Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental

Wrong venue in estate settlement proceedings is a waivable procedural defect, and a party who delays objecting to proceedings in an improper venue despite knowledge thereof is precluded by laches from later assailing those proceedings; testate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings for the settlement of the same estate.

Juan Uriarte y Goite, a non-resident alien, died leaving considerable properties in Negros Occidental and Manila. Vicente Uriarte claimed to be his natural son and sole heir, though he had not yet been judicially acknowledged as such, having filed Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment during the decedent's lifetime. Higinio Uriarte, a nephew of the decedent, and Juan Uriarte Zamacona were the private respondents who opposed Vicente's intestate petition and initiated probate proceedings based on a will allegedly executed by the decedent in Spain. Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, Courts of First Instance had original exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters, and under Rule 75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1), where the decedent was an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Courts of First Instance in any province where the decedent had estate had concurrent jurisdiction.

On November 6, 1961, Vicente Uriarte filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Juan Uriarte y Goite, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 6344, alleging that as a natural son of the decedent he was his sole heir. During the decedent's lifetime, Vicente had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same court for his compulsory acknowledgment as a natural child, but no final judgment on that action had yet been rendered. Upon Vicente's motion, the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961, and two days later set the hearing date and ordered publication of notices. The Philippine National Bank, however, never actually qualified as special administrator.

On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, a nephew of the decedent, filed an opposition to Vicente's petition, alleging that the decedent had executed a last will and testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy of which had been requested and would be submitted to the court upon receipt. Higinio further questioned Vicente's capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding. On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the decedent, attaching a copy of the petition for probate and the will to a motion to dismiss the Negros intestate proceeding, which he filed on the same date. The motion to dismiss asserted two grounds: that the existence of a will precluded intestate proceedings, and that Vicente had no legal personality to initiate the intestate proceeding as he was not an acknowledged natural son.

Vicente opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that the Negros Court, having first taken cognizance of the estate settlement, had acquired exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1. Nevertheless, on April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Zamacona's motion and dismissed Special Proceeding No. 6344. Vicente's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 27, 1963, after which he filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and on December 7, 1963, the Negros Court disapproved the record on appeal, reasoning that the certiorari petition before the Supreme Court rendered the appeal abandoned. Vicente's motion for reconsideration of that order was denied on February 26, 1964.

Meanwhile, on April 15, 1963, Vicente filed an omnibus motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 before the Manila Court, seeking leave to intervene, dismissal of the petition, and annulment of all proceedings therein. The Manila Court denied this motion on July 1, 1963. It was undisputed that after proper proceedings, the Manila Court had admitted the will to probate on October 31, 1962, the petition for probate appearing uncontested. It was likewise clear that from the time Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition on December 19, 1961, and from the time Zamacona filed his motion to dismiss on August 28, 1962, both the Negros Court and Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the will and of the probate proceedings in Manila. Despite this knowledge, Vicente waited until April 15, 1963 — more than five months after the will had been admitted to probate — to file his omnibus motion in the Manila Court.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction of First Court: Petitioner maintained that because the Negros Court was the first to take cognizance of the estate settlement, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the estate pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, and the Manila Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the probate proceeding.
• Error of the Negros Court: Petitioner argued that the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344 and in failing to declare itself the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate, as prescribed by Rule 75, Section 1.
• Error of the Manila Court: Petitioner argued that the Manila Court erred in failing to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
• Right to Appeal: Petitioner contended that the Negros Court erred in disapproving his record on appeal, which he argued was properly filed and should be given due course.

• Jurisdiction over Estate Settlement: Whether the Negros Court, having first taken cognizance of the intestate proceeding, acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the estate settlement such that the Manila Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the probate proceeding.
• Dismissal of Intestate Proceeding: Whether the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344 upon proof that the decedent had left a last will.
• Venue and Laches: Whether petitioner waived the right to object to the venue of the Manila probate proceeding or was precluded by laches from doing so.
• Supplemental Mandamus: Whether the supplemental petition for mandamus to compel the Negros Court to approve petitioner's record on appeal should be granted.

• Jurisdiction over Estate Settlement: No. While the Negros Court first took cognizance, the Manila Court did not lack jurisdiction; it was merely not the proper venue, and wrong venue is a waivable procedural defect.
• Dismissal of Intestate Proceeding: No error was committed. Testate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings; when a will is discovered in the course of intestate proceedings, probate proceedings should replace the intestate proceedings.
• Venue and Laches: Yes, petitioner waived the right to object or was precluded by laches. Petitioner knew of the will since December 19, 1961, and of the probate petition since August 28, 1962, yet delayed filing his objection until April 15, 1963, by which time the will had already been admitted to probate.
• Supplemental Mandamus: No. The supplemental petition had become moot and academic, as the orders from which petitioner sought to appeal were beyond his power to contest.

• Jurisdiction over Estate Settlement: Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of probate, whether testate or intestate. For a non-resident alien decedent like Juan Uriarte y Goite, the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left property have concurrent jurisdiction. Both the Negros and Manila Courts thus had concurrent jurisdiction over the estate settlement. Rule 75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1) regulates venue — the particular court where the proceeding should be commenced — not jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioner's contention that the first court's cognizance divested all other courts of jurisdiction confused venue with jurisdiction. The Manila Court did not lack jurisdiction; it was simply not the proper venue, a distinction critical to the resolution.

• Dismissal of Intestate Proceeding: Settled jurisprudence establishes that testate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings for settlement of the same estate. If, in the course of intestate proceedings, it is found that the decedent left a will, probate proceedings should replace the intestate proceedings, even if an administrator had already been appointed, who would then be required to render a final account and turn over the estate to the executor subsequently appointed. Should the will be rejected or disapproved, the proceeding continues as an intestacy. This principle of priority of testate over intestate proceedings supported the Negros Court's dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344 upon learning of the will's existence. The Court noted, however, that the more orderly course would have been for Zamacona to submit the will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate proceeding or in an appropriate motion within the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344, to avoid multiplying litigation across multiple courts.

• Venue and Laches: Wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect. Petitioner knew of the will's existence since December 19, 1961, when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition, and knew of the probate petition in Manila since August 28, 1962, when Zamacona filed his motion to dismiss with copies of the will and probate petition attached. Despite this knowledge, petitioner waited until April 15, 1963 — more than five months after the Manila Court had admitted the will to probate on October 31, 1962 — to file his omnibus motion seeking intervention, dismissal, and annulment. This prolonged inaction enabled the Manila Court to appoint an administrator with the will annexed and to admit the will to probate unopposed. To allow petitioner to assail the Manila proceedings at that late stage would put a premium on his negligence. The Court further declined to annul proceedings regularly held in a lower court even if it was not the proper venue, where the net result would be repetition of the same proceedings in another court of similar jurisdiction, especially where the objection was raised too late.

• Supplemental Mandamus: The supplemental petition sought to compel the Negros Court to approve petitioner's record on appeal and give due course to his appeal from the orders of December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964. Since the Court's ruling established that the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344 was proper and that petitioner could no longer contest the validity of the Negros Court's orders, the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose and would merely enable petitioner to circumvent the ruling. The supplemental petition was therefore moot and academic. The Court further noted that petitioner remained entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment, or to intervene in or seek reopening of Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court, which as a probate court had jurisdiction to declare the heirs of the deceased testator and determine whether a party should be declared his acknowledged natural child.

• Priority of Testate over Intestate Proceedings — Testate proceedings for the settlement of a decedent's estate take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. If, during pendency of intestate proceedings, it is discovered that the decedent left a will, probate proceedings should replace the intestate proceedings, even if an administrator has already been appointed, who must then render a final account and turn over the estate to the executor subsequently appointed. Should the will be rejected or disapproved, the proceeding continues as an intestacy.

• Wrong Venue as Waivable Procedural Defect — Wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, not a jurisdictional barrier. A party who knowingly permits proceedings to continue in an improper venue without timely objection waives the right to later challenge venue, and may be precluded by laches from doing so.

• Concurrent Jurisdiction over Estate of Non-Resident Alien — Under Rule 75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1), where the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Courts of First Instance in any province where the decedent left estate have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for settlement of the estate. The rule regulates venue, not jurisdiction over the subject matter.

• Probate Court's Jurisdiction to Determine Heirship and Acknowledgment — A probate court has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child.

• "It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that venue objections in estate proceedings may be waived through inaction and that laches bars belated challenges to proceedings in an improper venue.

• "if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the doctrine of priority of testate over intestate proceedings, frequently cited in subsequent probate jurisprudence.

• "To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence." — This statement encapsulates the equitable rationale underlying the laches ruling, emphasizing that courts will not reward a party's inaction with the power to unsettle proceedings already regularly conducted.

• Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249 — Cited in support of the proposition that a probate court has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether a party should be declared his acknowledged natural child.
• Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343 — Cited for the same proposition regarding probate court jurisdiction over heirship and acknowledgment.
• Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227 — Cited for the same proposition regarding probate court jurisdiction over heirship and acknowledgment.
• Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O.G. 1119 — Cited for the same proposition regarding probate court jurisdiction over heirship and acknowledgment.

• Section 44(e), Judiciary Act of 1948 — Grants Courts of First Instance original exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of probate, including settlement of estates of deceased persons, whether testate or intestate. Applied to establish that both the Negros and Manila Courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over the estate settlement.
• Section 1, Rule 75 (now Section 1, Rule 73), Rules of Court — Provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death shall be settled in the Court of First Instance of the province where he resided, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, in the Court of First Instance of any province where he had estate. Applied to determine that both courts had concurrent jurisdiction as venue, not exclusive jurisdiction, over the estate of the non-resident alien decedent.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concurred. Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurred in the result. Castro, J., was on leave. Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.