Uy vs. Court of Appeals

A court's territorial jurisdiction over a criminal case is determined by whether any essential ingredient of the offense charged occurred within its territorial boundaries, and jurisdiction over one offense does not automatically extend to a different offense even when both are jointly tried and consolidated.

Rosa Uy was formerly employed as an accountant at Don Tim Shipping Company, owned by the husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong. After resigning on 15 March 1982, Uy helped her husband manage their lumber business. The friendly relations between Uy and Leong continued, and the two agreed to form a partnership with Leong as capitalist partner contributing additional capital and Uy as industrial partner. The partnership documents were never processed, prompting Leong to demand the return of her investment.

Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant at Don Tim Shipping Company, owned by the husband of Consolacion Leong. During her employment, she was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. On 15 March 1982, a few months before she was to give birth, Uy resigned and thereafter helped her husband manage their lumber business. The friendly relations between Uy and Leong continued after the resignation.

The two later agreed to form a partnership, with Leong to contribute additional capital for the expansion of Uy's lumber business and Uy to serve as industrial partner. Various sums of money amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to have been given by Leong for the business; however, because of the trust they had for each other, no receipt was ever issued. Thereafter, a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, using funds contributed by Leong, as evidenced by various receipts.

The friendship between Leong and Uy turned sour when the partnership documents were never processed. Leong asked for the return of her investment, but the checks issued by Uy for that purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Six checks were dishonored: Check Nos. 068601, 068603, 068604, and 068605, all presented on 16 December 1983; Check No. 043122, presented on 3 January 1984; and Check No. 068660, presented on 24 January 1984 — all for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped." The checks were drawn against Uy's account at the Commercial Bank of Manila, Malabon Branch.

Leong filed a complaint for estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On 10 December 1984, an Information for estafa and several Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against Uy, and the offenses were consolidated and tried jointly. The prosecution presented Leong and Alexander D. Bangit, manager of the Commercial Bank of Manila, Malabon Branch, who testified on the dishonored checks. For her part, Uy did not deny the existence of the checks but averred that they were issued to evidence the investment of Leong in the proposed partnership. Uy and her witnesses maintained that no misrepresentation was committed and that the funds were utilized to construct the building in Bulacan, Bulacan. After joint trial, the RTC acquitted Uy of estafa but convicted her of the B.P. Blg. 22 charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: Petitioner contended that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22, as none of the essential elements constitutive of the violation was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. She maintained that the evidence established that complainant was a resident of Makati, petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City, the place of business of the alleged partnership was in Malabon, the drawee bank was located in Malabon, and the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati.
• Jurisdiction Not Waived: Petitioner argued that even assuming she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, she could not be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court, as lack of jurisdiction over the offense may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

• Incidental to Estafa: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, argued that even if no evidence showed that the essential ingredients of B.P. Blg. 22 took place in Manila, what was critical was that the court acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because it was the principal or main case, and that the B.P. Blg. 22 cases were merely incidental to the estafa case.
• Continuing Offense: Respondent contended that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the insufficiency of funds is a continuing eventuality, making B.P. Blg. 22 a transitory or continuing offense that may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed.
• Jurisdiction by Estoppel: Respondent relied on the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel, positing that it took some five years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: Whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
• Jurisdiction by Estoppel: Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court despite raising it late in the proceedings.
• Issuance for Value: Whether the checks had been issued on account or for value.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: No. The RTC of Manila lacked jurisdiction over the B.P. Blg. 22 cases, no evidence showing that any essential element — issuance, delivery, dishonor, or knowledge of insufficiency of funds — occurred within Manila.
• Jurisdiction by Estoppel: No. Petitioner was not estopped from questioning jurisdiction, the doctrine of laches not applying where no judgment had yet been rendered and the jurisdictional defect was promptly raised upon discovery.
• Issuance for Value: Not reached. The case was resolved on jurisdictional grounds, rendering this issue moot.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction in criminal cases requires that the offense or any of its essential ingredients occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. While jurisdiction is initially determined by the allegations in the information, if the evidence adduced during trial shows that the offense was committed elsewhere, the court should dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are two different offenses with different elements: estafa requires deceit and damage, while B.P. Blg. 22 requires (a) the making, drawing, and issuance of a check to apply on account or for value; (b) knowledge at the time of issuance that the drawer does not have sufficient funds; and (c) subsequent dishonor by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Because the elements differ, jurisdiction over the estafa case does not automatically confer jurisdiction over the B.P. Blg. 22 cases. The records showed that complainant resided in Makati, petitioner in Caloocan City, the business and drawee bank were in Malabon, and the checks were deposited in Makati — no proof that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored, or that knowledge of insufficiency occurred in Manila. The argument that knowledge of insufficiency is a continuing eventuality was rejected, the Court noting that such knowledge is simultaneous with issuance and no proof showed issuance occurred in Manila.
• Jurisdiction by Estoppel: Under Rule 117, Sec. 8 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged is not waived by failure to file a motion to quash, and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal, even motu proprio by the court. The records showed that petitioner timely questioned jurisdiction in a memorandum before the RTC and in succeeding pleadings. The doctrine of laches in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, which bars late jurisdictional challenges, was distinguished: in that case, the challenge was raised almost fifteen years after the questioned ruling and judgment had been rendered. Here, no judgment had yet been rendered when the defect was discovered, and petitioner promptly filed the appropriate motion. Absent the pivotal element of laches, the general rule that jurisdiction may be questioned at any stage applies.
• Issuance for Value: The Court did not reach this issue, having resolved the case on jurisdictional grounds.

• Territorial Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases — For a court to acquire jurisdiction in criminal cases, the offense or any of its essential ingredients must have occurred within the court's territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the information, but if the evidence shows the offense was committed elsewhere, the court must dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Applied: The RTC of Manila had no jurisdiction over the B.P. Blg. 22 charges because no evidence showed any essential element occurred in Manila.

• Distinct Offenses Require Separate Jurisdictional Inquiries — Estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are distinct offenses with different elements. Jurisdiction over one does not automatically confer jurisdiction over the other, even when jointly tried and consolidated. Each essential ingredient of each crime must be independently satisfied for jurisdiction to attach. Applied: The RTC's jurisdiction over the estafa case — based on evidence that business dealings were conducted in a Manila restaurant — did not extend to the B.P. Blg. 22 cases.

• Non-Waivability of Objection to Jurisdiction — Lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and may be considered motu proprio by the court. It is not waived by failure to file a motion to quash or to allege the ground therein. Applied: Petitioner was not estopped from questioning jurisdiction despite the passage of time, as the objection was timely raised and the ground is not waivable.

• Laches as Exception to Non-Waivability (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy) — The ruling in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy is an exception to the general rule that lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage. Laches — defined as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier — may bar a late jurisdictional challenge. Applied: Laches did not apply because no judgment had been rendered and petitioner promptly raised the defect upon discovery, unlike in Sibonghanoy where the challenge came fifteen years after judgment.

• "The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied." — This states the ratio decidendi: jurisdiction over one offense does not extend to another with different elements, even when jointly tried.

• "No proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense." — This applies the territorial jurisdiction rule to the evidentiary record, pinpointing the absence of any jurisdictional nexus to Manila.

• "A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal." — Quoted from Calimlim vs. Ramirez, this is the canonical formulation of the general rule on non-waivability of jurisdictional objections, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, No. L-21450, 15 April 1968, 23 SCRA 29 — Distinguished. Established the exception that laches may bar a late challenge to jurisdiction, but held inapplicable here because no judgment had been rendered and petitioner promptly raised the defect upon discovery.

• Calimlim vs. Ramirez, No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399 — Followed. Reaffirmed the general rule that lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage and clarified that Sibonghanoy is the exception, not the general rule. The Court quoted its canonical formulation of the non-waivability principle.

• Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA 639 — Cited for the three elements of B.P. Blg. 22: (a) issuance of a check to apply on account or for value; (b) knowledge of insufficiency of funds at the time of issuance; and (c) subsequent dishonor by the drawee bank.

• People vs. Grospe, G.R. Nos. 74053-54, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 154 — Cited for the proposition that deceit and damage are essential elements of estafa that must be established with satisfactory proof.

• People vs. Galano, No. L-42925, 31 January 1977, 75 SCRA 193 — Cited for the rule that if evidence shows the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

• Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27124, 29 May 1970, 33 SCRA 186 — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.

• B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) — The three elements were applied: (a) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (b) knowledge at the time of issuance that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank; and (c) subsequent dishonor by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. The Court used these elements to determine whether any occurred within Manila for jurisdictional purposes.

• Art. 315, par. 2(a), Revised Penal Code (Estafa) — Cited to distinguish estafa from B.P. Blg. 22 violations: estafa requires deceit and damage as essential elements, whereas B.P. Blg. 22 does not. This distinction was central to the ruling that jurisdiction over estafa does not extend to B.P. Blg. 22.

• Rule 117, Sec. 3(b), Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Provides that the accused may move to quash on the ground that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Applied to confirm that lack of jurisdiction over the offense is a valid ground for challenge.

• Rule 117, Sec. 8, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Provides that failure to assert grounds for a motion to quash before pleading is deemed a waiver, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Applied to hold that petitioner was not waived from questioning jurisdiction despite not filing a motion to quash.

Padilla, J., and Vitug, J., concurred. Kapunan, J., and Hermosisima, Jr., J., were on leave.