United States vs. Rodriguez

Premeditacion conocida qualifies a killing as murder even when the victim is not known or predetermined, provided the accused deliberately resolved to kill and persisted in that plan; where no aggravating or extenuating circumstances are proven, the penalty must be imposed in its medium degree.

The appellants were members of the second company of the Constabulary stationed at Davao, and the Government prosecuted them for acts arising from their service. The case was governed by the Penal Code then in force, which defined murder and enumerated aggravating circumstances, including craft, superior strength, abuse of confidence, abuse of public position, calamity, night or uninhabited place or gang, and contempt of public authority.

Manuel Rodriguez, Cipriano Galvez, Raymundo Revilla, Dorotea Rojas, Feliciano Pantanilla, Roman Villaister, Pedro Villanueva, Nicomedes Abella Sabino Raymundo, Geronimo Guijon, Martin Sauler, Eusebio Bustamante, Victoriano Calipusan, and Valentin Multialto, together with nine others, were members of the second company of the Constabulary stationed at Davao. On June 6, 1909, they mutinied and attempted to kill one of their superior officers, Lieutenant Goicuria. Immediately after the revolt, the mutineers took arms and ammunition from the depositary, left the vicinity of Davao, and marched toward the mountains of Lipada.

On June 8, 1909, the mutineers returned to Davao for the purpose of attacking the town. The inhabitants had received previous notice of the proposed attack and prepared to meet it. J. L. Burchfield, P. C. Libby, A. M. Templeton, and Roy Libby, armed with rifles, were detailed by those commanding the defense and advanced to the cemetery within the limits of the town, forming an outpost to await the mutineers. About 4:15 in the afternoon they sighted the mutineers. Immediately thereafter they heard a shot, followed by others, coming from near the cemetery where the mutineers had halted and dismounted. After a few shots were exchanged, Roy Libby was struck with a ball and killed. The outpost retreated to the convent and took refuge therein. The mutineers advanced against the town, attacking it at various points and especially the convent, where a portion of the residents, including women and children, had gathered for defense. No other person except Roy Libby was killed, although several others were more or less severely wounded.

Earlier on June 8, at about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, the appellants went to the house of Cenon Rasay, some distance from Davao, to obtain information as to whether reinforcements had landed at Davao. On being informed that none had landed to the knowledge of the persons questioned, they asked the elder Rasay to permit them to leave at his house the three women who accompanied them, as they were going to march on Davao and attack it. Rodriguez also requested that, in case he should be killed in the attack, Rasay should treat one of the women, who was Rodriguez's wife, as his servant. Having left the women in Cenon's house, they took up the march to Davao. On arriving near the river Bagoo, they were overtaken by Ignacio Rasay, a kinsman of Cenon Rasay. Suspecting that he was going to Davao to warn the town of the meditated attack, they halted him and told him that, if he should give any warning of their approach, they would cause damage to his family. He assured them that such was not his purpose, and they permitted him to proceed. The appellants continued on their way and, arriving at the cemetery near Davao, heard a shot, which they claimed came from those sent out to watch for their approach. On seeing this advance guard, the accused dismounted from their horses and began to fire, forming in a skirmish line and advancing steadily. Overwhelmed by the number of the attacking party, the outpost retreated toward the village, pursued by the appellants. There followed an attack upon the town, more or less general, and the mutineers withdrew when they saw the futility of further fighting.

What with the confession of some of the accused, the testimony of others, and the evidence presented by the witnesses for the prosecution, the appellants, with others, revolted against their superior officers on June 6, returned to Davao on June 8, attacked it viciously and persistently, killed one of its defenders, wounded several others, and all took a direct and active part therein. This was not only undoubted from the prosecution's testimony but was substantially admitted by all the defendants. Some appellants sought to defend themselves on the ground that they had been forced, by threats and intimidation, to take part in the mutiny and the attack upon Davao by other members of the mutineer band. The evidence in no way justified this defense. All the appellants, however, agreed in presenting the defense that they entered Davao on June 8 not for the purpose of attacking it but for the purpose of surrendering to their superior officers and the governor of the district. The Court found this conclusion impossible from the prosecution's testimony and almost as nearly impossible from the appellants' own evidence.

The trial court found premeditacion conocida as the element qualifying the crime as murder. It also found that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of craft, fraud, or disguise; advantage taken of superior strength or means employed to weaken the defense; abuse of confidence; advantage taken by the culprit of his public position; commission on the occasion of a fire, shipwreck, or other calamity or misfortune; commission at night, in an uninhabited place, or by a gang; and commission in contempt with insult to the public authorities.

• Premeditation and Unknown Victim: Defendants-appellants excepted to the finding of premeditacion conocida, arguing that because they did not know of Roy Libby's existence or that he was in the attacked village as one of the outpost of four, his death could not have been premeditated; they maintained that premeditation requires the accused to have resolved to kill the predetermined person.
• Force and Intimidation: Some appellants sought to defend themselves on the ground that they had been forced, by threats and intimidation, to take part in the mutiny and the attack upon Davao by other members of the mutineer band.
• Intent to Surrender: All appellants agreed in presenting the defense that they entered Davao on June 8, not for the purpose of attacking it, but for the purpose of surrendering to their superior officers and the governor of the district.

• Premeditacion Conocida: Whether the killing of Roy Libby was qualified as murder by premeditacion conocida even though the appellants did not know of his existence or that he would be among the town's defenders.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court—craft, fraud or disguise; superior strength; abuse of confidence; abuse of public position; calamity; night, uninhabited place or gang; and contempt of public authority—attended the commission of the crime.
• Defenses: Whether the appellants' defenses of force and intimidation and of intent to surrender to superior officers and the governor should be credited.
• Penalty: Whether, in the absence of aggravating and extenuating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium degree.

• Premeditacion Conocida: Yes. Premeditation may qualify the killing as murder even if the victim was not predetermined; the deliberate intent to kill and persistence in the plan suffice.
• Aggravating Circumstances: No. None of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court were proven; the evidence showed an open attack without the elements required by each circumstance.
• Defenses: No. The evidence did not justify the claim of force or intimidation, and the claim of intent to surrender was contradicted by the evidence of both the prosecution and the appellants.
• Penalty: Modified. With no aggravating and no extenuating circumstances, the penalty must be in its medium degree; cadena perpetua was imposed.

• Premeditacion Conocida: The trial court found premeditacion conocida. Counsel argued that because the appellants did not know Roy Libby, premeditation could not exist. The Court rejected this, citing United States vs. The Moro Manalinde, 14 Phil. Rep., 77, where the accused agreed to kill two undetermined persons, the first whom he should meet. The fact that the victim was not predetermined does not bar premeditation; the nature of the circumstances, the perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same. In this case, the appellants planned the attack: on June 8 about 11 a.m. they went to Cenon Rasay to ask if