Uy vs. Lacsamana

A party seeking to nullify a sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent must first prove the existence of a valid marriage; absent such proof, and where the registered owner rebuts the Article 147 presumption of co-ownership by establishing paraphernal acquisition, the sale executed by the sole owner alone is valid.

Luis Uy, a Chinese national who later sought Philippine citizenship, and Petra Rosca cohabited from approximately 1944 until their physical separation before 1973, raising eight children. The dispute centers on a 484-square-meter parcel of land in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City, originally owned by Spouses Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita de Villa under OCT No. 0-2840, and subsequently registered under TCT No. T-24660 in Rosca's name. The applicable marriage law at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited was Act No. 3613 (the Marriage Law of 1929), as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114, which required the solemnizing officer to furnish copies of the marriage certificate to the contracting parties and the municipal office. The case requires determining whether Uy and Rosca were legally married, which dictates the property regime governing the subject land and, consequently, whether Rosca could validly sell it without Uy's consent.

Uy and Rosca cohabited as husband and wife from approximately 1944, claiming to have been married though no marriage certificate was ever secured. They had eight children and lived together until separating before 1973. On January 29, 1964, Rosca purchased a 484-square-meter residential land in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City from Spouses Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita de Villa for P1,936, evidenced by a Deed of Sale. The sellers' OCT No. 0-2840 was cancelled and TCT No. T-24660 was issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy." Uy signed the deed merely as a witness, his signature appearing under "signed in the presence of." On June 15, 1964, Rosca purchased an adjacent 215-square-meter lot from Spouses Felix Contreras and Maxima de Guzman for P700, as declared under Tax Declaration No. 61724. A split-level house with a floor area of 208.50 square meters was thereafter constructed on the 484-square-meter lot, which became the family dwelling.

According to Uy, the properties were conjugal, acquired with funds from his business. His daughters Lydia and Shirley testified that the house was built using Uy's money and that the family lived there until Buena's agent demolished it sometime in 2006. Rosca, testifying as an adverse witness, claimed she alone purchased both properties using her own personal and paraphernal funds and constructed the house with her own money. She stated that she and Uy had attempted to formalize their marital union with a ceremony, but the celebration was not consummated because of wartime bombings on the day of the ceremony, and no marriage contract was ever secured. Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman, siring children with her, which led to their physical separation.

On September 17, 1976, Rosca obtained a real estate loan of P50,000 from Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC) using the house and lot as collateral. In support, she executed an Affidavit of Ownership dated September 27, 1976, stating that she was the sole and lawful owner of the 484-square-meter land and the building thereon, and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status. On April 18, 1979, Rosca executed a Deed of Sale over the 484-square-meter property and the house erected thereon for P80,000 in favor of Spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza. TCT No. T-24660 was cancelled and TCT No. T-35 was issued in favor of the Spouses Lacsamana, who subsequently mortgaged the property to PBC for P48,000. Upon full payment on April 15, 1982, PBC issued a Release of Real Estate Mortgage.

Uy contested the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Register of Deeds of Batangas City, which elevated the matter on consulta to the Land Registration Commission (LRC). In a Resolution dated November 7, 1979, the LRC ruled in favor of registration, recognizing Rosca as the sole registered owner and stating that litigious matters were to be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. On December 24, 1982, Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon Buena for P80,000, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-35 and the issuance of TCT No. T-3244 in Buena's name. Uy died on February 18, 1981, and was substituted by his daughters Lydia and Shirley. Rosca died on May 10, 1996, and Jose Lacsamana died on March 20, 1991; both were substituted by Buena. The RTC found no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca, upheld the validity of the sale, and denied both parties' claims for damages. The CA affirmed, finding that respondents overthrew the presumption of marriage and that the property was Rosca's paraphernal property.

• Simulation and Lack of Consideration: Uy argued that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca was simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration, stating that no proof was presented by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca.
• Lack of Consent: Uy insisted that he did not give his consent to the sale, which prejudiced his rights and interest over the property.
• Non-Delivery of Possession: Uy argued that Rosca did not give physical possession of the house and lot to the alleged buyers.
• Equitable Mortgage: Uy contended that, without admitting the sale's validity, the consideration paid was unreasonably low and unconscionable such that it constituted an equitable mortgage.
• Bad Faith of Buyers: Uy maintained that Spouses Lacsamana and Buena could not be considered buyers in good faith.

• Questions of Fact Barred Under Rule 45: Respondents asserted that Uy's contentions relied on the re-examination and re-evaluation of the parties' evidence, which had been exhaustively passed upon by both the trial and appellate courts, and that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45.
• Factual Findings Binding: Respondents argued that the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts were supported by substantial evidence and none of the recognized exceptions allowing Supreme Court review was present, warranting dismissal of the petition.

• Validity of Sale: Whether the Deed of Sale dated April 18, 1979, executed by Rosca alone without Uy's consent in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.
• Existence of Marriage: Whether Uy and Rosca were legally married, thereby determining the property regime governing the subject land.
• Nature of Property: Whether the subject property was co-owned under Article 147 of the Family Code or was Rosca's paraphernal property.

• Validity of Sale: Yes. The Deed of Sale was valid, Rosca being the sole paraphernal owner with full right to dispose of the property without Uy's consent.
• Existence of Marriage: No. The presumption of marriage was overcome by respondents' evidence, and Uy failed to discharge the burden of proving a valid marriage.
• Nature of Property: Paraphernal. Rosca overcame the Article 147 presumption of co-ownership through documentary evidence establishing sole acquisition, sole registration, and Uy's mere witness status in the purchase deed.

• Validity of Sale: The validity of the sale hinged on whether Uy and Rosca were validly married, as this determines whether Uy's consent was required. Since no marriage was proven, Article 147 of the Family Code governed, creating a presumption of co-ownership for properties acquired during cohabitation. However, Rosca overcame this presumption through four pieces of evidence: (1) the LRC Resolution dated November 7, 1979 recognizing her as sole registered owner; (2) Uy's signature as a mere witness — under "signed in the presence of" — in the January 29, 1964 Deed of Sale from Spouses Manuel, indicating his admission of the paraphernal nature of Rosca's ownership; (3) Rosca's Affidavit of Ownership dated September 27, 1976 declaring sole ownership and characterizing the title phrase as merely descriptive of her status; and (4) the title registration in her name alone, with "married to Luis G. Uy" being merely descriptive of civil status, not indicative of co-ownership. As sole paraphernal owner, Rosca could validly sell without Uy's consent. Uy's claims of simulation and inadequate consideration were factual issues not reviewable under Rule 45, and he presented no evidence — documentary or testimonial — showing that Rosca did not receive consideration or that the purchase price was unconscionably low relative to fair market value at the time of sale.

• Existence of Marriage: The presumption of marriage under Section 3(aa), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court — that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage — may be contradicted and overcome by competent evidence. Uy's own evidence defeated his claim: his Petition for Naturalization filed on November 12, 1953 stated "I am married (not legally)"; the Sworn Statement of the Governor of Batangas in support of that petition confirmed the same; his Immigrant Certificate of Residence as of October 9, 1951 listed him as "single"; and his Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758 also listed his civil status as single. Rosca testified that their marriage ceremony was never consummated due to wartime bombings. Uy failed to present any marriage certificate, which he could have sourced from his own records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office, as required under Act No. 3613 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114. Once the presumption was overcome, the burden shifted to Uy to prove the marriage, which he failed to discharge.

• Nature of Property: Under Article 147 of the Family Code, properties acquired during cohabitation by a couple capacitated to marry but living together without marriage are presumed co-owned unless proven otherwise. Rosca rebutted the presumption through the same four pieces of evidence establishing sole acquisition and registration. The phrase "married to Luis G. Uy" in the title was merely descriptive of Rosca's civil status, following the rule in Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals that such a phrase does not make the named spouse a co-owner. Had the property been conjugal, the title should have been in the names of both spouses. The house and lot were thus clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties, and she had every right to sell them even without Uy's consent.

• Presumption of Marriage — A man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage (Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court). This presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence. Once overcome, the burden of proving the marriage shifts to the party claiming it. In this case, Uy's own documentary evidence — his naturalization petition, immigration records, and alien certificate — contradicted the presumption, and he failed to present any marriage certificate to discharge the shifted burden.

• Descriptive Phrase "Married to" in Torrens Title — When property is registered in the name of one spouse alone with the phrase "married to [spouse's name]," such phrase is merely descriptive of the registered owner's civil status and does not make the named spouse a co-owner. The property is paraphernal unless proven otherwise. Had the property been conjugal, the title should have been in the names of both spouses. Applied to hold that TCT No. T-24660 in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" indicated paraphernal ownership by Rosca alone.

• Rule 45 — Questions of Law Only — In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. Factual findings of the trial and appellate courts, when in agreement and supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the Supreme Court. None of the recognized exceptions — such as findings grounded on speculation, grave abuse of discretion, or misapprehension of facts — was present. Applied to dismiss Uy's claims regarding simulation, consideration, and adequacy of purchase price, all of which were factual issues.

• Article 147 Presumption of Co-ownership — When a man and woman capacitated to marry live together without marriage or under a void marriage, properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts and owned in equal shares. This presumption may be overcome by proof that the property was acquired through one party's sole funds. Neither party can encumber or dispose of his or her share without the other's consent until after termination of cohabitation. Applied to determine the default property regime, but Rosca successfully rebutted the presumption, rendering the consent requirement inapplicable.

• "Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence." — This states the evidentiary standard for proving marriage, establishing that while the marriage certificate is the best documentary evidence, other competent evidence may suffice, and placing the burden on the party claiming marriage.

• "The words 'married to' were merely descriptive of Rosca's status at the time the property was registered in her name." — This defines the legal effect of the descriptive phrase in a Torrens title, drawing the critical distinction between paraphernal and conjugal property based on title registration, and is the commonly cited formulation following Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals.

• "Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married." — This links the failure to prove marriage to the applicable property regime, establishing the analytical framework for determining the validity of the sale.

• Pugeda vs. Trias, 114 Phil. 781 (1962) — Followed for the rule that testimony by a party to the marriage, a witness to the marriage, or the officiating person is admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

• Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84464, 21 June 1991, 198 SCRA 472 — Followed for the rule that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself, underscoring Uy's failure to produce one.

• People vs. Borromeo — Followed for the presumption that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed married absent contrary evidence, and for the principle that once the presumption is overcome, the burden shifts to the party claiming marriage.

• Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 419 (2003) — Controlling precedent for the rule that the phrase "married to [spouse]" in a Torrens title registered in one spouse's name is merely descriptive of civil status and does not make the named spouse a co-owner. Directly applied to hold that TCT No. T-24660 indicated paraphernal ownership by Rosca.

• Pisuena vs. Heirs of Unating, 372 Phil. 267 (1999) — Followed for the rule that a title in one spouse's name is notice to the world, including heirs and successors-in-interest, that the property belongs to that spouse as paraphernal property.

• Stuart vs. Yatco, 114 Phil. 1083 (1962) — Followed for the proposition that if property were conjugal, the title should have been in the names of both spouses, reinforcing the paraphernal character of the subject property.

• Article 147, Family Code — Governs property relations of couples capacitated to marry who live together without marriage or under a void marriage. Creates a presumption of co-ownership for properties acquired during cohabitation, which may be rebutted by proof of sole acquisition. Prohibits either party from encumbering or disposing of his or her share without the other's consent until after termination of cohabitation. Applied because Uy failed to prove marriage, but Rosca overcame the presumption of co-ownership, rendering the consent requirement inapplicable.

• Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Establishes the presumption that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Applied as the starting presumption in favor of Uy, which was then overcome by respondents' evidence, shifting the burden of proof to Uy.

• Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law of 1929), as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 — The marriage law in effect when Uy and Rosca cohabited. Requires the solemnizing officer to furnish the marriage certificate to the contracting parties and the municipal office where the marriage was solemnized. Applied to show that Uy could have obtained a marriage certificate from his own records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office, but failed to do so.

Brion, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ. concurred.