U.S. vs. De la Cruz

The extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation under subsection 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code is appreciated where the accused, in the heat of passion, kills his concubine upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with another man, the sudden revelation of infidelity being a sufficient impulse naturally producing the passion and obfuscation the law recognizes as grounds for mitigating criminal responsibility — even though the relationship was illicit, because the mitigating impulse arises not from the illicit relationship itself but from the unexpected discovery of betrayal.

The accused, Hilario de la Cruz, was charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide by the trial court. The deceased had theretofore been his querida — a concubine or lover — and the killing occurred in the context of that illicit relationship. The case was decided under the Penal Code then in force in the Philippines, which, in subsection 7 of article 9, recognized as an extenuating circumstance "that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation." The proper appreciation of this provision in cases where the victim and accused are parties to an illicit relationship was the central legal question, informed by both prior Philippine jurisprudence and Spanish Supreme Court authority interpreting analogous provisions.

Hilario de la Cruz was convicted in the court below of the crime of homicide. The deceased had theretofore been his querida — a concubine or lover — and the two had maintained an illicit relationship. The killing occurred after de la Cruz discovered the deceased in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. The evidence of record conclusively established his guilt for the homicide.

The trial court found that the commission of the crime was not marked by either aggravating or extenuating circumstances. Accordingly, it imposed the penalty in its medium degree: fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal. No finding was made that the accused had acted under an impulse powerful enough to constitute passion and obfuscation within the meaning of the Penal Code.

On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the circumstances surrounding the killing — specifically, the sudden discovery of the deceased's infidelity — warranted appreciation of the extenuating circumstance provided in subsection 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code. The Court concluded that the evidence clearly disclosed that the convict, in the heat of passion, had killed the deceased upon discovering her in the arms of another, and that this impulse was sufficient to bring the case within the statutory extenuating provision.

• Extenuating Circumstance of Passion and Obfuscation: Whether the extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code — having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation — should have been appreciated in favor of the accused who killed his concubine upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.

• Extenuating Circumstance of Passion and Obfuscation: Yes. The extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation under subsection 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code was applicable, the sudden discovery of the deceased's infidelity being a sufficient impulse naturally producing passion and obfuscation, warranting imposition of the prescribed penalty in its minimum degree.

• Extenuating Circumstance of Passion and Obfuscation: Subsection 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code provides as an extenuating circumstance "that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation." The evidence clearly disclosed that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased upon discovering her in flagrante in the arms of a mutual acquaintance. This sudden revelation of infidelity constituted a sufficient impulse in the ordinary and natural course of things to produce the violent passion and obfuscation that the law recognizes as a special reason for extenuation. The Court relied on a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated July 4, 1892, which reversed the Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba for disregarding an analogous extenuating provision where a man killed his concubine after catching her in her underclothes with another party. The Spanish Supreme Court held that the facts producing strong emotion in the accused were "a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course to produce the violent passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason for extenuation." The Court distinguished U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. Rep., 217, where passion and obfuscation was denied because the accused had acted with deliberation and premeditation — greeting everyone courteously, conversing with the victim, and disguising his intention — and because the alleged cause for loss of self-control was the woman's refusal to continue an illicit relationship, which she had a perfect right to do. In Hicks, the passion arose from "vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him." In the present case, by contrast, the impulse was not the woman's refusal to maintain the illicit relationship, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him and his discovery of her in flagrante with another. The distinction between a deliberate, premeditated killing motivated by vicious feelings and a spontaneous killing triggered by an unexpected discovery of betrayal was dispositive. Because the trial court failed to take the extenuating circumstance into account, the prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its minimum degree rather than the medium degree.

• Passion and Obfuscation as an Extenuating Circumstance — The extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation requires that the accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation. The impulse must arise from a sudden, unexpected revelation or discovery that naturally produces violent emotion, not from deliberate anger, vexation, or disappointment over a situation the victim had a right to bring about. Where the accused kills his concubine upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with another man, the sudden revelation of infidelity is a sufficient impulse to warrant appreciation of the extenuating circumstance, even though the underlying relationship was illicit — because the mitigating impulse stems from the unexpected discovery of betrayal, not from the illicit relationship itself. This doctrine distinguishes cases of spontaneous, passion-driven killings from cases of deliberate, premeditated retaliation where the accused's loss of self-control originates from "vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions" rather than from legitimate emotional shock.

• "The causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions." — This passage, quoted from U.S. vs. Hicks, articulates the standard for distinguishing legitimate passion and obfuscation from unworthy motives, and serves as the analytical framework the Court used to distinguish Hicks from the present case.

• "In the present case however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally 'produced passion and obfuscation' was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the critical distinction between a passion arising from the victim's exercise of a right (as in Hicks) and a passion arising from the sudden discovery of betrayal, which qualifies for the extenuating circumstance.

• "This was a 'sufficient impulse' in the ordinary and natural course of things to produce the passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration by the court." — This formulation, drawn from the Spanish Supreme Court's 1892 decision and adopted by the Court, defines the threshold for the extenuating circumstance: the impulse must be sufficient, in the natural and ordinary course, to produce the requisite passion and obfuscation.

• U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. Rep., 217 — Distinguished. In Hicks, the Court denied the extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation because the accused acted with deliberation and premeditation, and his loss of self-control originated from the woman's refusal to continue an illicit relationship — a "vicious, unworthy, and immoral passion" rather than a legitimate feeling. The present case was distinguished on the ground that the accused's impulse arose from the sudden discovery of infidelity, not from the victim's exercise of her right to leave the relationship.

• Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, July 4, 1892 (summarized by Viada, vol. 6, p. 69, question 19, art. 9) — Followed. The Spanish Supreme Court reversed the Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba for failing to appreciate the extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation where a man killed his concubine after catching her in her underclothes with another party. The Court adopted the Spanish Supreme Court's reasoning that the facts were "a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course to produce the violent passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason for extenuation."

• Subsection 7, Article 9, Penal Code (old) — Provides as an extenuating circumstance "that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation." The Court applied this provision to the facts, finding that the accused's discovery of his concubine in flagrante with another man constituted a sufficient impulse naturally producing passion and obfuscation, and that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate this circumstance in imposing the penalty.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concurred.

Moreland, J., filed a separate concurring opinion agreeing with the affirmance of the conviction but disagreeing with the application of the extenuating circumstance under paragraph 7, article 9 of the Penal Code, stating that in his judgment it was "not warranted by the facts or the law."