U.S. vs. Lacerna

Subornation of perjury is not consummated and is not punishable unless the person suborned actually commits the crime of perjury. The words "causes or procures" in section 4 of Act No. 1697 require that the criminal purpose of the suborner be attained—that is, the induced party must have testified falsely contrary to oath—so that mere inducement or attempted subornation, without the actual commission of perjury, does not constitute a punishable offense.

Fausto Briones and Estanislao Carrido were separately charged before the Court of First Instance of Tayabas with the theft of a cow. Jose Laserna was a protector or patron of Carrido and sought to secure the latter's acquittal by influencing Briones's testimony. The governing statute was Act No. 1697, which defined perjury in section 3 and subornation of perjury in section 4, prescribing for the suborner the same penalty as for the perjurer. The case also invoked provisions of the Penal Code on principals by inducement and the punishability of criminal propositions.

Fausto Briones and Estanislao Carrido were separately prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas for the theft of a cow. Both had given testimony during the preliminary investigation, and Briones had identified Carrido as the person who delivered the stolen animal to him. Hearings in both cases were set for the morning of November 15, 1910.

At about 8:30 on that same morning, half an hour before the scheduled hearing, Jose Laserna—a protector of Carrido—went to the provincial jail, called Briones aside, and handed him P10. Laserna told Briones to assume sole responsibility for the theft and to testify in court that the person named "Estanislao" whom he had mentioned in the preliminary investigation was not Estanislao Carrido, his co-accused, and that he did not know the man he had previously identified. The evident purpose was to secure Carrido's acquittal by having Briones retract his prior incriminating testimony.

Despite receiving the money, Briones did not accommodate Laserna's request. At the hearing held shortly afterward, Briones ratified his previous testimony and reaffirmed that the stolen animal had been delivered to him by Estanislao Carrido. He acknowledged having received the P10 from Laserna but stated that he had never promised to deny his earlier testimony against Carrido. The perjury Laserna sought to procure was therefore never committed.

On November 26, 1910, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint charging Laserna with subornation of perjury. The Court of First Instance of Tayabas, presided over by Judge Mariano Cui, rendered judgment on December 5, 1910, convicting Laserna and sentencing him to three months' imprisonment, a P50 fine, disqualification from public office for two years, disqualification from testifying in court for an equal period, and confiscation of the P10, with costs against him. Laserna appealed.

• Elements of Subornation of Perjury: Whether the act of subornation of perjury is punishable even though the crime of perjury was not actually committed by the person induced.
• Statutory Interpretation of "Causes or Procures": Whether the words "causes or procures" in section 4 of Act No. 1697 require that the perjury be actually accomplished through the inducement, or whether mere inducement suffices for liability.

• Elements of Subornation of Perjury: No. Subornation of perjury is not consummated unless the person suborned actually testifies falsely and commits perjury; mere inducement that fails to produce perjury is not punishable under Act No. 1697.
• Statutory Interpretation of "Causes or Procures": The words "causes or procures" require that the criminal purpose of the suborner be attained, secured, or accomplished—that the induced party actually testified falsely contrary to oath—so that unsuccessful inducement does not give rise to criminal liability.

• Elements of Subornation of Perjury: Section 4 of Act No. 1697 provides that "any person who causes or procures another person to commit perjury as defined in the preceding section is guilty of subordination of perjury." The provision must be read in light of the Penal Code, article 4 of which states that a conspiracy and proposition to commit a crime are punishable only in cases where the law specially makes them so—and perjury is not among such cases. An inducement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the viewpoint of social ethics, but it does not constitute an act penalized by law if the crime which was the sole object of the inducement was not committed. Here, Briones did not testify falsely; he ratified his prior testimony and sustained the charge against Carrido. Because the perjury was never committed, the subornation cannot be understood as consummated and punishable, and the law affords no means by which Laserna may be punished.

• Statutory Interpretation of "Causes or Procures": The English text of section 4 uses the words "causes or procures," which must be understood to mean that the criminal purpose of the suborner was attained, secured, or accomplished by the person induced having testified falsely contrary to oath. This interpretation was previously adopted in U.S. vs. Oruga, which construed identical language in section 4 of Act No. 1121, and was reaffirmed as a legal principle in U.S. vs. Ballen. It is therefore indispensable for the punishment of the suborner that the person suborned should have testified falsely and committed the crime of perjury. Because Briones did not do so, notwithstanding Laserna's efforts and the payment of P10, the statutory requisites were not satisfied.

• Subornation of Perjury Requires Actual Commission of Perjury — Subornation of perjury is not an independent or inchoate offense; it is consummated only when the person induced actually commits perjury. The words "causes or procures" in the statute require that the suborner's criminal purpose be attained through the induced party's false testimony. Mere inducement, persuasion, or attempted subornation that fails to produce perjury is not punishable, because under the Penal Code a proposition to commit a crime is punishable only where the law specially penalizes it, and perjury is not among such cases.

• "it is indispensable for the punishment of the suborner that the person suborned should have testified falsely and committed the crime of perjury" — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the actual commission of perjury by the suborned party is a necessary condition for punishing the suborner.

• "An inducement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the viewpoint of social ethics; it may be a sin, but it does not constitute an act penalized by law if the crime which was the principal and sole object of the inducement was not committed." — This formulation distinguishes moral culpability from legal punishability and explains why unsuccessful subornation falls outside the statute's reach.

• "the law affords no mean whereby such party, accused of subornation of perjury, may be punished, for, the crime of perjury not having committed, the subornation can not be understood as consummated and punishable." — This passage articulates the conclusion that the absence of perjury precludes punishment for subornation, tying the result directly to the statutory text.

• United States vs. Oruga, 6 Phil. Rep. 351 — Followed. The Court relied on this case for its interpretation of the words "causes or procures" in section 4 of Act No. 1121, which contained identical language to Act No. 1697, holding that those words require the actual accomplishment of perjury through the inducement.

• United States vs. Ballen, 18 Phil. Rep. 382 — Followed. The Court cited this case as having previously established the legal principle that the actual commission of perjury by the person suborned is indispensable for the punishment of the suborner.

• Section 3, Act No. 1697 — Defines perjury as willfully stating, contrary to oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, any material matter which the declarant does not believe to be true, and prescribes a fine of not more than P2,000 and imprisonment of not more than five years, plus disqualification from public office and from testifying in court. Applied to define the underlying offense that the suborner must procure.

• Section 4, Act No. 1697 — Defines subornation of perjury as causing or procuring another to commit perjury as defined in section 3, prescribing the same penalty as for the perjurer. Interpreted to require that the perjury actually be committed through the inducement.

• Article 4, Penal Code — Provides that conspiracy and proposition to commit a crime are punishable only in cases where the law specially makes them so. Relied upon to show that mere inducement or proposition to commit perjury is not independently punishable, perjury not being among the specially enumerated cases.

• Article 13, Penal Code — Defines principals by inducement as those who directly force or induce others to commit a crime, whether by command, agreement, or any act constituting real excitation or instigation efficaciously made to secure the commission of the crime. Cited to explain the general framework of inducement liability, under which the suborner is punishable as a principal only if the crime is actually perpetrated.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concurred.