Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasan

Offenses penalized with destierro or banishment fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts, not courts of first instance, because destierro is a lighter penalty than arresto mayor under the graduated scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, and the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on municipal courts over offenses penalized with imprisonment for not more than six months.

The petitioner was charged with attempted bribery under Article 212, in relation to the third paragraph of Article 210, of the Revised Penal Code, for offering P6 to two patrolmen to refrain from arresting him for a violation of the Price Tag Law (Republic Act No. 71). The consummated crime of bribery is penalized with arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, while the attempted crime carries a penalty two degrees lower, which is destierro in its minimum and medium periods. The question of which court has original jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro arose because the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) does not expressly confer such jurisdiction on either the courts of first instance or the municipal courts.

The petitioner was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with attempted bribery by offering the sum of P6 to patrolmen A. Caudal and L. de los Santos in consideration of their refraining from arresting him for a violation of the Price Tag Law (Republic Act No. 71). The police officers rejected the offer and placed the offeror under arrest.

Upon denial of his motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (which the Court interpreted to mean prohibition), praying that the respondent judge be ordered to refrain from further proceeding on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

The consummated crime of bribery or corruption of public officials is penalized by Article 212, in relation to the third paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, with arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods. The penalty for the attempted crime is two degrees lower, which is destierro in its minimum and medium periods, meaning the culprit shall be banished from his present residence (not imprisoned) for a period of not less than 6 months and 1 day and not more than 4 years and 2 months.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because the penalty for the attempted offense charged in the information is only arresto menor in its minimum and medium periods, and a fine not more than eighty pesos, which falls under the original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace or municipal court.

• Jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance: Respondent argued that if the scale provided by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code is to be followed, the penalty of destierro would have to be imposed, which would fall under the original jurisdiction of the court of first instance pursuant to the Judiciary Act of 1948.

• Jurisdiction over Offenses Penalized with Destierro: Whether the court of first instance or the municipal court has original jurisdiction to try an offense penalized with destierro or banishment.

• Jurisdiction over Offenses Penalized with Destierro: No. The court of first instance has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, and the writ of prohibition lies. Offenses penalized with destierro fall under the original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, not the courts of first instance.

• Jurisdiction over Offenses Penalized with Destierro: The Court reasoned that destierro is not a higher penalty than arresto mayor. Arresto mayor means imprisonment or complete deprivation of liberty, whereas destierro means banishment or only a prohibition from residing within a radius of 25 kilometers from the actual residence of the accused for a specified length of time. The respective severities of arresto mayor and destierro must not be judged by the duration of each penalty, but by the degree of deprivation of liberty involved. In the graduated scale of Article 71, the lawmaker placed destierro below arresto mayor. The Judiciary Act of 1948 does not expressly confer original jurisdiction on the court of first instance over offenses penalized with destierro. Section 44 of said Act provides that courts of first instance shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos. Section 87 provides that justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over all offenses in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six months, or a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or both. There exists a gap in the law as to which court shall have original jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro. The reasonable and logical interpretation is that since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary, it is logical and reasonable to infer that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.

• Hierarchy of Penalties under Article 71 — The graduated scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code places destierro below arresto mayor. The Court applied this scale to determine that offenses penalized with destierro fall under the jurisdiction of municipal courts, not courts of first instance, because destierro is a lighter penalty than arresto mayor.

• Interpretation of Jurisdictional Statutes — When a statute creating jurisdiction contains a gap, the court must fill the gap by reasonable interpretation of the existing law. The Court applied this principle to infer that the legislature intended offenses penalized with destierro to fall under municipal court jurisdiction, consistent with the placement of destierro below arresto mayor in the Article 71 scale.

• "To disregard the scale of penalties provided in article 71 and to apply destierro only to crimes specifically punished with that penalty, such as those mentioned in articles 247 and 334, would be to amend or change the law, and the court is not empowered to do so. Our sworn duty is to apply the law and not to tamper with it." — This passage articulates the majority's refusal to disregard the Article 71 scale, establishing the principle that courts must apply the law as written.

• "The respective severities of arresto mayor and destierro must not be judged by the duration of each of these penalties, but by the degree of deprivation of liberty involved." — This passage defines the controlling criterion for comparing penalties, which is the degree of deprivation of liberty, not the duration.

• "Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance." — This passage states the ratio decidendi, establishing the Court's reasonable interpretation of the jurisdictional gap in the Judiciary Act of 1948.

• People vs. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 562 — Cited in the separate opinion of Justice Paras as a case where the Court held that the penalty lower by two degrees than arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods is destierro in its minimum and medium periods, but the point decided in the case at bar was not actually raised and passed upon.

• Rivera vs. Geronimo, 76 Phil. 838 — Cited in the separate opinion of Justice Paras as a case where the Court ruled that the penalty lower by two degrees than prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period, the penalty of destierro having been disregarded.

• People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172 — Cited in the separate opinion of Justice Paras for the proposition that although destierro may not be an "imprisonment," it is nonetheless a "deprivation of liberty."

• Article 212, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes the consummated crime of bribery or corruption of public officials, in relation to the third paragraph of Article 210, with arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods.

• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for an attempt to commit a felony is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony.

• Article 71, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217 — Establishes the graduated scale of penalties, placing destierro below arresto mayor.

• Section 44(f), Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) — Confers original jurisdiction on courts of first instance in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos.

• Section 87(b), Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) — Confers original jurisdiction on justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities over all offenses in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six months, or a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment.

Justice Pablo, Justice Bengzon, Justice Tuazon, Chief Justice Moran (concurred in the result), Justice Montemayor (concurred in the result), Justice Reyes (concurred in the result), and Justice Padilla (concurred in the opinion of the majority, as certified by Chief Justice Moran).

• Justice Paras (concurring in the result) — Justice Paras concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority's reasoning. He argued that if the Article 71 scale is followed literally, an absurd result would follow: the consummated offense of corruption of public officials, penalized with arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, would be triable in the justice of the peace or municipal court, while the lower offense of attempted corruption would be penalized with destierro and triable in the court of first instance. He held that the penalty of destierro should be considered only when it is specifically imposed and should be disregarded in the scale provided in Article 71, and that the penalty for the attempted offense should be arresto menor in its minimum and medium periods.