Valdez vs. Court of Appeals

An action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance requires that the plaintiff's acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the defendant's possession; absent such a jurisdictional allegation on the face of the complaint, the municipal trial court acquires no jurisdiction over the ejectment suit.

Petitioners Spouses Valdez acquired a residential lot in Carolina Executive Village, Antipolo, Rizal from Carolina Realty, Inc. in November 1992. Private respondents Spouses Fabella occupied the subject property and built a house thereon without any color of title. Petitioners made several oral demands for respondents to vacate, referred the matter to the Barangay—which resulted in a Certification to File Action—and sent a formal demand letter on July 12, 1994. Respondents refused to heed all demands to surrender the premises.

• Petitioners' Acquisition: Petitioners became the registered owners of Lot No. 3, Block 19, located at Carolina Executive Village, Antipolo, Rizal, having purchased it from Carolina Realty, Inc. in November 1992.
• Respondents' Occupation: Private respondents built a house on the lot and occupied it without any color of title, thereby depriving petitioners of possession.
• Demands to Vacate: Petitioners repeatedly made oral demands for respondents to vacate. The matter was referred to the Barangay, but respondents still refused to leave, prompting the Barangay Captain to issue a Certification to File Action. A formal demand letter was sent by counsel on July 12, 1994, which was similarly ignored.
• The Pleadings: In their answer, respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that petitioners had prior physical possession or that they were lessors. Alternatively, respondents claimed ownership through open, continuous, and adverse possession for over thirty years.
• Deficiency of the Complaint: The complaint merely alleged that respondents, "without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof." It did not specify how respondents' entry was effected, how and when dispossession started, or that respondents' possession was initially tolerated by petitioners.

• Sufficiency of Allegations: Petitioners argued that the averments of their complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer, having alleged that respondents unlawfully withheld possession of the property.
• Implied Tolerance: Petitioners maintained that summary ejectment is the proper remedy available to an owner when another occupies the land at the former's tolerance or permission without any contract, as the occupant is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand by the owner.

• Absence of Jurisdictional Allegations: Respondents countered that the complaint failed to state that petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that petitioners were their lessors, jurisdictional requisites for ejectment.
• Adverse Possession: Respondents argued that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for more than thirty years, effectively claiming ownership.
• Procedural Defect: Respondents stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.

• Sufficiency of Complaint: Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer.
• Jurisdiction: Whether the Municipal Trial Court has original jurisdiction over the complaint based on its allegations.

• Sufficiency of Complaint: The complaint failed to state a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer necessitates that the defendant's possession was initially legal but became illegal upon the expiration or termination of the right to possess. To justify an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the plaintiff's acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered. The complaint contained only bare allegations that respondents occupied the lot without color of title and deprived petitioners of possession, without any averment that such occupation was initially permitted or tolerated.
• Jurisdiction: The Municipal Trial Court lacked jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint in summary ejectment proceedings, without resort to parol testimony. Because the complaint failed to aver the key jurisdictional fact of tolerance from the start, it did not establish a case for unlawful detainer. Neither did it allege prior material possession, which is mandatory for forcible entry. Consequently, the proper remedies are an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria before the Regional Trial Court, not a summary ejectment proceeding before the Municipal Trial Court.

• Jurisdictional Facts in Ejectment — In summary actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. The complaint must embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without need for parol testimony. Failure to aver how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started deprives the municipal trial court of jurisdiction.
• Tolerance in Unlawful Detainer — To justify an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the plaintiff's supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. If the possession was unlawful from the start, unlawful detainer is an improper remedy. Allowing a forcible entry suit to be recast as an unlawful detainer case based on a belated claim of tolerance would circumvent the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry and undermine the summary nature of ejectment proceedings.

• "To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy."
• "It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer."

• Sarona v. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365 (1968) — Followed. Established the doctrine that tolerance must be present right from the start of possession to categorize a cause of action as unlawful detainer; otherwise, allowing a belated plea of tolerance would circumvent the one-year time-bar for forcible entry.
• Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172 (2001) — Followed. Reiterated that tolerance must be present from the inception of possession; possession by stealth without the owner's knowledge constitutes forcible entry, not unlawful detainer.
• Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, 410 SCRA 485 (2003) — Followed. Held that bare allegations of tolerance contradict the requirement that tolerance must exist from the start of possession, especially when the allegations imply the occupation was unlawful from its inception.
• Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146 (1995) — Followed. Stated that jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint in ejectment cases to vest the court with jurisdiction.

• Rule 70, Section 1, Rules of Court — Governs forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions. Applied to require that complaints must specifically aver the jurisdictional facts of either prior physical possession (for forcible entry) or tolerance from the start of possession (for unlawful detainer) to clothe the municipal trial court with jurisdiction.

Artemio V. Panganiban (CJ), Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.