United States vs. Montiel

Jeopardy does not attach until the trial has actually begun — that is, after the accused has been arraigned and witnesses have been called for the prosecution or the defense; a demurrer sustained before trial begins does not place the accused in jeopardy under the original information.

During the American colonial period, criminal prosecutions were conducted in the name of the United States. Eduardo Montiel had been brought before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Romblon on a charge of theft. The justice of the peace exercised authority over minor criminal matters at the municipal level. The act of Congress of July 1, 1902 furnished the constitutional guarantee against twice in jeopardy then in force.

Eduardo Montiel was arrested and tried before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Romblon for the crime of theft (hurto). While the justice of the peace was hearing the case, Montiel attacked him and wounded him in the shoulder with a penknife, from which wound the justice of the peace had not yet recovered at the time of the subsequent trial. The attack occurred while the justice of the peace was in the act of dictating the sentence he had pronounced against Montiel.

Thereafter, an information was filed charging Montiel with the crimes of frustrated murder and attempt against an authority while in the exercise of the duties of his office. Montiel demurred to the complaint. The court sustained the demurrer and ordered the fiscal to amend the information. The fiscal complied by amending the information to omit the charge for attempt against an authority, and separately filed a second complaint charging Montiel with that offense as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Penal Code.

No further proceedings were taken on the amended complaint for frustrated murder. The fiscal proceeded on the new complaint for attempt against an authority. Montiel interposed a plea of twice in jeopardy, asserting that a warrant of arrest had been issued and that he had been imprisoned under the original information charging him with the same offense, and therefore he should not be convicted on a second information. The plea was overruled by the Court of First Instance, whereupon Montiel offered no defense and was convicted and sentenced.

• Double Jeopardy: Montiel argued that because a warrant of arrest had been issued and he had been imprisoned under the original information charging him with attempt against an authority, he had been placed in jeopardy under that complaint and could not be convicted upon a second information charging the same offense.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the accused was placed in jeopardy under the original information such that prosecution on a subsequent complaint charging the same offense violated the prohibition against twice in jeopardy.

• Double Jeopardy: No. Jeopardy attaches only when the trial has actually begun; because the accused's demurrer to the original complaint was sustained before arraignment or the introduction of evidence, he was never placed in jeopardy under that complaint.

• Double Jeopardy: The rule established in United States vs. Ballentine (4 Phil. Rep. 672, decided August 17, 1905) governed the inquiry: an accused cannot be considered in jeopardy, within the meaning of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, until the trial has actually begun. In this case, the demurrer to the original complaint was sustained before the trial on that complaint had commenced — the accused was never arraigned thereon, and no witnesses were called either for the prosecution or the defense. Because jeopardy had not attached under the original information, the subsequent complaint charging the accused with attempt against an authority did not violate the prohibition against twice in jeopardy, and the conviction was proper.

• Attachment of Jeopardy — Jeopardy attaches only when the trial has actually begun, meaning after the accused has been arraigned and witnesses have been called for the prosecution or the defense. The mere issuance of a warrant of arrest and imprisonment under an information does not place the accused in jeopardy. Applied here: because the demurrer to the original complaint was sustained before trial began — before arraignment and before any witness was called — the accused was not in jeopardy and could be prosecuted under the subsequent complaint.

• "This court has already decided in the case of the United States, vs. Ballentine (No. 1898, decided August 17, 1905) that an accused can not be considered in jeopardy in the meaning of that term as used in the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, until the trial has actually begun" — This passage states the controlling rule on when jeopardy attaches and forms the ratio decidendi of the decision.
• "The plea of twice in jeopardy can not be maintained, and the judgment and sentence of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed" — This is the dispositive conclusion applying the rule to the facts.

• United States vs. Ballentine, 4 Phil. Rep. 672 (1905) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case for the proposition that an accused cannot be considered in jeopardy until the trial has actually begun. The rule was applied directly to reject Montiel's plea of twice in jeopardy.

• Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 — The constitutional guarantee against twice in jeopardy applicable during the American colonial period. The Court interpreted "jeopardy" as used in this act to mean that jeopardy attaches only when trial has actually begun.
• Article 249, Penal Code — Defined and penalized the offense of attempt against an authority while in the exercise of the duties of his office, with which the accused was charged in the subsequent complaint.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concurred.