U.S. vs. Tayongtong

A driver cannot be held criminally liable for homicide by negligence when the death is due entirely to the negligence of the deceased himself and not to any negligence on the part of the driver.

On January 19, 1911, Severino Resume was painting telephone poles along the highway between Jaro and Iloilo when he was run over and killed by an automobile driven by Policarpio Tayongtong. The highway was straight, wide, and in good condition. The telephone pole Resume was painting was located outside the beaten portion of the highway, about two feet into the grass, with a footpath between it and the road. The automobile was a large passenger vehicle with racks extending about two feet beyond its wheels for carrying baggage, and was loaded to full capacity on its third trip from Iloilo to Jaro at about 10 o'clock in the morning.

The prosecution's sole eyewitness, Pablo Tayson, testified that he was standing near the deceased on the left side of the highway. He claimed the automobile was traveling at full speed and zigzagging across the road. According to Tayson, just before reaching them, the automobile darted to the opposite side and then suddenly turned back, striking the deceased as he stood painting the pole, with the "suction" of the vehicle drawing him under the wheels. However, Tayson's credibility was impeached; he admitted that during the preliminary investigation, he had testified that he turned his back and covered his face with his cap to avoid the dust, which contradicted his trial testimony that he kept his eyes uncovered and saw everything.

The accused, supported by several passengers, testified that he was driving at a moderate speed of 10 to 15 miles per hour in the center of the road. He saw Tayson cover his face to avoid the dust. The deceased, apparently also trying to escape the approaching dust cloud, suddenly started to cross the road. He misjudged the distance and time, stepping squarely in front of the machine. The accused applied both brakes and turned the vehicle, but it was too late; the front wheel passed over the deceased. The physical evidence showed the mudguard over the left wheel struck the deceased, which would have been impossible if the deceased had been standing behind the telephone pole as the prosecution claimed, without the vehicle's side racks hitting the pole.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Appellant argued that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to warrant his conviction for homicide by negligence.

• Criminal Liability for Homicide by Negligence: Whether the evidence sufficiently establishes negligence on the part of the accused to sustain a conviction for homicide by negligence.

• Criminal Liability for Homicide by Negligence: No. The conviction was reversed and the accused acquitted because the death was due entirely to the deceased's own negligence, with no sufficient reliable proof establishing negligence on the part of the driver.

• Criminal Liability for Homicide by Negligence: The prosecution's case relied entirely on the testimony of Pablo Tayson, whose credibility was impeached by his prior inconsistent statement during the preliminary investigation and whose account of the accident was physically improbable. It was improbable that a large, fully loaded vehicle could zigzag at high speed, strike the deceased behind a telephone pole without hitting the pole, and draw him under the wheels via "suction." The physical evidence showing the left mudguard struck the deceased contradicted the prosecution's theory. Conversely, the defense's version—that the deceased suddenly crossed the road to escape dust and was accidentally struck—was reasonable, straightforward, and uncontradicted. Because the death was attributable solely to the deceased's own negligence in suddenly crossing the road, and no negligence was proven against the driver, criminal liability could not attach.

• Sole Negligence of the Decedent — Where death is due to the negligence of the decedent himself and not to the negligence of the driver of the automobile, the latter cannot be held criminally liable for homicide. While contributory negligence on the part of the person killed is no defense if the driver's own negligence was the proximate cause, the absence of any negligence on the part of the driver absolves them of criminal responsibility.

• "where death is due to the negligence of the decedent himself and not to the negligence of the driver of the automobile, the latter cannot be held for homicide." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that criminal liability for homicide by negligence requires proof of the driver's negligence as the cause of death.
• "There being no negligence, he is not responsible, no matter what the result of the accident may have been." — This reinforces the principle that without proven negligence on the part of the accused, no criminal liability attaches regardless of the fatal outcome.

• United States vs. Reyes, 10 Off. Gaz., 1045 — Cited for the doctrine that contributory negligence on the part of the person killed is no defense provided the driver of the automobile was himself negligent and that negligence was the proximate cause of death. The Court distinguished this case by noting that the doctrine does not apply where death is due entirely to the decedent's own negligence and not the driver's.

Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concurred.