United States vs. Samonte

A peace officer may arrest without a warrant any person who is committing, or has committed, a breach of the peace in his presence, and an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, if the offense is continuing or has not been consummated at the time the arrest is made. Grave resistance under Article 249 of the Penal Code is committed when the accused refuses to submit to arrest and strikes at the arresting officer with a knife, even if the officer is not wounded or touched.

The case arose under the Penal Code, specifically Articles 249 and 250, which define and penalize criminal attempts against authorities or their agents. The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas for attacking an agent of the authorities while the latter was discharging the functions of his office. The statutory framework authorized peace officers to arrest without a warrant persons committing or having committed a breach of the peace in their presence, a rule drawn from general principles of criminal procedure and American jurisprudence.

About 8 o'clock on the night of September 6, 1908, the appellant, Isaac Samonte, and Basilio Rabe were together in the house of one Demetrio Pandeñio in the barrio of Macalalong, jurisdiction of Pitogo, Province of Tayabas. They both left the house and met shortly afterwards in Verdades Street in said barrio, where they became engaged in a quarrel, the appellant knocking or pushing Rabe down and proceeding to maltreat him. At this moment Rabe called "police! police!" Gregorio Glindo, a municipal policeman of Pitogo who was on patrol duty that night in the barrio, heard these words and went to the scene, arriving just as the offended party was getting up, and attempted to arrest the appellant, saying to him: "In the name of the United States, don't move." The appellant, on seeing the policeman and hearing this command, said: "Don't come near, because I will take your life." The policeman continued toward the appellant and, when very near him, the appellant struck at the policeman with a knife. On account of this resistance, the policeman could not arrest the appellant at that time, so he went immediately to the house of the councilman of that barrio, Demetrio Pandenio, and reported the matter. Pandenio ordered him to arrest the appellant. He returned to obey this order, being followed by Pandenio. They found the appellant in a place called Mutingbayan. The policeman attempted to take hold of the appellant, but he resisted, striking at the policeman again with his knife. The councilman then ordered the appellant to submit himself, and on receiving this order the appellant said: "I do not recognize anyone," and struck at the councilman with the knife.

The appellant was not arrested on that night on account of this resistance. He did not lay hands on or touch with his knife either the policeman or the councilman, but he did refuse to submit himself to the authorities and resisted arrest. The policeman did not see the appellant knock the priest down, neither did he see him kick the said priest, but he heard the cries of the priest calling for help, saying "police! police!" and when he arrived on the scene the priest was getting up and freeing himself from the appellant. When the policeman heard these cries for help he was only a very short distance — some 6 or 8 brazas — away, and when he arrived the trouble had not terminated, although no active fighting took place after his arrival.

• Failure to Prove the Arrest Attempt: Counsel for the appellant insisted that the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the policeman, Gregorio Glindo, attempted to arrest the accused in Verdales Street, the place where the trouble occurred.
• Lack of Authority to Arrest: Counsel argued that if said policeman did attempt to arrest the defendant at this place, he, not having a judicial warrant, was not, under the circumstances, authorized to make the arrest which he attempted to make.

N/A — The decision does not recount the appellee's arguments beyond the Attorney-General's appearance for the appellee.

• Authority to Arrest Without Warrant: Whether the policeman, not having a judicial warrant, was authorized to arrest the accused under the circumstances.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Arrest Attempt: Whether the prosecution established beyond a reasonable doubt that the policeman attempted to arrest the accused in Verdales Street, the place where the trouble occurred.
• Commission of Criminal Attempt Against an Agent of the Authorities: Whether the accused's acts constituted criminal attempt against an agent of the authorities under Article 249 of the Penal Code.

• Authority to Arrest Without Warrant: Yes. The policeman was authorized, and it was his duty, to arrest the accused without a warrant because the offense was committed in his presence or within his view — he heard the cries for help and arrived at the scene before the disturbance had finally ended.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Arrest Attempt: Yes. The evidence established that the policeman attempted to arrest the accused in Verdales Street, the place where the trouble occurred, and the accused resisted.
• Commission of Criminal Attempt Against an Agent of the Authorities: Yes. The accused offered grave resistance by refusing to submit himself to arrest and by striking at the policeman with a knife, which constituted criminal attempt under Article 249 of the Penal Code, notwithstanding that the policeman was not wounded or touched.

• Authority to Arrest Without Warrant: Any officer charged with the preservation of the public peace may arrest, without a warrant, any person who is committing, or has committed, a breach of the peace in his presence. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, if the offense is continuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made. In this case, Gregorio Glindo, being a peace officer, not only had authority to arrest the defendant at that time, but it was his duty to do so, he having heard the priest call for help and having arrived on the scene before the disturbance had finally ended.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Arrest Attempt: The facts show that the policeman, upon hearing the cries for help, went to the scene and attempted to arrest the appellant, saying "In the name of the United States, don't move." The appellant responded by refusing to submit and striking at the policeman with a knife. The evidence thus established the arrest attempt at the place where the trouble occurred.
• Commission of Criminal Attempt Against an Agent of the Authorities: Article 249 of the Penal Code provides that those who attack the authorities or their agents, or employ force against them, or gravely intimidate them, or offer an equally grave resistance while they are discharging the functions of their office or on the occasion thereof, commit criminal attempt. Article 250 fixes the penalty for such offenses. The accused, after an attempt had been made to arrest him by a duly authorized police officer in the discharge of his duty as such, offered grave resistance by refusing to submit himself to arrest and by striking at the policeman with a knife, thereby attempting a personal injury. Although the policeman was not wounded or touched by the accused, these facts do not relieve him from criminal responsibility.

• Arrest Without Warrant for Breach of the Peace Committed in the Officer's Presence — Any officer charged with the preservation of the public peace may arrest, without a warrant, any person who is committing, or has committed, a breach of the peace in his presence. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, if the offense is continuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the policeman, having heard the victim's cries for help and arrived before the disturbance ended, was authorized and duty-bound to arrest the accused without a warrant.
• Grave Resistance Under Article 249 of the Penal Code — Those who attack the authorities or their agents, or employ force against them, or gravely intimidate them, or offer an equally grave resistance while they are discharging the functions of their office or on the occasion thereof, commit criminal attempt. The Court held that refusing to submit to arrest and striking at the arresting officer with a knife constitutes grave resistance, and the fact that the officer was not wounded or touched does not relieve the accused from criminal responsibility.

• "Any officer in charged with the preservation of the public peace may arrest, without a warrant, any person who is committing, or has committed, a breach of the peace in his presence." — This passage states the controlling rule on warrantless arrests by peace officers and is the doctrinal foundation for the Court's ruling on the policeman's authority.
• "An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof; of the offense is continuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made." — This passage defines the scope of "in the presence or within the view" for purposes of warrantless arrest, and was applied to the facts of the case.
• "In the case at bar Gregorio Glindo, being a peace officer, not only had authority to arrest the defendant at that time, but it was his duty to do so, he having heard the priest call for help and having arrived on the scene before the disturbance had finally ended." — This passage applies the doctrine to the facts, establishing both the authority and the duty of the arresting officer.
• "Although the policeman was not wounded or touched by the accused, these facts do not receive him from criminal responsibility." — This passage rejects the argument that the absence of physical contact with the officer absolves the accused, affirming that the act of striking with a knife constitutes grave resistance.

• Carolina vs. McAfee, 10 L. R. A., 607 — Cited as authority for the rule that any officer charged with the preservation of the public peace may arrest without a warrant any person committing or having committed a breach of the peace in his presence.
• Commonwealth vs. Tobin, 11 Am., Rep., 375 — Cited in support of the same rule on warrantless arrests for breaches of the peace.
• People vs. Rounds, 35 N. W., 77 — Cited in support of the rule on warrantless arrests for breaches of the peace.
• Douglas vs. Barber, 28 Atl. Rep., 805 — Cited in support of the rule on warrantless arrests for breaches of the peace.
• Ramsey vs. State, 17 S. E., 613 — Cited for the proposition that an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer when the officer sees the offense at a distance or hears the disturbance and proceeds at once to the scene.
• Dilger vs. Com., 11 S. W., 651 — Cited in support of the rule defining when an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer.
• State vs. McAfee, 12 S. E., 435 — Cited in support of the rule defining when an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer.
• State vs. Williams, 15 S. E., 554 — Cited in support of the rule defining when an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer.
• Hawkins vs. Lutton, 70 N. W., 483 — Cited in support of the rule defining when an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer.

• Article 249, Penal Code — Defines criminal attempt against authorities or their agents, including those who attack the authorities or their agents, employ force against them, gravely intimidate them, or offer an equally grave resistance while they are discharging the functions of their office or on the occasion thereof. The Court applied this provision to hold the accused liable for his resistance to arrest.
• Article 250, Penal Code — Fixes the penalty for those guilty of an attempt against the authorities or their agents as provided in Article 249. The Court noted this provision in affirming the penalty imposed by the lower court.
• Article 61, Penal Code — Provides for the accessory penalties imposed by the lower court, which were included in the affirmed sentence.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the decision.