United States vs. Tan Tayco and Co Sencho

The mere discovery of prohibited articles in a place where a person is found does not conclusively establish that person's possession of those articles; possession requires both physical control and the intent to possess (animus possidendi), which may be rebutted by credible evidence. The legislature has broad discretion to regulate or prohibit the possession of opium and its paraphernalia as a valid exercise of police power, and such prohibition does not violate due process.

The defendants, Tan Tayco and Co Sencho, were charged under Section 7 of Act No. 1761, the Opium Law, which made it unlawful for any unauthorized person to have in his possession opium or any pipes, hypodermic syringes, or other apparatus or paraphernalia used for smoking, injecting, or using opium. The law was enacted to address the recognized evil of opium smoking in the Philippines. The defendants challenged the constitutionality of the law under Section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

On the night of November 30, 1907, in the municipality of Ormoc, Province of Leyte, the municipal treasurer, accompanied by a policeman, found various utensils used for smoking opium, including a lamp and a pipe, in a store owned by defendant Tan Tayco and his partner, Andres T. Avila. The utensils were found near or under Avila's bed in the room occupied by him jointly with defendant Co Sencho, who was employed as an assistant in the store. This room connected with the room occupied by Tan Tayco by a small passageway.

The defendants admitted that the utensils were discovered but denied that they were in their possession or control at the time of discovery, claiming that the utensils were the property of Andres Avila, one of the co-proprietors of the store. Avila admitted ownership of the utensils but testified that at the time of their discovery he was in Cebu, where he had gone on business not long before the seizure. He stated that he had left for Cebu prior to the passage of Act No. 1761; that at the time he left, he held a license under Act No. 1461 authorizing him to smoke opium and to have in his possession the utensils for smoking opium; that not anticipating the passage of Act No. 1761, he left the implements in his room; and that his partner Tan Tayco and their employee Co Sencho had no interest whatever in the ownership or control of these utensils.

The prosecution introduced three witnesses who testified that Tan Tayco was the real owner of the pipe and other utensils and that they had seen him smoking opium with the pipe on various occasions in the months of August, September, and October 1907. The defendants introduced evidence tending to show that these three witnesses were professional gamblers with no occupation or visible means of support and wholly unworthy of credit or belief. Tan Tayco and Avila declared that on various occasions these witnesses had begged them for opium and for permission to smoke it, and that when their requests were denied, they became angered and testified falsely at the trial in a spirit of revenge.

The trial judge found Avila to be a perjurer who testified falsely, basing his opinion on the self-contradictory character of Avila's testimony regarding the ownership of the pipe. On direct examination, Avila initially stated that the pipe was not his because the metal giving it strength was not of the same shape as that on his pipe, but upon cross-examination, he eventually admitted that the pipe was indeed his, explaining that he had not recognized it at first glance because it was very dirty and had been out of his possession for many months.

• Constitutionality of the Opium Law: The appellants contended that Section 7 of Act No. 1761 was unconstitutional because its enactment violated Section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
• Beneficial Nature of Opium: The appellants argued that opium is a beneficial and wholesome medicine and that to deprive one of such medicine who might have need thereof would inflict serious injury upon his health.
• Infringement on Personal Liberty: The appellants contended that the provisions of the Opium Law forbidding the possession of utensils for smoking opium constitute an infringement on the personal liberty of the citizen guaranteed by the Philippine Bill.
• Moderate Use Defense: The defense urged that a moderate use of opium, or the moderate use of an opium pipe, is not deleterious and consequently cannot be prohibited.
• Lack of Possession: The defendants denied that the utensils were in their possession or control at the time of discovery, claiming that they were the property of Andres Avila, one of the co-proprietors of the store.

• Possession Established by Discovery: The prosecution contended that the discovery of the pipe and other utensils in the room shared by the defendants tended strongly to support the claim that they were found in the possession of one or both of the defendants.
• Credibility of Avila: The prosecution argued that Avila's testimony was self-contradictory, particularly regarding his initial denial and subsequent admission of ownership of the pipe, and that this demonstrated he was a perjurer whose testimony was false and unworthy of belief.
• Testimony of Eyewitnesses: The prosecution presented three witnesses who testified that they had seen Tan Tayco smoking opium with the pipe on various occasions in August, September, and October 1907.

• Constitutionality of the Opium Law: Whether Section 7 of Act No. 1761 is unconstitutional as a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in violation of Section 5 of the Philippine Bill.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Possession: Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction for illegal possession of opium-smoking utensils.

• Constitutionality of the Opium Law: No. The Court indicated that the legislature has the power to determine whether the indiscriminate use of opium is dangerous to the public welfare and to prohibit its possession by unauthorized persons as a valid exercise of police power, but did not base its decision on this ground.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Possession: No. The conviction was reversed because the evidence offered by the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, as possession was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

• Constitutionality of the Opium Law: The Court stated that it did not deem it necessary to discuss the constitutional question at length because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. However, the Court indicated that the habitual use of opium to excess is a vice degrading and dangerous in its effects, and that there can be no doubt of the power of the legislature to determine for itself whether the indiscriminate use of this drug is dangerous to the welfare of the general public. The Court answered the defense's argument that moderate use of opium is not deleterious by stating that this is a question of fact which can only be inquired into by the legislature. The discretion of the legislature in employing means reasonably calculated to protect the health, morals, or safety of the public is very great, and so long as it does not infringe upon the inherent rights of life, liberty, and property, its determination is conclusive upon the courts.

• Sufficiency of Evidence of Possession: The Court defined possession as "the detention or enjoyment of a thing which a man holds or exercises by himself or by another who keeps or exercises it in his name." Possession clearly involves a state of mind on the part of the possessor whereby he intends to exercise, and as a consequence of which, he does exercise a right of possession. While the intention and will of the possessor may be inferred from the fact that the thing is under the apparent power and control of the alleged possessor, the existence of the animus possidendi is subject to contradiction and may be rebutted by evidence tending to prove that the person under whose power and control the thing appears to be does not in fact exercise such power of control and does not intend to. The Court cited the example that where stolen property is placed in the house of A without his knowledge or consent, A is not properly speaking in possession of such property so long as he does not assert a right to its control and is not moved by the animus possidendi with reference thereto.

The Court found that Avila's statements, if believed, furnished a full, satisfactory, and sufficient explanation of the presence of the utensils in his house at the time of their seizure, entirely consistent with the defendants' allegations that the utensils were not at that time in their possession. The Court disagreed with the trial judge's finding that Avila was a perjurer, stating that the evidence of record did not establish this finding beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court noted that the only self-contradictory statement in Avila's testimony was his initial denial and subsequent admission of ownership of the pipe, but reasoned that the witness may well have been mistaken as to the identity of the pipe at first glance, as it had been out of his possession for many months and the metal finishing might have become tarnished. The Court observed that if Avila were indeed a deliberate perjurer, it would seem more reasonable that he should have claimed ownership of the pipe under the examination of counsel for the defendant, rather than having that fact develop upon cross-examination.

The Court also rejected the testimony of the three prosecution witnesses who claimed to have seen the defendants smoking the pipe, noting that their testimony, taken together with the evidence tending to prove that they were actuated by a feeling of revenge because the defendants refused to let them have opium or smoke in their store, was sufficient to justify rejecting their testimony. The Court considered the worthless character of these witnesses, their suspicious mode of living, the fact that they had no known means of gaining a lawful livelihood, and the fact that under the law, informers receive a share in the fine inflicted upon violators of the Opium Law. The Court therefore held the statements of these witnesses as unworthy of credit and belief.

• Animus possidendi in Criminal Possession — Possession requires both physical control over a thing and the intent to possess (animus possidendi). The mere discovery of prohibited articles in a place where a person is found does not conclusively establish possession; the apparent control may be rebutted by evidence showing that the person did not in fact exercise control and did not intend to possess the articles. The Court applied this doctrine by accepting Avila's explanation that he left the utensils in his room under a prior license, which was consistent with the defendants' innocence.

• Legislative Discretion in Police Power — The legislature has very great discretion in employing means reasonably calculated to protect the health, morals, or safety of the public. Whether the nature and character of a drug are such that its possession by unauthorized persons should be prohibited is a question of fact and of public policy which belongs to the legislative department to determine. So long as the legislature does not infringe upon the inherent rights of life, liberty, and property, its determination is conclusive upon the courts.

• "Possession has been defined to be the detention or enjoyment of a thing which a man holds or exercise by himself or by another who keeps or exercises it in his name." — This passage defines the legal concept of possession applied by the Court in determining whether the defendants had possession of the opium utensils.

• "Clearly it involves a state of mind on the part of the possessor whereby he intends to exercise, and as a consequence of which, he does exercise a right of possession, whether that right be legal or otherwise; and while the intention and the will of possess may be, and usually are inferred from the fact that the thing in question is under the apparent power and control of the alleged possessor, nevertheless, the existence of the animus possidendi is subject to contradiction, and may be rebutted by evidence which tends to prove that the person under whose power and control the thing in question appears to be, does not in fact exercise such power of control and does not intend to required, that there be an occupancy, apprehension, or taking, that the taking be with an intent to possess (animus possidendi)." — This passage articulates the core doctrine that possession requires both physical control and the intent to possess, and that the animus possidendi may be rebutted.

• "The discretion of the legislature in the employment of means which are reasonably calculated to protect the health, moral, or safety of the public is very great; and so long as it does not infringe upon the inherent rights of life, liberty, and property, either directly or through some limitations upon the means of living or some material right essential to the enjoyment of life, its determination is conclusive upon the courts." — This passage states the principle of legislative discretion in police power matters, affirming the constitutionality of the Opium Law.

• Territory of Washington vs. Ah Lim, 9 L.R.A., 395, 397 — Cited for the proposition that opium has been regarded as a proper subject of legislation in every Western State.
• Mon Luck vs. Sears, 32 L.R.A., 738, 739 — Cited for the principle that the legislature's discretion in employing means to protect public health, morals, or safety is very great and conclusive upon the courts.
• State vs. Ah Chew, 16 Nev., 50, 40 Am. Rep., 488 — Cited in support of the legislature's broad discretion in regulating or prohibiting substances dangerous to public welfare.
• In re Yung Jon, 28 Fed. Rep., 308 — Cited in support of the legislature's power to regulate or prohibit the possession of opium and its paraphernalia.

• Section 7, Act No. 1761 (Opium Law) — Made it unlawful for any person not authorized to have in his possession opium or any pipes, hypodermic syringes, or other apparatus or paraphernalia to be used for smoking, injecting, or using opium, with penalties of fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. The Court applied this provision in determining whether the defendants' possession was established, ultimately finding the evidence insufficient.
• Section 5, Philippine Bill — Provides that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The defendants challenged the constitutionality of the Opium Law under this provision, but the Court did not base its decision on this ground, instead resolving the case on insufficiency of evidence.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Willard, JJ., concurred.