United States vs. Soliman

The repeal of a penal statute by a general repealing clause does not extinguish criminal liability if the repealing law itself is later repealed, thereby reviving the original penal provisions; furthermore, a defendant in a criminal case who testifies under oath in his own behalf is a "witness" and can be prosecuted for perjury.

The case arose from the defendant's testimony in a prior criminal trial for estafa. To avoid conviction based on his extrajudicial confession, Soliman testified under oath that the confession was involuntary and procured by torture. The trial court acquitted him in the estafa case, finding reasonable doubt about the confession's voluntariness. Subsequently, the government charged Soliman with perjury for that false testimony.

• Filed in the Court of First Instance (now RTC).
• The trial court convicted Soliman of perjury under Section 3 of Act No. 1697.
• The case was appealed directly to the SC (as was the procedure at the time for cases originating in Courts of First Instance).

• Gabino Soliman was a defendant in a criminal case for estafa.
• During that trial, he took the witness stand and testified under oath in his own defense.
• He falsely stated that an extrajudicial confession implicating him was not voluntary and was obtained through force, intimidation, and torture.
• The trial court in the estafa case acquitted him, partly due to doubt about the confession's voluntariness, establishing the materiality of his false testimony.
• Soliman was then charged with and convicted of perjury under Act No. 1697.

• The repeal of Act No. 1697 by the Administrative Code (effective after his conviction but before final judgment) extinguished his criminal liability.
• A defendant testifying in his own criminal case cannot be guilty of perjury because under Spanish law (the origin of the Penal Code), a party was not considered a "witness" in his own cause.
• Prosecuting a defendant for perjury would discourage accused persons from exercising their right to testify in their own defense.

• The repeal of Act No. 1697 did not extinguish liability because the repeal revived the prior Penal Code provisions on perjury.
• Under the new procedural rules (Act No. 190, General Orders No. 58), an accused person who chooses to testify under oath becomes a "witness" and is subject to the same laws against false testimony as any other witness.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  1. Whether the repeal of Act No. 1697 by the Administrative Code extinguished the accused's criminal liability for perjury committed prior to the repeal.
  2. Whether a defendant in a criminal case who testifies under oath in his own behalf can be held liable for perjury.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  1. The repeal did not extinguish criminal liability. The SC held that the express repeal of Act No. 1697 by the Administrative Code revived the provisions of the Penal Code on perjury, which Act No. 1697 had impliedly repealed. The penalty under the revived Penal Code was more favorable to the accused, so the SC modified the sentence accordingly.
  2. A defendant can be liable for perjury. The SC ruled that under modern procedure allowing defendants to testify, an accused who takes the stand and testifies under oath becomes a "witness." If he testifies falsely on a material matter, he is subject to prosecution for perjury. The SC distinguished this from the old Spanish procedure where a party could not be a witness.

• Revival of Repealed Statutes (Doctrine of Re-repeal) — When a statute that expressly repealed a prior law is itself repealed, the original law is revived unless the repealing statute provides otherwise. The SC applied this to hold that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived the Penal Code's perjury provisions.
• Liability of an Accused as a Witness — The right of an accused to testify under oath carries with it the responsibility to testify truthfully. By choosing to testify, the accused subjects himself to the same laws governing witnesses, including perjury statutes.

• "The right of an accused person to testify under oath in his own behalf is secured to him, not that he may be enabled to introduce false testimony into the record, but to enable him to spread upon the record the truth as to any matter within his knowledge which will tend to establish his innocence."
• "When, as in the case at bar, an accused person voluntarily goes upon the witness stand and falsely imputes to some other person the commission of a grave offense, it would seem to be highly proper that he should be called to account in a criminal action for perjury..."

• United States v. Cuna — Cited for the rule that the repeal of a penal law does not deprive courts of jurisdiction to try offenses committed prior to the repeal, and that the penalty to be applied is the one more favorable to the convict.
• United States v. Gutierrez — Cited and extended. That case held a party in a civil case could be liable for perjury. The SC applied analogous reasoning to a criminal defendant.
• United States v. Estraña — Cited to establish the materiality of false testimony regarding the voluntariness of a confession.

• Section 3, Act No. 1697 — The repealed statute defining and penalizing perjury, under which the original conviction was had.
• Articles 21 & 22, Revised Penal Code (then the Spanish Penal Code) — Article 21 (no crime without a prior penal law) and Article 22 (retroactive application of penal laws favorable to the accused). The SC used these to determine the applicable penalty.
• Article 319, Spanish Penal Code — The revived provision penalizing false testimony in a criminal case, which the SC applied to the accused.
• Section 12, Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) — Provided that the repeal of a repealing law does not revive the first law unless expressly so provided. The SC inferred from this that the old common-law rule (revival) still applied when the first repeal was implied.

• Justice Moreland (Dissenting) — Argued forcefully that:
  1. The language of Article 319 of the Penal Code ("any person who shall give false testimony in favor of a defendant") plainly refers to a third-party witness, not the defendant himself.
  2. Under the Spanish legal system and commentaries (e.g., Viada), a party was never considered a "witness" in his own cause, and the frailty of human nature in a criminal trial should be considered.
  3. The acquittal in the underlying estafa case, based on the court's doubt about the confession's voluntariness, should operate as res judicata or collateral estoppel, barring the subsequent perjury prosecution on the same factual issue. He cited American cases like Cooper v. Commonwealth and Coffey v. United States to support this point.