United States vs. Tan Teng

The privilege against self-incrimination prohibits only testimonial compulsion — that is, the use of legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips an admission of guilt — and does not extend to the exclusion of the accused's body or physical substances taken therefrom as evidence when material. A substance emitted from the accused's body may be taken, scientifically analyzed, and introduced in evidence without infringing the privilege, just as stolen property found on his person or clothing bearing blood stains may be used as evidence against him.

On September 15, 1910, a seven-year-old girl named Oliva Pacomio was staying at the house of her sister on Ilang-Ilang Street in the city of Manila. Several Chinese men, including the accused Tan Teng, had been in the habit of visiting the house, where gambling took place. After Oliva had taken a bath and returned to her room, the accused followed her, asked for and used face powder on his private parts, then threw her to the floor and placed his private parts upon hers, remaining in that position for some time. Approximately one to two weeks later, the sister discovered that Oliva was suffering from gonorrhea, whereupon Oliva related what had occurred.

• The Incident: On September 15, 1910, Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of age, was at the house of her sister on Ilang-Ilang Street, Manila. The accused Tan Teng, a Chinese man who frequented the house where gambling occurred, followed Oliva into her room after she had bathed. He asked her for face powder, applied some to his private parts, then threw Oliva to the floor, placed his private parts upon hers, and remained in that position for some time.

• Discovery of the Offense: Approximately one to two weeks later, Oliva's sister discovered that Oliva was suffering from a venereal disease identified as gonorrhea. Upon this discovery, Oliva recounted to her sister what the accused had done on the morning of September 15. The sister immediately initiated an investigation to locate the Chinese man responsible.

• Identification and Arrest: Several Chinese men were gathered together for identification. Although the accused was not initially present, he arrived later and Oliva identified him at once as the person who had abused her. The accused was arrested and taken to a police station.

• Physical Examination of the Accused: At the police station, the accused was stripped of his clothing and examined. A policeman observed that the accused was suffering from gonorrhea. A portion of the substance emitting from the body of the accused was taken and submitted to the Bureau of Science for analysis. The scientific examination confirmed that the accused was suffering from gonorrhea.

• Defense at Trial: The accused objected to the admissibility of Oliva's testimony on grounds of her tender years. He also contested the admissibility of the medical evidence taken from his body, invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. Additionally, he attempted to show that gonorrhea could be communicated through means other than sexual contact and alleged that the prosecution was brought to compel him to pay P60 to Oliva's sister.

• Lower Court's Findings: The trial court found Oliva competent to testify despite her youth, having carefully examined her capacity to understand the nature of an oath. The court rejected the defense of extortion, finding it incredible that a sister would settle for P60 after discovering the violation of a child relative. The court admitted the scientific evidence from the Bureau of Science.

• Self-Incrimination: Whether the examination and chemical analysis of a substance taken from the body of the accused while in custody, and the introduction of the results as evidence, violated the privilege against self-incrimination under section 5 of the Philippine Bill.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for abusos deshonestos under Article 439 of the Penal Code.

• Self-Incrimination: The prohibition against self-incrimination in section 5 of the Philippine Bill is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. The privilege does not extend to the exclusion of the accused's body as evidence when material. The substance taken from the accused's body was obtained without his objection and examined by competent medical authority. As the trial judge reasoned, had the accused been found with stolen property on his person, that property could unquestionably be used as evidence; similarly, clothing bearing blood stains furnishing evidence of a crime could be taken and used as proof without violating the rule. The prohibition is directed at testimonial compulsion, not at the use of physical evidence derived from the person. Citing Holt vs. United States (218 U.S. 245), the prohibition forbids the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications but does not exclude the body itself as evidence when material. Wigmore's treatise was also invoked: the kernel of the privilege is testimonial compulsion, not merely compulsion. The doctrine contended for by the accused would produce the absurd result that a guilty person could shut himself up with all the tools and indicia of his crime and defy the law from employing anything obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession — a clear reductio ad absurdum.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The child complainant, though only seven years old, was found by the trial court, after careful examination, to possess sufficient intelligence and discernment to warrant full faith and credit in her testimony, a conclusion with which the Supreme Court concurred. The testimony established that the accused placed his private parts upon those of the victim for some moments. Both parties were subsequently found to be suffering from gonorrhea, and medical experts agreed that the disease could have been communicated by the contact described. Although proof that the victim contracted the disease from the accused was not necessary to establish guilt — serving only as corroboration — it reinforced the truth of the complainant's declaration. The defense claim that the prosecution was brought to extort P60 was rejected as incredible: an honest woman would not consent to the violation of a near relative for mere money. The accused was therefore guilty of abusos deshonestos under Article 439 of the Penal Code, and taking into account that the crime was committed in the house where the victim lived, the maximum penalty of six years of prision correccional was warranted.

• Distinction Between Testimonial and Physical Evidence Under the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination — The privilege against self-incrimination protects only against testimonial compulsion: the use of legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. It does not create inviolability for the accused's body or for physical objects found on his person. The body of the accused may be examined, and substances emitted from it may be taken and scientifically analyzed for use as evidence without infringing the privilege. This is because such evidence is not testimony but the body itself. The following corollaries flow from this doctrine:
  • Evidence obtained from the person of the accused (bodily substances, wounds, physical features) is admissible even if taken without consent, provided no testimonial compulsion is involved.
  • The privilege does not bar the introduction of stolen property found on the person of the accused, clothing bearing evidentiary stains, or other physical indicia of crime.
  • The inspection of the bodily features of the accused by the court or witnesses does not violate the privilege because it does not call upon the accused for testimonial responsibility.
  • The doctrine would not prevent court-ordered physical examinations where personal injuries are alleged, nor would it bar a physician appointed to examine an insanity plea from testifying.
  • The main purpose of the provision is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before or upon trial for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations.

• "The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt." — This is the core ratio decidendi, distilling the privilege to its essential scope: testimonial utterances, not physical evidence.

• "If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control] in whatever form exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reductio ad absurdum." — Quoting Wigmore, the Court adopted the policy rationale that a broader interpretation would render criminal prosecution impossible in many cases.

• "In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion." — Emphasizing the critical distinction between physical compulsion (permissible) and testimonial compulsion (protected).

• "The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found upon his body was examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a thief." — The trial court's reasoning, adopted by the Supreme Court, equating bodily substances with other physical evidence.

• Holt vs. United States, 218 U.S. 245 — Relied upon as controlling United States Supreme Court precedent. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated that the prohibition against self-incrimination is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications, not an exclusion of the body as evidence when material.

• State vs. Miller, 71 N.J. Law Reports 527 — The New Jersey Supreme Court held that permitting a jail physician to testify to wounds observed on the accused's hands, even after the accused was divested of clothing, did not compel the accused to be a witness against himself. The case also upheld placing the accused's hand on a wall for comparison with bloody prints.

• People vs. Agustin, 199 N.Y. 446 — Cited for the proposition that excluding physical examination evidence under the privilege would preclude medical testimony regarding an insanity defense, requiring the use of the defendant's person for examination.

• People vs. Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119 — Cited for the principle that the main purpose of the constitutional provision is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before or upon trial to extort unwilling confessions.

• Section 5, Philippine Bill of 1902 — The constitutional precursor prohibiting compulsory self-incrimination. Construed as a prohibition limited to testimonial compulsion (extracting admissions from the defendant's own lips against his will) and not as a bar to the examination of the defendant's body or objects found on his person.

• Article 439, Penal Code of the Philippines — The provision defining and punishing abusos deshonestos. Applied to the accused's act of placing his private parts upon those of a seven-year-old girl, which constituted the crime, and provided the penalty range of prision correccional, with the maximum fixed at six years.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concurred.