

• Employer liability under Article 2180 requires prior employee negligence — In a quasi-delict under Article 2176, an employer may be liable for damages caused by an employee acting within the scope of assigned tasks, but the presumption of employer negligence under Article 2180 flows from the negligence of the employee. If the employee is not shown to be at fault or negligent, the employer’s vicarious liability does not arise, and the employer need not prove due diligence in selection and supervision. Applied: Cabanilla was not negligent; Catubig’s own negligence was the proximate cause, so petitioner was not liable.
• Proximate cause — The cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred; more comprehensively, the cause acting first and producing the injury through a natural and continuous chain of events, each closely connected to its predecessor, where the person responsible should have reasonably expected that injury might probably result. Applied: Catubig’s overtaking of a truck at a curve and encroachment on the bus’s lane was the proximate cause of the collision.
• Verification is formal, not jurisdictional, and is required only when law or rule specifically requires it — A pleading need not be verified unless a law or rule specifically requires verification; verification is intended to assure that allegations are true and filed in good faith, and courts may order correction or waive strict compliance. The certificate against forum shopping is a separate requirement for initiatory pleadings and must be signed by the party. Applied: respondent’s complaint for damages was not required to be verified, and the attached certificate against forum shopping sufficed; dismissal for lack of verification was improper.
• Rule 45 limits review to questions of law, subject to exceptions for factual review — Although a petition for review under Rule 45 raises only questions of law, factual findings may be reviewed when: (1) the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. Applied: the RTC and Court of Appeals had contradictory findings on negligence, so the Court reviewed the factual findings.
• Overtaking at a curve and encroaching on the opposite lane — Under Section 41(b) of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, overtaking is not allowed while approaching a curve; under Section 41(a), passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction should be resorted to only if the highway is free from incoming vehicles to permit safe overtaking. Such conduct constitutes reckless driving penalized under Section 48 of Republic Act No. 4136 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Applied: Catubig violated these provisions when he overtook a truck at a curve and crossed into the bus’s lane.

• "The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from the negligence of their employees." — This states the ratio for rejecting employer liability: without employee negligence, the statutory presumption against the employer never arises.
• "Having adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision resulting in Catubig's death was his own negligence, and there was no fault or negligence on Cabanilla's part, then such presumption of fault or negligence on the part of petitioner, as Cabanilla's employer, does not even arise." — This applies the employer-liability rule to the facts and explains why petitioner was not liable.
• "Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." — This is the Court’s canonical definition of proximate cause, used to identify Catubig’s overtaking as the cause of the collision.
• "Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit." — This supports the procedural holding that respondent’s complaint for damages did not require verification and should not have been dismissed on that ground.

• Pajuyo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492 — Cited to distinguish failure to sign the certificate against forum shopping from failure to sign the verification; the certificate must be signed by the party, while verification is formal and may be signed by a representative, lawyer, or person who knows the facts.
• Jimenez vda. De Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 157, 165 (1996) — Cited for the rule that verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement and that courts may order correction of unverified pleadings or waive strict compliance in the interest of justice.
• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Monet’s Export and Manufacturing Corporation, 493 Phil. 327, 338 (2005) — Cited for the rule that a petition for review under Rule 45 raises only questions of law and that factual findings of lower courts are generally respected, subject to recognized exceptions.
• Pestaño vs. Sumayang, 400 Phil. 740, 749 (2000) — Cited for the proposition that the issue of negligence is basically factual.
• Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 184905, August 28, 2009, 597 SCRA 526, 535-536 — Cited for the definition of proximate cause.
• McKee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102, July 16, 1992, 211 SCRA 517, 544 — Cited for the rule that the presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 flows from the negligence of their employees.

• Article 2176, Civil Code — Defines quasi-delict as damage caused to another by act or omission where there is fault or negligence and no pre-existing contractual relation. Applied: respondent’s claim required proof of fault or negligence as the basis for liability.
• Article 2180, Civil Code — Makes the obligation under Article 2176 demandable for one’s own acts and for persons for whom one is responsible, including employers for damages caused by employees acting within the scope of assigned tasks; responsibility ceases if the employer proves all diligence of a good father of a family. Applied: because Cabanilla was not negligent, the employer’s liability and the due-diligence defense did not arise.
• Rule 7, Section 6, 1964 Rules of Court — Required verification by affidavit stating that the affiant read the pleading and that the allegations were true of his own knowledge; verification based on information and belief was insufficient. Applied: this was the rule in effect when respondent filed her complaint on July 19, 1995.
• Rule 7, Section 4, 1997 Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10 — Provides that, except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be verified; a pleading required to be verified that lacks proper verification is treated as unsigned. Applied: no law or rule specifically required respondent’s complaint for damages to be verified, so dismissal was not warranted.
• Rule 7, Section 5, 1997 Rules of Court / Administrative Circular No. 04-94 — Requires a certificate against forum shopping for initiatory pleadings. Applied: respondent’s complaint was accompanied by such a certificate, satisfying the separate requirement.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Limits a petition for review to questions of law. Applied: the Court recognized exceptions, including contradictory factual findings between the RTC and Court of Appeals, and reviewed the negligence findings.
• Sections 41(a) and 41(b), Republic Act No. 4136, as amended — Prohibit overtaking while approaching a curve and allow passing another vehicle in the same direction only when the highway is free from incoming vehicles to permit safe overtaking. Applied: Catubig violated these provisions when he overtook a truck at a curve and encroached on the bus’s lane.
• Section 48, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended — Penalizes reckless driving. Applied: the RTC characterized Catubig’s overtaking at a curve as reckless driving.
• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes reckless driving. Applied: the RTC noted that overtaking another vehicle while approaching a curve constitutes reckless driving under this provision.

Corona, C.J. (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Peralta, and Perez, JJ., concur. Peralta, J., acted per Special Order No. 994 dated May 27, 2011.