Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Antonio Villareal, et al.

A search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized, and officers executing the warrant have no discretion to seize property not described therein. The seizure of a person's private papers to be used as evidence against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself, constituting an unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional prohibition.

The petitioners were Chinese nationals charged with violation of the Opium Law, which prohibited the possession of opium and related paraphernalia. The case arose under the Jones Law, which provided constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and General Orders No. 58, which governed the issuance of search warrants in the Philippine Islands. The petitioners' house and bodega in Iloilo were searched by Constabulary officers pursuant to a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance, leading to the seizure of opium and various other articles.

On April 30, 1919, Corporal Ramon Gayanilo of the Philippine Constabulary presented an application for a search warrant to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, stating under oath "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Niño St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain amount of opium." The application was subscribed and sworn to before Judge L. M. Southworth, who issued a search warrant on the same day commanding any officer of the law to make an immediate search on the person of Uy Kheytin or in the house at Sto. Niño St., No. 20, for opium, and to bring any found before the court.

Armed with the warrant, Lieutenant M. S. Torralba of the Philippine Constabulary, accompanied by subordinates, searched Uy Kheytin's house on the same day and found 60 small cans of opium. The officers also wanted to search the bodega on the ground floor, but Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that he rented it. Lieutenant Torralba placed a guard in the premises to ensure nothing was removed and went to ascertain the owner of the bodega. The next morning, he learned from the owner of the house, one Segovia of Molo, that Uy Kheytin was renting the bodega. Lieutenant Torralba and his subordinates then resumed the search and seized various articles, including a broken bottle of opium liquid, an opium pipe complete with container, opium ashes, a leather handbag containing seven small bottles of opium with two cedulas belonging to Tian Liong, a wooden box containing 75 empty opium cans, a tin box with 23 small empty cans, a cardboard box containing tools and tin plates, a roll of brass sheets, three soldering outfits, a hammer, a Chinese scale for opium, twelve small empty bottles, two bottles containing opium, a bundle of Chinese books of accounts with personal letters of Uy Kheytin, and a tin box containing 60 cans of molasses.

Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the justice of the peace court of Iloilo against all petitioners charging them with violation of the Opium Law. They were arrested, and after preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace found probable cause and transmitted the case to the Court of First Instance. While the case was pending there, the petitioners filed a petition asking for the return of "private papers, books and other property" seized by the Constabulary officers, on the ground that they had been seized illegally and in violation of their constitutional rights. They urged that the search warrant was illegal because the requisites of General Orders No. 58 had not been complied with, that the searches and seizures made on May 1st were made without authority, and that the seizure of books and letters violated the Jones Law's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination. Judge Antonio Villareal denied the petition, concluding that the searches and seizures had been legally made.

• Illegality of the Search Warrant: Petitioners contended that the search warrant of April 30, 1919, was illegal because it was not issued upon either of the grounds mentioned in section 96 of General Orders No. 58, arguing that opium had not been stolen or embezzled, nor had it been used or intended to be used as the means of committing a felony, since the word "felony" applies only to a serious crime which is malum per se and not to one merely malum prohibitum such as the possession of opium.
• Failure to Examine Witnesses: Petitioners invoked section 98 of General Orders No. 58, arguing that the judge who issued the warrant did not determine probable cause by examining witnesses under oath as required, but relied solely upon the sworn application of the Constabulary officer.
• Illegality of the May 1st Search: Petitioners contended that the search made on May 1st was made without any search warrant and without authority of law, arguing that the search warrant of April 30th could not be used on May 1st because it had been executed on the day of its issuance, and that a warrant cannot be used every day for ten days and for a different purpose each day.
• Illegal Seizure of Books and Letters: Petitioners argued that the seizure of their books and letters was a violation of the Jones Law providing that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself and protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures.

• Sufficiency of the Warrant: Respondents contended that the search warrant was legally issued and that the searches and seizures complained of had been legally made.
• Justification for Seizure of Articles: Respondents argued that Lieutenant Torralba's belief or suspicion that the seized books, papers, and other articles had some relation to the opium and might be used as evidence against the petitioners was a sufficient justification under the law for their seizure under the same warrant for opium.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: Whether the search warrant of April 30, 1919, was illegal for failure to comply with the requisites of General Orders No. 58, specifically the grounds for issuance under section 96 and the examination requirement under section 98.
• Legality of the May 1st Search: Whether the search made on May 1, 1919, was made without authority of law, the search warrant of April 30th having already been executed.
• Seizure of Books, Letters, and Other Articles: Whether, under a search warrant for opium, the officers of the law were authorized to seize books, personal letters, and other property having a remote or no connection with opium.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: No. The search warrant was irregularly issued because the judge did not first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath as required by section 98 of General Orders No. 58, but this irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium found and seized under the warrant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper arrest.
• Legality of the May 1st Search: Yes. The search made on May 1st was not made "for a different purpose" nor could it be considered "another search," but was really a continuation of the search begun on April 30th, and was therefore authorized under the search warrant of April 30th.
• Seizure of Books, Letters, and Other Articles: No. The seizure of the petitioners' books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent relation with opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law was illegal and in violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights, because they were not particularly described in the search warrant, a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence, and to compel a person to produce his private papers to be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: The Court deemed it unnecessary to draw the distinction between "felony" and "misdemeanor" as used in the common law, stating that it would be "the height of absurdity" to hold, upon technical grounds, that a search warrant is illegal which is issued to search for and seize property the very possession of which is forbidden by law and constitutes a crime. Opium is such property. As to the failure to examine witnesses under oath, the Court likened a search warrant to a warrant of arrest, both being restricted by the same provision of the Jones Law requiring probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. Citing Ker vs. Illinois, the Court reasoned that mere irregularities in the manner in which a person is brought into custody do not entitle him to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged. Since the property sought to be searched for and seized was actually found in the place described by the complainant, the irregularity in the issuance of the warrant was not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium and exonerating the petitioners.

• Legality of the May 1st Search: The Court agreed with counsel that a search warrant cannot be used every day for ten days "and for a different purpose each day," and that after the articles for which the warrant was issued have been seized, the same warrant cannot be used as authority to make another search. However, this argument was not applicable to the facts. The search for opium was not completed on April 30th; it was interrupted by the necessity to ascertain who owned the bodega because Uy Kheytin falsely disclaimed ownership. The search of May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on April 30th, as shown by the fact that the premises were guarded by Constabulary soldiers during the interval and the petitioners were made to understand that the authorities were not yet through with the search.

• Seizure of Books, Letters, and Other Articles: The Court held that both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those particularly described in the warrant, leaving the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made. Citing American authorities, the Court stated that the property to be seized must be described with such certainty as to identify them, and the description must be so particular that the officer charged with the execution of the warrant will be left with no discretion respecting the property to be taken. The officers' belief that the books and papers might be used as evidence was no justification for the seizure: first, because they were not particularly described in the search warrant; second, because a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce his private papers to be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself, citing Boyd vs. United States.

• Particularity of Description in Search Warrants — A search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and no other property can be taken thereunder. The goods to be seized must be described with such certainty as to identify them, and the description must be so particular that the officer charged with the execution of the warrant will be left with no discretion respecting the property to be taken. The Court applied this doctrine to declare illegal the seizure of books, letters, and other articles not described in the warrant for opium.

• Search Warrant Not for Obtaining Evidence — A search warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an intended crime, but only after lawful evidence of an offense actually committed. Nor is it allowable to invade one's privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against him, except in a few special cases where that which is the subject of the crime is supposed to be concealed. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the officers' belief that seized articles might be used as evidence was no justification for their seizure.

• Private Papers and Self-Incrimination — The seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself, and in a prosecution for a crime, penalty, or forfeiture, is equally within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment. When the thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment, namely, compelling a man to be a witness against himself, is the object of a search and seizure of his private papers, it is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the Fourth Amendment. The Court applied this doctrine to declare illegal the seizure of the petitioners' books and letters.

• Irregularity in Warrant Issuance — Mere irregularities in the manner in which a person is brought into the custody of the law do not entitle him to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment. Reasoning by analogy, the Court held that the judge's failure to examine witnesses under oath before issuing the search warrant was an irregularity not sufficient to order the return of the opium actually found and seized.

• "Whatever may be the technical common-law meaning of the word 'felony,' which is used in paragraph 2 of section 96 above quoted, we believe it would be the height of absurdity to hold, upon technical grounds, that a search warrant is illegal which is issued to search for and seize property the very possession of which is forbidden by law and constitutes a crime." — This passage establishes the Court's rejection of the petitioners' technical argument that opium was not subject to seizure under the grounds enumerated in General Orders No. 58, holding that property whose possession is itself criminal may be searched for and seized.

• "In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the judge did not first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath, as required by section 98 of General Orders No. 58. But the property sought to be searched for and seized having been actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we are of the opinion that that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium found and seized under said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter." — This passage states the Court's ruling that the judge's failure to comply with the examination requirement did not warrant the return of the opium, applying the analogy of an improper arrest.

• "The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that 'unreasonable searches and seizures' may not be made, — that abuses may not be committed." — This passage articulates the rationale behind the particularity requirement for search warrants, emphasizing the limitation on officer discretion to prevent abuses.

• "The seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself, and, in a prosecution for a crime, penalty or forfeiture, is equally within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment." — This passage, quoted from Boyd vs. United States, establishes the constitutional principle that seizing private papers for use as evidence violates the privilege against self-incrimination.

• Ker vs. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 — Followed. The Court cited this case for the proposition that mere irregularities in the manner in which a person is brought into custody do not entitle him to avoid trial for the crime charged, applied by analogy to the irregular issuance of the search warrant.
• U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122 — Followed. Cited as following Ker vs. Illinois on the principle that irregularities in arrest do not bar prosecution.
• U.S. vs. Wilson, 4 Phil., 317 — Followed. Cited as following Ker vs. Illinois on the same principle.
• Boyd vs. United States, 116 U.S., 616 — Controlling. Cited for the principle that the seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself, and that when this is the object of a search and seizure, it is an unreasonable search and seizure.
• Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States — Cited. Referenced in support of the principle that search and seizure of private papers to be used as evidence is different from the search and seizure of stolen goods or dutiable articles.
• State vs. Slamon, 87 Am. St. Rep., 711 — Cited. Cited for the proposition that it is a violation of the declaration of rights for an officer, while searching under a warrant for stolen goods, to take a letter written to the person searched.
• Regidor vs. Araullo, 5 Off. Gaz., 955 — Cited. Cited for the proposition that a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence, as this would be an unreasonable use of the remedy.

• Section 3, Jones Law — The constitutional provision providing that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. The Court applied this provision to require particularity in the description of things to be seized and to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.
• Section 96, General Orders No. 58 — The provision enumerating the grounds upon which a search warrant may be issued: (1) when the property was stolen or embezzled, and (2) when it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the means of committing a felony. The Court held that opium, the possession of which is forbidden by law, is property subject to seizure under this provision.
• Section 97, General Orders No. 58 — The provision requiring that a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause. The Court cited this provision in connection with the requirement of particular description.
• Section 98, General Orders No. 58 — The provision requiring the judge or justice to examine on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing before issuing the warrant. The Court found that the judge failed to comply with this requirement, constituting an irregularity in the issuance of the warrant.
• Fourth and Fifth Amendments, United States Constitution — Cited through Boyd vs. United States for the principles that unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited and that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The Court applied these principles to the seizure of private papers.

• Araullo, J.
• Villamor, J.
• Mapa, C.J. (concurred in the result)

• Avanceña, J. (concurring and dissenting) — Concurred with the decision except as to the part which declares that the search warrant was irregularly issued, disagreeing with the majority's finding of irregularity in the issuance of the warrant.
• Moir, J. (concurring and dissenting) — Did not concur in the part of the decision stating that the judge did not comply with the requirement of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, arguing that the affidavit made by the complainant was sufficient and that requiring witnesses would defeat the very object of a search warrant. Also expressed the view that all the articles mentioned in the decision, except the book and letters, were used in and about the sale of opium and should not be returned.
• Malcolm, J. (concurring) — Concurred with Justice Moir's separate opinion.