United States vs. Tamporong

Where an appeal from a justice of the peace court reaches the Supreme Court solely because the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is drawn in question, the Court's review is confined to the question of the statute's or ordinance's validity and does not extend to the evidence on the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The defendants were charged with playing the game of chance called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35, enacted by the municipal authorities of Baguio. The case originated in the justice of the peace court and was appealed to the Court of First Instance, where the validity of the ordinance was questioned, thereby giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction to entertain the further appeal under Section 43 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. 1627, which provides that decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases appealed from justice of the peace courts are final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity of a municipal or township ordinance.

The defendants were charged before the justice of the peace of Baguio with having played the game of chance called "monte," in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They were convicted and appealed to the Court of First Instance, where they were again tried and convicted upon the same charge. During the trial in the Court of First Instance, the defendants drew in question the validity of Ordinance No. 35, thereby enabling an appeal to the Supreme Court, since under Section 43 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Section 34 of Act No. 1627, the decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases appealed from justice of the peace courts were final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity of a municipal or township ordinance.

Two questions were raised on appeal: first, whether Ordinance No. 35 was valid, and second, whether the Supreme Court was required under the law to examine the evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants. The defendants contended that by reason of their having questioned the legality of the ordinance in the lower court, the case had been brought to the Supreme Court in all its details of law and fact, including the evidence taken at the trial. The prosecution, for its part, maintained that the only questions of fact the Supreme Court was authorized to examine were those essential to determining the legality of the ordinance and the penalties provided therein, and no other.

The defendants further urged that the civil-law term "appeal" as used in Section 43 should be construed to bring up the entire case for review of both law and facts, citing the rule applied in England and the United States, as well as American authorities including Loeb vs. Columbia Township Trustees and Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City. The Court, however, found these authorities distinguishable on the ground that the Philippine system blended legal and equitable relief in the same tribunals, and that the power to review facts must be found in Section 43 itself, the framers of which did not intend to confer such power.

• Validity of Ordinance: Defendants-appellants questioned the legality and validity of Ordinance No. 35, under which they had been convicted.
• Scope of Appellate Review: Defendants-appellants contended that by questioning the legality of the ordinance in the lower court, the case was brought to the Supreme Court in all its details of law and fact, including the evidence taken at the trial, and that the Court was therefore required to examine the evidence touching their guilt or innocence.
• Construction of "Appeal": Defendants-appellants urged that the civil-law term "appeal" as used in Section 43 of General Orders No. 58 should be construed according to the rule applied in England and the United States, thereby entailing an unqualified review of both law and facts, citing Nashville Ry. & Light Co. vs. Bunn, Loeb vs. Columbia Township Trustees, and Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City.
• Fragmentation Objection: Defendants-appellants argued that the Court's limited-review ruling "involves the legal absurdity of disjoining a single case and turning over one fragment to one court and another parcel to another court," citing Elliott on Appellate Procedure.

• Limited Scope of Review: The prosecution contended that the questions of fact which the Supreme Court was authorized to examine were only those essential to determining the legality of Ordinance No. 35 and the penalties provided therein, and no other.

• Validity of Ordinance No. 35: Whether Ordinance No. 35 is valid.
• Scope of Appellate Review: Whether the Supreme Court is required to examine the evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants when the appeal reaches the Court solely because the validity of an ordinance is drawn in question.

• Validity of Ordinance No. 35: Yes. The ordinance is valid, as held in United States vs. Joson (26 Phil. Rep., 1), which is on all fours with the present case.
• Scope of Appellate Review: No. The Court's review is confined to the question of the validity of the ordinance and does not extend to the evidence on the guilt or innocence of the accused, the framers of Section 43 of General Orders No. 58 having intended only to provide a means for reviewing statutory questions arising in cases originating in justice of the peace courts.

• Validity of Ordinance No. 35: The question was answered in the affirmative by direct citation to United States vs. Joson (26 Phil. Rep., 1), which the Court found to be "on all fours" with the present case. No further discussion was deemed necessary.

• Scope of Appellate Review: The Court examined the history of criminal procedure in the Philippines prior to and after the promulgation of General Orders No. 58 on April 23, 1900. Under the Spanish Provisional Law of Criminal Procedure (published in the Official Gazette of Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887, effective four months thereafter), justices of the peace had original jurisdiction over offenses in Book 3 of the Penal Code. Rule 19 of that law provided that the judgment of the Court of First Instance on appeal from a justice of the peace was executory, with no recourse except responsibility before the audencia del territorio. Thus, prior to General Orders No. 58, no appeals whatever were allowed to the Supreme Court from CFI judgments in cases originating in justice of the peace courts.

Section 43 of General Orders No. 58 amended this practice by authorizing appeals to the Supreme Court from CFI judgments in cases appealed from justice of the peace courts when the validity or constitutionality of a statute (construed to include ordinances) was drawn in question. The Court reasoned that the framers intended only to open a narrow avenue for statutory review, not to permit full re-examination of every case. If the Court were to review not only the statutory question but also every other question raised during trial, the former practice would be entirely destroyed, because any party could bring an entire case to the Supreme Court merely by raising some statutory question, "whether material to the decision of the case or not."

The Court rejected the argument that the term "appeal" in Section 43 should carry its civil-law meaning of removing the entire cause for review of both law and facts. Under the Philippine system, legal and equitable relief were dispensed in the same tribunal, with no distinction between courts of law and courts of equity as in England and the United States; therefore, the word "appeal" did not necessarily imply removal of the cause in its entirety. The American authorities cited by the defendants were distinguished: Loeb and Boise Artesian involved writs of error under the U.S. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, where Congress maintained the distinction between "appeals" and "writs of error," and where the Supreme Court reviewed legal questions only. Elliott on Appellate Procedure was likewise distinguished, as the author himself recognized that "an appeal under the code system does not necessarily bring up the entire case."

The Court further noted that the distinction between the illegality of an ordinance and the correctness of proceedings taken under it was "plain and broad." An ordinance might be perfectly regular in its enactment yet inherently unconstitutional, or it might be unassailable in content yet illegally passed. Section 43 referred to facts of the former class — those touching the validity or constitutionality of the ordinance itself — not to facts touching the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court cited a uniform line of decisions spanning more than ten years — Trinidad vs. Sweeney, United States vs. Trinidad, United States vs. Espiritusanto, United States vs. Ten Yu, United States vs. Abendan, United States vs. Co Chee, and numerous unreported cases — all consistently holding that the Court's review in such appeals was limited to the validity of the ordinance and did not extend to the evidence on guilt or innocence.

• Limited Appellate Review in Ordinance-Validity Appeals — When an appeal from a justice of the peace court reaches the Supreme Court solely because the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is drawn in question, the Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the validity of the ordinance itself. The Court may examine facts touching the due enactment or intrinsic legality of the ordinance, but it may not review the evidence on the guilt or innocence of the accused. This doctrine rests on the intention of the framers of Section 43 of General Orders No. 58, who sought only to amend the prior practice — under which CFI judgments in cases originating from justice of the peace courts were final and conclusive — by providing a narrow avenue for Supreme Court review of statutory questions. To construe the provision otherwise would destroy the former practice entirely, as any party could bring an entire case to the Supreme Court merely by raising a statutory question, "whether material to the decision of the case or not."

• Construction of "Appeal" Under the Philippine System — Because the Philippine system blends legal and equitable relief in the same tribunals, the term "appeal" as used in General Orders No. 58 does not necessarily carry its civil-law meaning of removing the entire cause for review of both law and facts. The term must be interpreted by the ordinary rules of construction, in light of existing law and circumstances at the time of promulgation, rather than by mechanically importing the distinction between "appeal" and "writ of error" that prevails in jurisdictions maintaining separate courts of law and equity.

• "All that would be necessary would be to raise some statutory question, whether material to the decision of the case or not, and the right of appeal and re-examination of the whole case would be assured. Clearly, no such result was intended, nor it is manifest from the language employed in section 43." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi: the framers of General Orders No. 58 intended only to allow Supreme Court review of statutory questions in cases originating from justice of the peace courts, not a full re-examination of the entire case.

• "In cases where the appeal involves the constitutionality or validity of a statute, the disagreement of the assessors with the judgment of the Court of First Instance on appeal does not authorize this court to review the evidence, but its decision shall be confined only to the question of the validity of the Act or statute in question, as occurs in the present case." — Quoted from United States vs. Trinidad (7 Phil. Rep., 325), this formulation of the limited-review doctrine was cited as controlling authority and represents the canonical expression of the rule followed by the Court for more than ten years.

• "While we have discussed at length each of the assignments of error made by the appellants, nevertheless, the only question, in fact, presented by the appeal under the law, in the first instance, is whether or not the ordinance under which the defendants were sentenced is legal." — From United States vs. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), this passage illustrates the Court's consistent practice of confining its review to the validity of the ordinance and dismissing the appeal once the ordinance was upheld.

• United States vs. Joson, 26 Phil. Rep., 1 — Controlling precedent on the validity of Ordinance No. 35; found to be "on all fours" with the present case, rendering further discussion unnecessary.
• Trinidad vs. Sweeney, 4 Phil. Rep., 531 — Established the doctrine that in appeals involving the validity of an ordinance, the Supreme Court cannot review the evidence and must confine its decision to the validity of the ordinance.
• United States vs. Trinidad, 7 Phil. Rep., 325 — Followed and reaffirmed Trinidad vs. Sweeney, holding that the Court's decision shall be confined only to the question of the validity of the statute in question.
• United States vs. Espiritusanto, 23 Phil. Rep., 610 — The Court examined facts touching the due enactment of the ordinance but did not go into facts touching the guilt or innocence of the appellant.
• United States vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. Rep., 1 — After upholding the ordinance as legal, the Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that the only question presented was the legality of the ordinance.
• United States vs. Abendan, 24 Phil. Rep., 165 — The Court held the ordinance valid and addressed the reasonableness of its application, but did not hold that it had authority to examine the question of guilt or innocence.
• United States vs. Co Chee, G.R. No. 8269 (unreported) — Followed United States vs. Ten Yu on the validity of Ordinance No. 152; judgment affirmed without examining the evidence on guilt or innocence.
• Nashville Ry. & Light Co. vs. Bunn, 168 Fed. Rep., 862 — Cited by defendants for the distinction between "writ of error" (review of law only) and "appeal" (review of law and facts); distinguished by the Court on the ground that the Philippine system does not maintain the law-equity distinction.
• Loeb vs. Columbia Township Trustees, 179 U.S., 472 — Cited by defendants for the proposition that the Supreme Court may review all questions when jurisdiction is based on a constitutional question; distinguished as involving writs of error under the U.S. Judiciary Act of 1891, where Congress maintained the distinction between appeals and writs of error.
• Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City, 230 U.S., 84 — Followed Loeb; distinguished on the same grounds.

• Section 43, General Orders No. 58 — Provided that decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases appealed from justice of the peace courts were final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute (construed to include ordinances), in which appeal to the Supreme Court was permitted. This was the provision whose scope the Court construed as limited to review of the ordinance's validity, not the evidence on guilt or innocence.
• Section 54, General Orders No. 58 — Provided that all cases appealed from a justice's court shall be tried anew in the court to which appealed, but that a written record was unnecessary unless the appeal involved the constitutionality or legality of a statute.
• Section 34, Act No. 1627 — Amended Section 43 of General Orders No. 58 to expressly include cases involving the validity of a municipal or township ordinance among those appealable to the Supreme Court; the Court noted this amendment did not affect the issue because the original section already covered ordinances by construction.
• Section 108, General Orders No. 58 — Extended the jurisdiction of justices of the peace to all offenses punishable by arresto mayor in all its grades, cited as one of the reasons the lawmakers opened the avenue for Supreme Court review of statutory questions in such cases.
• Rules 1–19, Provisional Law of Criminal Procedure (1887) — Governed criminal procedure before justices of the peace under the Spanish regime; Rule 19 in particular provided that CFI judgments on appeal from justice of the peace courts were executory with no recourse except responsibility before the audencia del territorio, establishing the prior practice that Section 43 amended only narrowly.
• Articles 405, 406, 412, Compilation of Laws of Criminal Procedure of 1879 — Prescribed the form of complaints presented to justices of the peace or gobernadorcillos under the Spanish procedural regime.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, JJ., and Araullo, J., concurred.