University of the Philippines vs. Hon. Elpidio M. Catungal, Jr.

A writ of preliminary injunction may be nullified when the trial court grants it without the plaintiff having exhausted administrative remedies and without the plaintiff coming to court with clean hands. The Court held that the issuance of a preliminary injunction requires the trial court to state its own findings of fact and cite the particular law justifying the grant, and that the applicant must come with equity or with clean hands, as injunction is the strong arm of equity.

The University of the Philippines (UP) is a state university created by virtue of Act No. 1870. Private respondent Salvador Carlos was a UP Diliman faculty member who was charged administratively with grave misconduct following his arrest for illegal possession of firearms and alleged sexual abuse of minors. The UP Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal was constituted to investigate the administrative case against Carlos, pursuant to the University's Rules and Regulations in the Discipline of Faculty Members and the Civil Service Law and Rules. Carlos, while the administrative case was pending, filed a complaint for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking to restrain the University from proceeding with the administrative case.

Private respondent Salvador Carlos was a faculty member of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman. On 5 October 1994, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 217, issued an Order granting the application of the Quezon City Central Police District Command for a search warrant against Carlos, based on the testimonies and sworn statements of three complaining witnesses, Jessica Romblon, Amy Fallorina, and Ferline Alaan, who alleged that Carlos had threatened them with a gun, ordered them to strip naked, taken nude photos of them, and forced them to have sex with him. The search warrant was served upon Carlos on the same date at his residence in the UP Campus, resulting in the seizure of a 38 caliber revolver with live ammunition, a camera, bullets, spent shells, pictures of nude women, and sexual paraphernalia. Carlos was arrested and detained at the Quezon City jail for illegal possession of firearms.

On 6 October 1994, petitioner Dayco ordered a preliminary investigation and designated Atty. Marichu C. Lambino of the UP Diliman Legal Office to conduct it, citing Administrative Order No. 120, series of 1982. Atty. Lambino submitted her Preliminary Investigation Report on 7 October 1994, confirming that a prima facie case existed against Carlos and recommending that he be charged with grave misconduct and placed under preventive suspension for ninety days. That same day, the Office of the Chancellor filed a Formal Charge for grave misconduct against Carlos, docketed as Administrative Case No. UPD-94-01, and constituted the Tribunal composed of petitioners Balbastro, Florencio, and Penaño-Ho to conduct the investigation. Dayco also issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against Carlos, and both the charge and order of suspension were served upon Carlos while he was in detention.

On 10 October 1994, Dayco filed an Amended Formal Charge against Carlos, alleging that he committed acts amounting to grave misconduct by possessing unlicensed firearms and ammunition and pornographic materials, and by having sexual intercourse with minors through intimidation or deceit. Carlos moved for the dismissal of the Amended Formal Charge, citing that no complaint had been filed against him pursuant to the Rules, that the 90-day preventive suspension exceeded the 60-day period allowed, that only the UP President had the power to impose preventive suspension, and that charges outside of UP could not be the basis of an administrative complaint. The Tribunal did not act on the motion but set the case for preliminary hearing, where the parties agreed on the place and dates of hearings and other procedural matters.

The UP prosecutor presented witnesses, including Lt. Amado Bragais, Philipson Docabo, and the three minor complainants. Carlos and his counsel, Atty. Salvador S. Panelo, employed various strategies that the Court later characterized as dilatory: moving for reconsideration, failing to appear at hearings, walking out of proceedings, filing a complaint for oppression and grave misconduct against the Tribunal Chairman, and requesting multiple postponements. Atty. Panelo withdrew as counsel after being asked to cross-examine a witness, but later appeared as counsel for Carlos in the civil case before the RTC. Carlos thrice sought postponement of the hearings, and the Tribunal granted all his requests.

Unknown to the Tribunal and the UP prosecutor, Carlos filed on 8 December 1994 a complaint for injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-22364 and assigned to Branch 85. In his complaint, Carlos prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, and for his reinstatement and payment of withheld salary and Christmas bonus. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on 12 December 1994. On 1 February 1995, the trial court issued the assailed order granting a writ of preliminary injunction, directing the petitioners to refrain from proceeding with the administrative case. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on 24 April 1995, and the case was set for pre-trial.

The Tribunal continued its proceedings and, in its report submitted to petitioner Posadas, found Carlos guilty of grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of dismissal. On 23 February 1996, Posadas issued an Order adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of the Tribunal. The petitioners then filed the instant special civil action with the Supreme Court, praying that the trial court's orders be declared null and void, the writ of preliminary injunction be dissolved, and Civil Case No. Q-94-22364 be dismissed.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing Injunction: Petitioners argued that the respondent judges gravely abused their discretion in enjoining UP from exercising its authority to discipline its faculty members and employees, and in ruling that UP violated administrative due process because the service of the charge was effected while Carlos was in jail and the conduct of the preliminary investigation was defective.
• Denial of Motion to Dismiss: Petitioners argued that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying their motion to dismiss without passing upon the issues and grounds therein, and in denying their motion for reconsideration of the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
• Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: Petitioners maintained that Carlos failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief, as he admitted in his complaint that he did not appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss to the President and the Board of Regents of UP.

• Dismissal of Petition: Carlos asked for the dismissal of the petition, the nullification of the order of suspension of the administrative proceeding, his reinstatement with back wages and all benefits due him, and the continuance of Civil Case No. Q-94-22364.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Inapplicable: Carlos argued that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to his case because the question to be resolved was purely legal, the administrative action was patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive, and exhaustion of administrative remedies would result in irreparable damage.

• Validity of Preliminary Injunction: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether Carlos' failure to exhaust administrative remedies barred his recourse to the courts.
• Clean Hands Doctrine: Whether Carlos came to court with clean hands so as to be entitled to equitable relief.
• Mootness of Jurisdictional Issues: Whether the issues regarding the validity of the filing of the charges and the constitution of the Tribunal were rendered moot and academic by subsequent developments.

• Validity of Preliminary Injunction: Yes. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, as its order failed to state its own findings of fact and cite the particular law justifying the grant, and the grounds for the injunction were not established under Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Yes. Carlos' immediate recourse to the court was effectively barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which were available to him, and his claim that the doctrine did not apply was a self-serving conclusion and speculative.
• Clean Hands Doctrine: No. Carlos did not come to court with clean hands, as his conduct and that of his counsel before the Tribunal was characterized by dilatory strategies intended to unduly delay the investigation and prevent witnesses from testifying.
• Mootness of Jurisdictional Issues: Yes. The issues regarding the validity of the filing of the charges and the constitution of the Tribunal were rendered moot and academic by the further proceedings on the case, Carlos' submission to the Tribunal's authority, the Tribunal's report, and the Chancellor's order adopting the findings and recommendation.

• Validity of Preliminary Injunction: The Court found that the challenged order of 1 February 1995 was "outstanding for its sweeping conclusion that Carlos has a 'right' and that said right was 'violated.'" The trial court merely noted the precipitate service of the formal charge and notice of preventive suspension upon Carlos while he was in jail, and questioned the identity of the preliminary investigator, but failed to state its own findings of fact and cite the particular law justifying the grant of preliminary injunction. Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court requires that the plaintiff be entitled to the relief demanded, that the commission or continuance of the act complained of would probably work injustice, or that the defendant is doing some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights. The Court emphasized that "utmost care in this regard is demanded" and that injunction is "the strong arm of equity that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages."
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The Court held that Carlos admitted in paragraph 25 of his complaint that he did not appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss to the President and the Board of Regents of UP. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. The Court cited both legal and practical reasons for the principle: the administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes, and where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, the courts will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to. Carlos' claim that the doctrine did not apply was "nothing more than a self-serving conclusion and is speculative."
• Clean Hands Doctrine: The Court applied the equitable maxims that "he who seeks equity must do equity" and "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands." The Court found that Carlos' conduct and that of his counsel before the Tribunal "can by no means be characterized as nobly fair, just, and reasonable." The various strategies adopted by them "could lead rational minds to only one conclusion: they were intended to unduly delay the investigation, if not to gain time to prevent the witnesses from testifying." The Court noted that Carlos' counsel even cross-examined witness Lt. Bragais, and that having participated in the preliminary conference, agreed to the matters therein taken up, attended the hearings, and cross-examined a witness, Carlos had waived any legal issue which he initially raised. The withdrawal of counsel was characterized as "another ploy not so much to express his disgust at the manner he felt he was treated by the Tribunal as to gain more time to achieve the ends of his dilatory strategy." The Court also held that Carlos' preventive suspension and the withholding of his salary and Christmas bonus could not cause "irreparable" injury, as his unpaid salary and Christmas bonus were of fixed amounts which would be paid him depending on the outcome of the case, citing Social Security System vs. Bayona.
• Mootness of Jurisdictional Issues: The Court held that the issues of whether Dayco could validly file the Formal Charge and Amended Formal Charge and whether the Tribunal could be validly constituted were rendered moot and academic by: (1) the further proceedings on the case, (2) the submission by Carlos and his new counsel to the Tribunal's authority by presenting evidence on behalf of Carlos, (3) the submission by the Tribunal of its Report to Chancellor Posadas, and (4) the rendition by the latter on 23 February 1996 of an Order adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of the Tribunal and declaring Carlos guilty of grave misconduct and imposing the penalty of dismissal. The Court noted that in view of the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 9 October 1995, the Tribunal no longer suffered from any legal impediment to proceed with the investigation.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — The doctrine requires that before a party may seek judicial relief, he must first avail of the administrative remedies provided by law. The underlying principle rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. The Court applied this doctrine to bar Carlos' recourse to the courts, as he admitted he did not appeal to the President and the Board of Regents of UP, and his claim that the doctrine did not apply was self-serving and speculative.
• Clean Hands Doctrine — A litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair, and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. The Court applied this doctrine to deny Carlos equitable relief, finding that his dilatory tactics before the Tribunal demonstrated that he did not come to court with clean hands.
• Irreparable Injury — Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. The Court held that Carlos' preventive suspension and the withholding of his salary and Christmas bonus could not cause irreparable injury, as these were of fixed amounts which would be paid depending on the outcome of the case.

• "There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or (which is) more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuing of an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages." — This passage articulates the standard of care required in issuing injunctions and underscores the equitable nature of the remedy, which the Court applied in finding that the trial court gravely abused its discretion.
• "Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with clean hands." — This statement establishes the clean hands doctrine as a prerequisite for equitable relief, which the Court applied to deny Carlos' injunction.
• "Indisputably then, Carlos' immediate recourse to the court was effectively barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly." — This passage states the ratio decidendi regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies and its application to Carlos' case.

• Social Security System vs. Bayona, 5 SCRA 126 (1962) — Cited as controlling authority for the definition of irreparable injury in the context of injunctions, holding that damages are irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
• De los Santos vs. Limbaga, 4 SCRA 224 (1962) — Cited in support of the principle that the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency will decide the matter correctly.
• Carale vs. Hon. Abarintos, G.R. No. 120704, 3 March 1997 — Cited in support of the principle that courts will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.

• Section 3, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Provides the grounds for the grant of a preliminary injunction: (a) that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of; (b) that the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or (c) that the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights. The Court held that the trial court failed to establish these grounds in issuing the preliminary injunction.
• Section 1, Rules on Administrative Proceedings of UP — Provides that administrative proceedings may be commenced against any member of the teaching staff, officer, or employee of the University by filing specific written charges with the President either directly or through his channels. Carlos cited this provision in his motion to dismiss, arguing that no complaint had been filed against him pursuant to this rule.
• Section 19, Rules on Administrative Proceedings of UP — Provides the period for preventive suspension. Carlos cited this provision in arguing that the 90-day preventive suspension imposed against him was beyond the 60-day period allowed.
• Republic Act No. 7610 — Provides for the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua for those who commit sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. The Tribunal cited this law in finding Carlos guilty of grave misconduct.
• Article 335, Revised Penal Code — Provides that rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation. The Tribunal cited this provision in finding Carlos guilty of grave misconduct.
• Republic Act No. 6773 — The "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," Section 4 of which enjoins all public officials to respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety, and public interests. The Tribunal cited this law in recommending Carlos' dismissal.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.