United States vs. Pasca

A plea of self-defense that fails only because the means employed were not reasonably necessary does not wholly exempt the accused from criminal liability, but entitles him to the reduced penalty under article 86 of the Penal Code where the majority of the conditions for exemption are present.

Genaro Pasca and the deceased owned adjoining rice lands. The prosecution arose under the Penal Code, which exempts from criminal liability one who acts in self-defense under article 8(4) and provides a reduced penalty for incomplete self-defense under article 86. The appeal also implicated article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142, concerning low order of intelligence.

Genaro Pasca and the deceased owned adjoining rice lands. At or about 6 o’clock on the evening of the day mentioned in the information, both were working on their respective parcels of land, and a quarrel arose between them. Pasca struck the deceased a blow on the right temple with a piece of bamboo about 7 feet long and as thick as a man’s arm, inflicting a wound as a result of which the deceased died a few hours later without regaining consciousness. Pasca admitted that he struck the fatal blow, but claimed that he did so in self-defense.

Pasca testified that the deceased was constructing a fence upon Pasca’s land; that he asked the deceased why he built the fence upon his land; that the deceased came over into Pasca’s land, struck him and knocked him down in a pool of water about knee-deep; and that as he fell he seized a piece of bamboo which happened to be floating on the water, and, raising himself to a half-sitting posture, struck the fatal blow. In answer to the question, “What did you think that the deceased wished to do to you?” he replied: “He wished to kill me because he pushed me down into the water.”

The son of the deceased, 18 years of age, testified that he was working at a point some 10 brazas distant, facing away from Pasca and his father. Although he saw the fatal blow delivered, he heard no altercation and observed no indication of a quarrel between his father and Pasca. At first he swore that this was all he saw, but later he added that he saw Pasca approach his father and strike the blow without saying a word. Thereupon he went to the assistance of his father and asked Pasca why he had struck him, to which Pasca replied: “I did not know what I was doing.” Robert Panet, who was also working some little distance away, rushed to the scene upon hearing the cries of the son and, when he came up to the place where they were standing, said to them: “What have you done, sons of man?” to which Pasca replied that he did not know what he had done. From the undisputed testimony of Panet and the son, it appeared that the deceased had his bolo in its sheath strapped upon his person underneath his shirt at the time when he came to his death. The president of the municipal board of health arrived on the scene a short time thereafter and made an examination of the body of the deceased; his testimony corroborated Pasca’s testimony that he struck but one blow upon the head of the deceased.

The trial judge convicted Pasca of homicide. In attempting to set aside the judgment, he said that upon mature consideration he had concluded that the testimony of the son of the deceased was not worthy of credence, and that the son had evidently testified falsely when he denied all knowledge of the altercation which resulted in the striking of the fatal blow. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge in this regard: the boy was standing at a distance of only 10 brazas from Pasca and his father, yet he said he saw the fatal blow struck without hearing any words pass between them and without observing any indication of a quarrel; his account would require belief that, without provocation and without any motive, Pasca deliberately walked toward his father and struck him a deadly blow upon the head. The accused’s testimony as to the existence of a quarrel was much more reasonable, and the witness deliberately refused to tell the whole truth as to what really occurred. On the other hand, Pasca’s testimony in support of his plea of self-defense was not wholly satisfactory. He claimed that he struck the fatal blow because the deceased was pushing him in the water and he feared that the deceased was going to drown him; but in view of the fact that at the moment when he struck the fatal blow he must have been some little distance from his opponent, it seemed hardly possible that he could have believed that he was in any real danger of his life from drowning in the shallow pool of water into which, as he claimed, the deceased attempted to thrust him. According to Pasca’s story, he was half sitting and half rising out of the water when he struck the fatal blow; the trial judge pointed out that from the very nature of the wound the blow must have been delivered “with terrible force,” and the description of the wound by the president of the municipal board of health amply confirmed this understanding. Pasca was a man 5 feet 2 inches high and weighed only 110 pounds, and it was difficult to understand how he could have picked up a bamboo pole 7 feet long and as thick as a man’s arm and then struck the fatal blow from the half-sitting, half-rising position which he described in the court below.

Giving Pasca the benefit of all reasonable doubts as to the circumstances under which the blow was struck, the Court found that Pasca, having discovered that the deceased had built a part of his fence on Pasca’s land, asked the deceased why he had done so; that the question angered the deceased so that he rushed at Pasca and pushed him into a shallow pool of water, and then made some attempt to push him still further into the pool; that the deceased made no attempt to draw the bolo which he had at his side; that Pasca had no reason to believe that the deceased intended to take his life or do him any grave bodily harm; that the fatal blow was struck by Pasca in the heat of anger, in an attempt to defend himself from the unprovoked assault of the deceased; and that the fatal blow was struck “with terrible force” on the head of the deceased, and with a heavy bamboo pole 7 feet long and as thick as a man’s arm. Pasca was found to have a low order of intelligence.

• Self-Defense: Appellant admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense, testifying that the deceased was constructing a fence on his land; that when he asked the deceased why he had done so, the deceased came over, struck him, and knocked him down in a knee-deep pool of water; and that as he fell he seized a piece of bamboo floating on the water and, raising himself to a half-sitting posture, struck the fatal blow because he believed the deceased wished to kill him by pushing him down into the water.

• Self-Defense: Whether the appellant’s plea of self-defense was established so as to exempt him from criminal liability for homicide.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: Whether the presence of unlawful aggression but absence of reasonable necessity for the means employed entitled the appellant to a reduction of the penalty under article 86 of the Penal Code.
• Low Order of Intelligence: Whether the appellant’s low order of intelligence, under article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142, warranted a further reduction of the penalty.

• Self-Defense: No. The plea of self-defense was not established so as wholly to exempt the appellant from criminal liability, because although unlawful aggression was present, there was no reasonable necessity for the means employed.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: Yes. The appellant was entitled to the benefit of article 86 of the Penal Code, which allows a penalty lower by one or two degrees when the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some conditions required for exemption, provided the majority thereof are present.
• Low Order of Intelligence: Yes. The penalty was reduced to six years and one day of presidio mayor, having in mind the appellant’s low order of intelligence under article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142.

• Self-Defense: Article 8(4) of the Penal Code exempts from criminal liability anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights when the following circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The Court, giving the accused the benefit of all reasonable doubts, found unlawful aggression, but no reasonable necessity. The accused was not in real danger of his life; his adversary, although armed with a bolo, had not attempted to draw it and limited his assault to an attempt to push the accused back into the shallow pool into which he had been thrown at the outset of the quarrel. The accused must have been at some little distance from his victim when he struck the fatal blow with a bamboo pole 7 feet long, and there was no reasonable necessity for delivering a fatal blow at the head of his adversary with such weapon and with such terrible force. Thus, self-defense was not established so as to exempt him wholly from criminal liability.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: Article 86 of the Penal Code provides that a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed were not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required for exemption in the several cases mentioned in article 8, provided that the majority thereof be present; the courts shall impose the penalty in the degree which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and weight of the conditions of exemption present or lacking. Because unlawful aggression was present but reasonable necessity was lacking, the deed was not wholly excusable, yet the majority of the conditions for self-defense was present. The Court therefore sustained the conviction for homicide but reduced the penalty under article 86. The Court also considered the accused’s low order of intelligence under article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142, and reduced the penalty to six years and one day of presidio mayor.
• Low Order of Intelligence: The Court, having in mind the low order of intelligence of the accused under article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142, reduced the penalty to six years and one day of presidio mayor.

• Self-Defense under Article 8(4) of the Penal Code — Self-defense exempts from criminal liability only when the following requisites concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In this case, the Court found unlawful aggression but no reasonable necessity, because the accused was not in real danger of his life and used a 7-foot bamboo pole to deliver a fatal blow to the head with terrible force when his adversary had not drawn his bolo and had only pushed him into a shallow pool. Self-defense therefore did not wholly exempt him from liability.
• Incomplete Self-Defense under Article 86 of the Penal Code — When the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required for exemption under article 8, but the majority of those conditions are present, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed; the court imposes the penalty in the degree deemed proper in view of the number and weight of the conditions present or lacking. The Court applied this provision because unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation were present, while reasonable necessity was lacking, thereby reducing the penalty for homicide.
• Low Order of Intelligence under Article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142 — The Court considered the accused’s low order of intelligence as a factor in reducing the penalty to six years and one day of presidio mayor. The decision cites article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142, as the basis for this consideration.
• Credibility of Witnesses — The trial court’s assessment that the deceased’s son was not worthy of credence was upheld because the son was only 10 brazas away yet claimed he saw the fatal blow without hearing any altercation or observing any quarrel, and because his account that the accused struck without provocation or motive was unreasonable. This credibility finding supported the conclusion that a quarrel preceded the killing.

• “Upon this findings of facts we are of opinion that while the defendant's plea of self-defense is not established, so as wholly to exempt him from criminal liability, it should be taken into consideration in accordance with the provisions of article 86 of the Penal Code to reduce the degree of the penalty prescribed for the commission of the crime of homicide.” — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the plea of self-defense was incomplete, not exempting, but mitigating the penalty under article 86.
• “While the accused might have been and doubtless was justified in picking up the bamboo pole to keep his adversary at bay, we do not think that under all the circumstances he was justified in using it as he did.” — This passage explains why reasonable necessity was absent, the decisive element that made the self-defense incomplete.
• “We think that the judgment of the court below convicting the defendant of the crime of homicide must be sustained, but we think that in imposing the penalty he should be given the benefit of the provisions of article 86 of the Penal Code, and that having in mind the low order of intelligence of the accused (article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142) the penalty should be reduced to six years and one day of presidio mayor.” — This passage combines the Court’s affirmance of the homicide conviction with the two grounds for reducing the penalty.
• “The judgment of the court below, modified by substituting the penalty of six years and one day of presidio mayor for so much thereof as imposes twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.” — This is the dispositive portion, specifying the modified penalty and costs.

• Article 86, Penal Code — Provides that a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required for exemption in the cases mentioned in article 8, provided that the majority thereof be present; the courts shall impose the penalty in the degree deemed proper in view of the number and weight of the conditions of exemption present or lacking. The Court applied this provision to reduce the penalty for homicide because the self-defense was incomplete.
• Article 8(4), Penal Code — Exempts from criminal liability anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights when the following concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The Court found unlawful aggression but no reasonable necessity, so the exemption did not apply.
• Article 11, Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142 — Cited by the Court as the basis for considering the accused’s low order of intelligence in reducing the penalty to six years and one day of presidio mayor.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Araullo, JJ., concur.