Ursua vs. Court of Appeals

A conviction under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085, requires the public and habitual use of another name as an alias in addition to the person’s real name; a single, isolated use of a different name without intent to adopt it as a permanent second name does not constitute a violation. Penal statutes must be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.

Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato passed a resolution requesting the Provincial Governor to report alleged irregularities involving petitioner and other DENR officials, including bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority, and illegal logging. The Provincial Governor asked the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to investigate. Petitioner, through counsel, sought a copy of the complaint.

• Investigation and Complaint: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato passed a resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to report petitioner and other DENR officials to the Ombudsman for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority, and illegal cutting and hauling of mahogany trees. The Governor formally requested an investigation in Manila.
• Request for Copy of Complaint: On 1 August 1989, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Francis Palmones, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting a copy of the complaint. He asked petitioner to personally deliver the letter-request because the law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had personal matters to attend to.
• Prior Conversation with Oscar Perez: Before going, petitioner told Oscar Perez about his reluctance to identify himself, being one of the respondents. Perez advised petitioner to simply sign Perez’s name if acknowledging receipt became necessary.
• The Ombudsman Visit: At the Ombudsman office in Davao City, a security officer instructed petitioner to sign the visitors’ logbook. Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez.” He then proceeded to the Administrative Division, gave the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, and received a copy of the complaint. He acknowledged receipt by writing “Oscar Perez.”
• Discovery: Before leaving, petitioner conversed with an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked there. Loida Kahulugan later learned from Amparo that the person who signed as “Oscar Perez” was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua. She reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman, who recommended prosecution.
• Trial and Demurrer: At trial, after the prosecution rested, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence, arguing that the prosecution failed to present any civil registry document showing his registered name and that the supposed alias differed from it. The trial court rejected this argument and convicted him.

• Meaning of Alias: Petitioner maintained that “alias” connotes habitual use of another name. He used the name “Oscar Perez” only once, and with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. He never claimed it as his own second name.
• Essential Element Missing: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry, a condition sine qua non for conviction under the Anti-Alias Law.
• Wrong Law Charged: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals should have considered his defense that he was charged under an inapplicable statute.

• Definition of Alias: Whether the single, isolated use of another person’s name, without intent to adopt it habitually and publicly as a second name, constitutes a violation of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142 as amended.
• Strict Construction: Whether the act, assuming it is not clearly covered by the plain language of the statute, can sustain a conviction given the rule that penal laws must be strictly construed against the State.

• Definition of Alias: The act did not constitute a violation. Under C.A. No. 142 as amended, an alias is a name used by a person publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to his real name. The legislative purpose, traced to Act No. 3883, was to eliminate confusion and fraud in trade caused by the use of multiple names. Petitioner’s use of “Oscar Perez” was an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. The confusion and fraud the law seeks to prevent were absent under these peculiar circumstances. There was no evidence that petitioner intended to be known by that name thereafter.
• Strict Construction: As a penal statute, C.A. No. 142 must be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The statute’s language did not clearly penalize a one-time, non-habitual use of another person’s name. The presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by the legislature was applied. Consequently, the conviction could not stand.

• Definition of “Alias” under the Anti-Alias Law — An alias is a name or names used by a person, or intended to be used publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized, or a substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A single, isolated use of a different or fictitious name, without any sign that the user intends to be known by that name from that day forward, does not fall within the prohibition of C.A. No. 142 as amended.
• Strict Construction of Penal Statutes — Penal laws must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. A court cannot convict under a statute that does not clearly penalize the act committed. Any ambiguity or doubt is resolved in favor of the accused, grounded on the tenderness of the law for individual rights.

• “Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. x x x Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.” — This passage is the ratio decidendi, defining the exact scope of the prohibited act.
• “Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.” — Articulates the controlling rule of construction that dictated the outcome.

• Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic, 106 Phil. 762 (1959) — Relied upon for the definition and effects of an alias; the Court imported the concept that an alias adds to confusion in business and that difficulties with two names are self-created and avoidable by simply using one’s real name.
• People v. Purisima, Nos. L-42050-66, 28 November 1978, 86 SCRA 524 — Cited for the canon of statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in light of its purpose, and that a construction avoiding absurd, mischievous, or injurious consequences is favored.
• People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 (1957) — Authority for the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the accused.

• Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085 — Prohibits the use of any name different from the one registered at birth or baptism, except for authorized pseudonyms or judicially authorized substitute names. The Court interpreted the prohibition as limited to the public and habitual adoption of an additional name, not an isolated transaction.
• Act No. 3883, as amended by Act No. 4147 — Identified as the origin and basis of C.A. No. 142; its focus on regulating names in business transactions confirmed that the evil sought to be remedied was confusion in trade, reinforcing the reading that the Anti-Alias Law targeted habitual commercial aliases.

Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.

None.