Valdez vs. Republic

Under the Civil Code, a judicial declaration of presumptive death is unnecessary and unauthorized, as the presumption arises by operation of law after seven consecutive years of absence without news of the absentee being alive.

Petitioner Angelita Valdez married Sofio Polborosa in 1971. Following constant quarrels, Sofio left the conjugal dwelling in 1972. He returned briefly in 1975 to execute a separation agreement, after which he was never heard from again. Believing Sofio dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in 1985. Decades later, Virgilio's application for US naturalization was denied on the ground that petitioner's first marriage was still subsisting. To remove this impediment, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of Sofio's presumptive death in 2007.

• First Marriage and Separation: Angelita Valdez and Sofio Polborosa were married on January 11, 1971, and had one child, Nancy. Sofio left the conjugal home in March 1972 due to constant quarrels over his unemployment. In October 1975, Sofio reappeared, and the spouses agreed to separate, executing a document to that effect. This was the last time petitioner saw or heard from him.
• Second Marriage: On June 20, 1985, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes, believing Sofio was already dead.
• Immigration Complication: Virgilio's application for naturalization with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioner's marriage to Sofio was deemed subsisting.
• Petition for Presumptive Death: To resolve the immigration issue, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death before the RTC on March 29, 2007. The RTC dismissed the petition, finding petitioner failed to prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was dead, as she admitted she did not try to find him and even prevented her daughter from doing so.

• Applicable Law: Petitioner argued that the Civil Code, not the Family Code, applies because her marriages to Sofio and Virgilio were celebrated before the Family Code's effectivity.
• Vested Right: Petitioner maintained that she acquired a vested right under the Civil Code, and applying the stricter "well-founded belief" requirement of the Family Code would impair this right.
• Non-repeal: Petitioner asserted that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not expressly repealed by the Family Code.

• Inapplicability of Family Code Requirement: The Office of the Solicitor General countered that the "well-founded belief" requirement under Article 41 of the Family Code cannot be imposed, as it did not exist at the time of the 1985 marriage.
• Vested Right and Non-retroactivity: The OSG argued that petitioner acquired a vested right regarding the validity of her second marriage under the Civil Code, which cannot be prejudiced by the Family Code pursuant to Article 256 thereof.
• Non-repeal: The OSG contended that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by the Family Code, as Title XIV of the Civil Code was not expressly repealed.

• Applicable Law: Whether the Family Code's "well-founded belief" requirement applies to a subsequent marriage celebrated before its effectivity.
• Judicial Declaration: Whether a judicial declaration of presumptive death is authorized or necessary under the Civil Code.

• Applicable Law: The Family Code's "well-founded belief" requirement does not apply. The Civil Code governs because both marriages were celebrated under its regime. Retroactive application of the Family Code would impair the vested right to the validity of the 1985 marriage, violating Article 256 of the Family Code.
• Judicial Declaration: A judicial declaration of presumptive death is unnecessary and unauthorized under the Civil Code. The presumption arises by operation of law after seven years of absence. A judicial decree on this point is useless because the presumption is merely prima facie and disputable, incapable of becoming final and executory.

• Presumption of Death under the Civil Code — After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absentee is presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. This presumption arises by operation of law and requires no judicial declaration. A petition solely for such a declaration cannot be entertained because the presumption is merely juris tantum and cannot be the subject of a final decree.
• Retroactivity of the Family Code — The Family Code cannot be applied retroactively if it prejudices or impairs vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code. A marriage valid at the time of celebration under the Civil Code cannot be invalidated by the subsequent enactment of stricter requirements under the Family Code.

• "Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding." — Reiterating the rule from In re Szatraw that a judicial declaration of presumptive death is unauthorized because the presumption is disputable and cannot reach finality.
• "A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case..." — Explaining why courts cannot issue a final decree of presumptive death under the Civil Code.

• In re Szatraw, 81 Phil. 461 (1948) — Followed. Established that a petition for judicial declaration of presumptive death is unauthorized by law because the presumption is merely prima facie and cannot become final and executory.
• Lukban v. Republic, 98 Phil. 574 (1956) — Followed. Reiterated Szatraw, holding that a petition for judicial declaration of presumptive death cannot be entertained.
• Gue v. Republic, 107 Phil. 381 (1960) — Followed. Reiterated Szatraw.
• Jones v. Hortigüela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937) — Followed. Interpreted Article 83 of the Civil Code, stating that a judicial declaration of absence is unnecessary for the celebration of a subsequent civil marriage; the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years and is generally reputed to be dead.

• Article 41, Family Code — Requires a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is dead before contracting a subsequent marriage. Held inapplicable to marriages celebrated under the Civil Code.
• Article 83, Civil Code — Allows a subsequent marriage if the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years without news of being alive, or is generally considered dead. Applied to validate the petitioner's second marriage.
• Article 390, Civil Code — Presumes an absentee dead after seven years of absence. Applied by operation of law, requiring no judicial decree.
• Article 256, Family Code — Prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code if it prejudices or impairs vested or acquired rights. Applied to protect the validity of the second marriage.

Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Peralta