United States vs. Venancio de Guzman

An accused who obtains dismissal of an information by agreeing to testify for the prosecution must act in good faith and testify fully and truthfully; if he knowingly and falsely testifies in breach of that agreement, he is not entitled to plead the dismissal as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, at least where the order of discharge was made before trial began.

Venancio de Guzman was charged with the murder of Rufino Garin under the criminal procedure established by General Orders No. 58, a military order issued April 23, 1900, which governed criminal cases in the Islands under American sovereignty. Sections 34 and 35 of that order authorized the court, in cases against two or more persons, to discharge a defendant so that he might testify for the Government, and section 36 provided that such discharge “shall amount to an acquittal” and “shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense.” The practice of using an accomplice as a state witness was borrowed from English and American procedure, under which immunity depended on the witness’s good faith and truthful testimony.

Venancio de Guzman was charged jointly with Pedro and Serapio Macarling with the murder of Rufino Garin. The evidence showed that on the day and at the place stated in the information, De Guzman was walking through a field with Pedro and Serapio Macarling and Rufino Garin; De Guzman struck Garin on the head, knocked him down, and held him on the ground while Pedro Macarling stabbed him to death.

Before the former case came on for trial, De Guzman entered into an agreement with the fiscal. He promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government at the trial of his coaccused and to tell the truth as to all that occurred, provided the information was dismissed as to him and he himself was not brought to trial. With the consent of the court, and in pursuance of that agreement, he was not arraigned or brought to trial, and the information was dismissed as to him.

One of his coaccused pleaded guilty and the other not guilty, and the case thereafter came on for trial. After several witnesses had been called, De Guzman was placed on the witness stand. He denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied that he had ever said anything implicating his coaccused, and swore that a statement made by him before a justice of the peace was false and had been made through fear of certain police officers. Questions by the court developed that he had made still another statement to one Natnat implicating his coaccused, but he swore that statement had also been made through fear; repudiating all former statements, he declared that they were false and had been procured by the prosecuting officials through improper and illegal methods.

The trial court found that De Guzman had deceived the fiscal, his own attorney, and the court, and that he had failed to comply with his agreement. It ordered the fiscal to file a new complaint against De Guzman, summon witnesses, and set a day for hearing. De Guzman was thereafter convicted in the court below of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the only question raised was his right to exemption from prosecution on the ground that the former information charging the same offense had been dismissed as to him so that he might testify as a witness for the prosecution. The Supreme Court found no room for doubt as to his guilt and no prejudicial error in the proceedings.

• Statutory Bar: Appellant contended that his former information, charging the same offense, had been dismissed as to him in order that he might testify as a witness for the prosecution, and that under sections 34, 35, and 36 of General Orders No. 58 the dismissal amounted to an acquittal and barred further prosecution for the same offense.
• Repudiation of Prior Statements: Appellant denied all knowledge of the murder and repudiated his prior statements, claiming that they were false and had been procured by prosecuting officials through improper and illegal methods.

• Recommendation for Discharge: The Solicitor-General, relying on sections 34, 35, and 36 of General Orders No. 58, recommended the discharge of appellant and that he be set at liberty forthwith, while acknowledging that such action would bar a future prosecution for the crime charged in the dismissed information.

• Effect of Dismissal Under Sections 34–36: Whether the dismissal of the former information as to appellant, made pursuant to his agreement to testify for the prosecution, amounted to an acquittal and barred his subsequent prosecution for the same offense despite his failure to testify truthfully.
• Effect of Discharge Before Trial: Whether the bar under section 36 of General Orders No. 58 applied where the order discharging appellant was made before the trial began.
• Affirmance of Conviction: Whether the conviction and sentence should be affirmed absent prejudicial error.

• Effect of Dismissal Under Sections 34–36: No. The dismissal did not bar prosecution because appellant failed to carry out his agreement and knowingly and falsely testified; a legal right cannot be based upon fraud.
• Effect of Discharge Before Trial: No. Because the order discharging appellant was made before the trial began, he was not entitled to have the order of discharge held to amount to an acquittal or a bar to further prosecution.
• Affirmance of Conviction: Yes. No errors prejudicial to appellant’s substantial rights were found, and the judgment convicting and sentencing him was affirmed with costs.

• Effect of Dismissal Under Sections 34–36: The Court reviewed sections 34, 35, and 36 of General Orders No. 58 and the history of the practice of discharging an accused to testify for the prosecution. Under English and American procedure, an accomplice who contracts for immunity must testify fully and fairly; if he testifies corruptly or falsely, he cannot claim immunity. The Court cited The Whiskey Cases, Ex parte Greenhaw, Goodwin vs. State, and Scribner vs. State for the rule that the State is not bound by its agreement unless the accused keeps faith with it. It found that De Guzman failed to carry out his agreement, knowingly and falsely testified at the trial of his coaccused, and fraudulently secured the dismissal of the former information. Consequently, the State was wholly within its rights in bringing him to trial, convicting, and sentencing him for the crime charged in the former information.
• Effect of Discharge Before Trial: The Court acknowledged disagreement among its members as to the precise scope of the rule. Some members believed that agreements of this kind are always vitiated by the accused’s failure to testify honestly, regardless of whether the discharge occurred at or before trial; others, including the writer of the opinion, believed that the general rule applies where the agreement and order of discharge are made before trial begins, but that section 36 may limit the rule where the accused is discharged after he has entered trial. The Court did not resolve that broader question. All members agreed, however, that because the order discharging De Guzman was made before the trial began, he was not entitled to have the order of discharge treated as an acquittal or as a bar to further prosecution.
• Affirmance of Conviction: The Court found no errors in the proceedings prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused. The judgment convicting and sentencing him was therefore affirmed, with costs of the instance against him.

• State Witness Immunity Conditioned on Good Faith — An accused who is discharged from an information so that he may testify for the prosecution must act in good faith and testify fully and truthfully. If he breaches that agreement by knowingly and falsely testifying, he is not entitled to claim immunity or to plead the dismissal as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The Court applied this rule to De Guzman, who denied all knowledge of the murder and repudiated his prior statements after having agreed to tell the truth.
• No Legal Right Based on Fraud — A legal right cannot be based upon fraud. The Court invoked this principle to hold that De Guzman could not use a dismissal procured by his false undertaking and false testimony as a bar to prosecution.
• Scope of the Section 36 Bar — Under section 36 of General Orders No. 58, an order discharging a defendant to be a witness for the prosecution “shall amount to an acquittal” and “shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense.” The Court held that this bar did not protect an accused who failed to keep faith with the State, at least where the order of discharge was made before trial began. The Court left open the question whether a discharge made after trial began would bar further prosecution.
• Judicial Construction of Borrowed Statutes — Courts may examine the legislative history of a statute borrowed from another jurisdiction and consult American and English decisions construing similar legislation in order to ascertain its proper construction and application. The Court applied this principle to General Orders No. 58.

• "We are all agreed that the failure of the accused in the case at bar, faithfully and honestly to carry out his undertaking to appear as a witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his coaccused, deprived him of the right to plead his former dismissal as a bar to his prosecution in the case now before us." — This is the majority’s central ratio: breach of the agreement to testify truthfully removes the statutory bar to prosecution.
• "It is a familiar rule of common law, common sense, and common justice that a legal right cannot be based upon fraud." — The Court used this principle to reject the claim that a dismissal procured by false testimony could bar a later prosecution.
• "But however this may be, we are all agreed that in the case at bar, in which the order discharging defendant was made before the trial began, appellant was not entitled to have the order of discharge held to amount to an acquittal or a bar to further prosecution." — This passage defines the narrow ground on which the Court resolved the case and leaves open the effect of a discharge made after trial began.
• "We find no errors in the proceedings prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, and the judgment convicting and sentencing him should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against him." — This is the dispositive conclusion affirming the conviction and sentence.

• The Whiskey Cases, 9 Otto 594; 25 L. ed. 399 — The Court cited this case for the history and development of the practice of discharging an accused to testify for the prosecution, noting that faithful performance of the agreement was required for immunity.
• Ex parte Greenhaw, 41 Tex. Crim. R. 278 — Quoted for the rule that the State may contract with an accomplice only in consideration of full and fair testimony, and that an accomplice who testifies corruptly or falsely cannot claim immunity.
• Goodwin vs. State, 158 S.W. 274 — Cited as a Texas decision holding that the State is not bound by its agreement unless the informer carries out her agreement to testify fully.
• Scribner vs. State, 132 Pac. 933, 940 — Quoted for the rule that a witness claiming immunity must act in good faith with the State and make truthful replies; material concealment or suppression of truth deprives him of immunity.
• State vs. Murphy, 128 Wis. 201 — Cited in the discussion of statutory immunity clauses and the reservation of the right to prosecute for perjury.
• Kepner vs. U.S., 195 U.S. 100; 11 Phil. Rep. 669 — Cited for the principle that courts may review legislative history and American and English decisions when construing borrowed legislation.
• Serra vs. Mortiga, 204 U.S. 470; 11 Phil. Rep. 762 — Cited for the same principle of statutory construction.
• Alzua vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. Rep. 308 — Cited for the same principle of statutory construction.

• Sections 34, 35, and 36, General Orders No. 58 — Section 34 authorized the court, when two or more persons were included in the same charge, to direct any defendant to be discharged so that he might be a witness for the United States. Section 35 authorized discharge of a defendant when there was insufficient evidence to put him on his defense, so that he might be a witness for his codefendant. Section 36 provided that the order of discharge “shall amount to an acquittal of the defendant discharged” and “shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense.” The Court construed section 36 not to protect an accused who obtained his discharge by fraud or bad faith, at least where the discharge was ordered before trial began.

Arellano, C.J., and Torres, J., concurred. Trent, J., filed a separate concurring opinion, stating that the evidence of guilt was conclusive and that the record supported the finding that the accused fraudulently obtained his discharge; he noted that the accused himself offered the record of the former case in support of his plea in bar and did not object to the trial court’s findings.

• Araullo, J. — Dissented. No separate opinion is reproduced in the provided text.
• Moreland, J. — Dissented on the ground that there was no evidence in the record to support the majority’s finding that the accused obtained his discharge by fraud and deceit. He argued that fraud was never alleged or proved during trial, that the trial court’s opinion could not supply the facts, and that the accused had no notice or opportunity to meet the fraud charge, violating due process. He also maintained that the record on appeal was incomplete and that prior decisions such as United States vs. Quilatan, United States vs. Tan, United States vs. Hollis, United States vs. Dacanay, United States vs. Talbanos, and United States vs. Tan Yak required the entire record, including all evidence, before the Supreme Court could affirm a conviction; that section 36 was an absolute bar; and that the Solicitor-General had recommended discharge. He further warned that allowing prosecutors to condition immunity on the kind of testimony given would create dangerous incentives to corruption and perjury.