U.S. vs. Marasigan

A defendant convicted of physical injuries cannot obtain a new trial on the ground that the injured member could be surgically restored, nor on the contention that the trial court misidentified which finger was disabled, where it is undisputed that one of the fingers was rendered useless by the defendant's voluntary act. The accused must bear the natural and ordinary consequences of his own criminal conduct without aid from the victim.

The accused, Filomeno Marasigan, and the complaining witness, Francisco Mendoza, were neighboring landowners in the barrio of Irucan (now called Calayan), municipality of Taal, Batangas Province, whose properties were separated by a division line that was the subject of dispute. The case was prosecuted by the United States, as was the practice during the American colonial period, with the Office of the Solicitor-General representing the government. Silvester Apacible appeared as counsel for the appellant.

On the afternoon of January 23, 1913, Francisco Mendoza was examining his sugar crop on his lands in the barrio of Irucan, now called Calayan, in the municipality of Taal, Batangas Province, when the accused, Filomeno Marasigan, and his wife asked Mendoza to approach them. Upon arriving near them, the accused pointed to the division line between their lands and asked, "Why is this line curved? Let us make it straight." Mendoza responded by asking why the accused wanted to straighten the line, noting that doing so would place certain logs and trees on the accused's land. The accused replied, "This is false," drew his knife, and struck at Mendoza.

Mendoza attempted to ward off the blow and was cut in the left hand. The accused continued the attack, whereupon Mendoza seized the accused by the neck and body and threw him to the ground. While both were lying on the ground, the accused still sought to strike Mendoza with his dagger. Mendoza seized the hand holding the dagger and attempted to loosen the accused's grip. During this struggle, the accused's wife came forward, took the dagger from her husband's hand, and threw it aside. She then seized Mendoza and, after various maneuvers, struck him a blow that knocked him senseless.

As a result of the fight, Mendoza received three wounds — two in the chest and one in the left hand. The wound to the left hand was the most serious: the extensor tendon was severed, requiring medical treatment for seven days at a cost of about ₱45, and the middle finger of the left hand was rendered useless. The accused presented a different account of the affair, but the trial court's findings of fact were fully supported by the evidence, and the Supreme Court found no reason to reverse on the facts.

The accused thereafter moved for a new trial, asserting that he could present the testimony of physician Gregorio Limjoco to show, first, that the finger found to have been rendered useless was not necessarily a useless member because it could be restored to normal condition through a surgical operation, and second, that it was the third finger, not the middle finger, that had been disabled.

• Identity of the Injured Finger: The accused argued that he could demonstrate through physician Gregorio Limjoco that it was the third finger, not the middle finger, that had been disabled, warranting a new trial.
• Possibility of Surgical Restoration: The accused maintained that the finger rendered useless by the cut could be restored to its normal condition through a surgical operation, if he would permit one, and that this should relieve him from the consequences attributed to his act.

• New Trial — Identity of Injured Finger: Whether a new trial should be granted on the ground that the accused could prove the disabled finger was the third finger and not the middle finger.
• New Trial — Surgical Restoration: Whether the possibility that the injured finger could be surgically restored to normal condition is a sufficient ground for a new trial or for mitigating the accused's liability for the consequences of his act.

• New Trial — Identity of Injured Finger: No. It is immaterial which finger was disabled, all parties agreeing that one of the fingers of the left hand was rendered useless by the accused's act.
• New Trial — Surgical Restoration: No. The possibility of surgical restoration cannot relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary consequences of his voluntary criminal act; he must abide by those consequences without aid from the victim.

• New Trial — Identity of Injured Finger: The accused sought a new trial to present evidence that the disabled finger was the third finger rather than the middle finger. The Court found this distinction immaterial because all parties agreed that one of the fingers of the left hand had been rendered useless by the accused's act. The specific identity of the finger did not affect the essential finding that the accused had permanently disabled a member of the victim's body, and therefore the proposed evidence could not change the outcome or warrant a new trial.

• New Trial — Surgical Restoration: The accused contended that the finger's original condition could be restored through a surgical operation, thereby mitigating or eliminating the permanent injury. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the accused's voluntary act caused the disability and that he must bear the natural and ordinary consequences of his crime. The possibility of medical or surgical correction by the victim's own initiative or expense cannot serve to reduce the accused's culpability or the gravity of the injury he inflicted. The accused is responsible for the injury as it existed at the time of the criminal act, not as it might be remedied thereafter.

• Natural and Ordinary Consequences Doctrine — A person who voluntarily commits a criminal act is responsible for the natural and ordinary consequences that flow from it, and cannot seek relief from those consequences on the ground that the injury might later be remedied through medical intervention. The accused must abide by the results of his own conduct without requiring aid or effort from the victim. Applied here, the Court held that the possibility of surgically restoring the victim's disabled finger was irrelevant to the accused's criminal liability, as the disability was the direct and natural result of the accused's voluntary assault.

• "It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the finger, the usefullness of which was destroyed, was the middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the left hand was rendered useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger it was." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the first issue: the identity of the specific finger disabled is irrelevant so long as the fact of permanent disability is established.

• "Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza." — This passage articulates the controlling principle that a criminal actor bears the natural consequences of his voluntary conduct and cannot shift the burden of remediation to the victim.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concurred.