U.S. vs. Pineda

A pharmacist who sells one drug for another — as where barium chlorate, a poison, is sold under the label of potassium chlorate — is penalized under the Pharmacy Law whether the substitution results from negligence or mistake, the word "fraudulent" in the statute not requiring proof of scienter but only that a false name was given to the drug asked for.

Santiago Pineda was a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Nos. 442, 444, Calle Santo Cristo, Manila. The Pharmacy Law, first enacted as Act No. 597 and later amended by Act Nos. 1921, 2236, and 2382, was codified as Chapter 30 of the Administrative Code. Section 17 of the Pharmacy Law (now Administrative Code, section 751) fixed responsibility on pharmacists for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons they sell, and prohibited the sale of any drug "under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense." The case required the first judicial construction of these penal provisions.

Santiago Pineda was a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at Nos. 442, 444, Calle Santo Cristo, Manila. One Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented at Pineda's drug store a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, which on prior occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results. The prescription read "clorato de potasa — 120 gramos — en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six papers marked "Botica Pineda — Clorato potasa — 120.00 — en seis papeles — para caballo — Sto. Cristo 442, 444, Binondo, Manila."

Santos, under the belief that he had purchased potassium chlorate as requested, put two of the packages in water and administered the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for a third horse but was not used. The two horses that received the preparation died shortly afterwards. Santos thereupon took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, chemists at the Bureau of Science, analyzed the packages and found that they contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate — a poison, whereas potassium chlorate is not. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to Pineda's drug store and purchased potassium chlorate, which upon analysis was again found to be barium chlorate. Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses and found that death was the result of poisoning.

The lower court found that the substance sold by the accused to Santos on June 22, 1916, was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate, and convicted Pineda of an infraction of the Pharmacy Law, sentencing him to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

• Admissibility of Subsequent Purchase Evidence: Pineda relied on the maxim res inter alios acta, arguing that the testimony of chemists Peña and Darjuan regarding their subsequent purchase of "potassium chlorate" from his drug store — which turned out to be barium chlorate — was inadmissible as evidence of other offenses.
• Finding on Substance Sold: Pineda contended that the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold to Santos was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate, asserting the proof demonstrated the contrary.
• Strict Definition of "Fraudulent": Pineda vigorously insisted on the technical definition of fraud, arguing that the prosecution must prove a material false representation made with knowledge of its falsity, intent that it be acted upon, reliance by the purchaser, and resulting injury — and that absent such proof, no conviction could stand under the Pharmacy Law.

• Admissibility of Evidence: Whether the testimony of the chemists regarding their subsequent purchase of barium chlorate from the defendant's drug store was admissible notwithstanding the maxim res inter alios acta.
• Sufficiency of Evidence on Substance Sold: Whether the evidence supported the finding that the substance sold to Santos was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate.
• Interpretation of "Fraudulent" in the Pharmacy Law: Whether the word "fraudulent" in the statutory prohibition against selling any drug "under any fraudulent name" requires proof of scienter — knowledge of the falsity and intent to deceive — or whether it penalizes the sale of one drug for another even through negligence or mistake.

• Admissibility of Evidence: Yes. The testimony was admissible, not to convict the accused of a second offense, but to ascertain his knowledge, intent, and negligence; the maxim res inter alios acta does not bar evidence of similar acts when used to prove intent or negligence rather than a separate offense.
• Sufficiency of Evidence on Substance Sold: No error. The proof demonstrated that the substance sold was barium chlorate, not potassium chlorate, as confirmed by Bureau of Science analysis of both the original packages and the subsequent test purchase.
• Interpretation of "Fraudulent" in the Pharmacy Law: No, scienter is not required. The word "fraudulent" was not intended by the Legislature in its strict technical sense; the law penalizes any druggist who sells one drug for another, whether through negligence or mistake.

• Admissibility of Evidence: The general rule that evidence of other offenses is inadmissible admits of exceptions. The prosecution's purpose in introducing the chemists' testimony about their subsequent purchase was not to convict Pineda of a second offense but to ascertain his knowledge, intent, and negligence. Where a defendant has performed similar acts on more than one occasion, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. The United States Supreme Court was cited for the proposition that evidence tending to show motive is admissible even if it tends to prove commission of another offense (Moore vs. U. S., 150 U.S. 57). The trial judge's discretion in admitting such testimony will not be disturbed unless it manifestly appears that the testimony has no legitimate bearing and is calculated to prejudice the accused.

• Sufficiency of Evidence on Substance Sold: The appellant's contention that the substance was not barium chlorate was directly contradicted by the proof. Bureau of Science chemists Peña and Darjuan analyzed the original packages and found barium chlorate, not potassium chlorate. Their subsequent test purchase from the defendant's drug store yielded the same result. The Court found that "the proof demonstrates the contrary" to the appellant's assertion.

• Interpretation of "Fraudulent" in the Pharmacy Law: Adhering to the technical definition of fraud would strip the law of much of its force, leaving the innocent purchaser — who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist — at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill; the care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge the law demands. The druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for, because the nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser anything. The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply; instead, caveat venditor governs. A druggist who fills a prescription calling for potassium chlorate with barium chlorate, a poison, and labels it "potassium chlorate," cannot escape responsibility on a plea of mistake; at minimum, the mistake is negligence. The Spanish translation of the statute uses "supuesto," which is not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud — falsity, deception, and injury — must be present, but not scienter. In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, the law penalizes any druggist who sells one drug for another, whether through negligence or mistake.

• Pharmacist's Standard of Care — The care required of a pharmacist must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. The standard has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a special high degree," and "the highest degree of care known to practical men." Even under the most conservative formulation, "ordinary care" with reference to the business of a druggist signifies the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with reasonable conduct of the business, in order that human life may not be exposed to the danger of substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the defendant's plea of mistake, holding that such a mistake constitutes at minimum negligence.

• Caveat Venditor in Drug Sales — The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs; the vendor and vendee do not stand at arm's length as in ordinary transactions. The druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for, because the nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser anything. The Court relied on this principle to justify construing "fraudulent" without requiring scienter, since the purchaser must blindly trust in the pharmacist's good faith and vigilance.

• Statutory Construction of Penal Provisions — Liberal Interpretation to Effectuate Legislative Purpose — A penal statute should not be so devitalized by a rigidly technical construction as to strip it of its force and leave the public unprotected. The word "fraudulent" in the Pharmacy Law was construed not in its strict technical sense but in light of the legislative purpose to protect the public from the careless sale of drugs. The usual badges of fraud — falsity, deception, and injury — must be present, but scienter (knowledge of falsity) is not required. The Court applied this by affirming the conviction despite the absence of proof that Pineda knowingly sold barium chlorate instead of potassium chlorate.

• Admissibility of Similar Acts to Prove Intent or Negligence — Evidence of other similar acts by a defendant is admissible when offered not to prove commission of a separate offense but to ascertain the defendant's knowledge, intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. The Court applied this exception to admit the chemists' testimony about their test purchase from the defendant's drug store, which corroborated the original sale and demonstrated a pattern of negligent substitution.

• "The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar leaning." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for the heightened standard of care imposed on pharmacists and explains why the purchaser of drugs cannot be expected to verify the substance received, justifying the Court's rejection of a strict scienter requirement.

• "In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, stating the controlling rule of decision: the Pharmacy Law penalizes substitution of drugs regardless of fault level, whether negligent or mistaken.

• "A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributed to the druggist as a legal fault." — This passage defines the Court's treatment of mistake in the context of pharmacy practice: mistake itself constitutes legal fault, and the manner of occurrence is irrelevant if the fact of substitution is attributable to the druggist.

• Moore vs. U. S., 150 U.S. 57 (1893) — Cited as United States Supreme Court authority for the proposition that evidence tending to show motive is admissible in a criminal action even if it tends to prove commission of another offense by the defendant. Followed to justify admission of the chemists' test purchase testimony.

• Tombari vs. Connors, 85 Conn. 235 (1912) — Cited for the proposition that even "ordinary care" with reference to the business of a druggist must signify the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance. Followed in establishing the standard of care expected of pharmacists.

• Fleet vs. Hollenkemp, 56 Am. Dec. 563 (1852) — Cited as a decision standing alone in its absolute guarantor approach, holding that caveat venditor rather than caveat emptor should apply to drug store owners, and that excuses of accidental or innocent mistake will not avail. Discussed as one conception of druggist liability.

• Knoefel vs. Atkins, 81 N.E. 600 (1907) — Cited for the rule that where a customer calls upon a druggist for a harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake is prima facie negligence, placing the burden on the druggist to show the mistake was consistent with due care. Followed in the Court's analysis of mistake as negligence.

• Smith's Admrx. vs. Middleton, 56 L.R.A. 484 (1902) — Cited for the proposition that furnishing the wrong drug constitutes gross negligence of an aggravated form, and that a druggist cannot be heard to say that such mistakes are not in and of themselves gross negligence. Followed.

• Nat. Savings Bank vs. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) — Cited as a case repeatedly termed the leading case on the subject, following Thomas vs. Winchester (1852), holding that pharmacists who carelessly label a poison as a harmless medicine are liable to all persons injured by the false label, the liability arising from the duty to avoid acts dangerous to the lives of others. Followed.

• Thomas vs. Winchester, 2 Seld. (N.Y.) 387 (1852) — Cited as the leading case on druggist liability for false labeling, followed by the United States Supreme Court in Nat. Savings Bank vs. Ward. Followed.

• Tessymond's Case, 1 Lewin, C.C. 169 (1828) — Cited for the proposition that apothecaries or apothecary clerks guilty of negligence in the sale of medicine when death ensues have been held guilty of manslaughter. Cited to demonstrate that rigorous rules apply in criminal law as well as civil.

• Section 17, Act No. 597 (Pharmacy Law), as amended (now Administrative Code [1917], section 751) — Provides that every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale, and makes it unlawful for any person to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug. A drug is held to be adulterated or deteriorated if it differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia. The Court construed the word "fraudulent" in this provision as not requiring scienter, holding that the law penalizes the sale of one drug for another whether through negligence or mistake.

• Section 2676, Administrative Code — Provides the penalty for violations of the Pharmacy Law: any person engaging in the practice of pharmacy contrary to any provision of the Pharmacy Law or violating any provision for which no specific penalty is provided shall, for each offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court. Applied as the penal provision under which Pineda was convicted and fined P100.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, and Street, JJ., concurred.