United States vs. Memoracion

Oral testimony is competent proof of marriage in an adultery prosecution. The declaration of the husband or wife alone may suffice to prove the marriage if it satisfies the conscience of the court, and corroboration is not absolutely necessary. A witness who was present at the wedding is likewise competent to testify that the marriage took place. Additionally, a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, which presumption can only be rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence.

The defendants were charged with adultery under the Penal Code for carnal intercourse between Cecilia Memoracion, a married woman, and Dalmacio Uri. The offended party was Eustaquio Abrigo, the husband of Cecilia Memoracion. The prosecution's case required establishing the fact of the marriage between Abrigo and Memoracion as an essential element of the crime of adultery, as well as proving that the co-accused Uri knew of that marriage.

On June 7, 1915, a complaint was presented against Cecilia Memoracion and Dalmacio Uri in the justice of the peace court of the municipality of Albay, charging them with adultery. After a preliminary examination, the justice of the peace found probable cause and held the defendants for trial in the Court of First Instance. On June 26, 1915, the offended party, Eustaquio Abrigo, presented a complaint, and on August 23, 1915, he presented an amended complaint alleging that Cecilia Memoracion, being legally married to Abrigo, had carnal intercourse with her co-accused Dalmacio Uri on or about June 6, 1915, and that Uri, knowing Memoracion was married to Abrigo, had carnal intercourse with her.

The defendants were arraigned and each pleaded not guilty. At trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of the husband, Eustaquio Abrigo, who testified that Memoracion was his wife. When asked how he was related to the defendant woman, he answered, "She is my wife," over the defense's objection. The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nicolas Briola, who testified that he was present at the wedding of Memoracion and Abrigo. The prosecution further offered Exhibit G, a marriage certificate issued by the parish priest of Daraga, which the lower court admitted over objection but later excluded from consideration, stating it was improperly admitted and would not be considered as evidence.

The record showed that Abrigo and Memoracion had been living together in the same house, under the same roof, and cohabiting for a period of twenty years. The fact of their cohabitation was not denied. The illicit relations between Uri and Memoracion at the time and place described in the complaint were not denied and were proven beyond a reasonable doubt by eyewitnesses. The record further showed that Uri had visited the house of Abrigo and Memoracion twenty or more times before the commission of the crime, had seen them together in the same house, and knew they were living there together. Uri had been in the community where the crime was committed for a number of months.

• Incompetent Evidence — Husband's Testimony: The appellants contended that the husband's declaration that Memoracion was his wife was not competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage.
• Incompetent Evidence — Eyewitness Testimony: The appellants contended that the oral declaration of Nicolas Briola should not have been accepted on the question of whether the marriage existed.
• Improper Admission of Marriage Certificate: The appellants claimed the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit G, the marriage certificate issued by the parish priest of Daraga.
• Lack of Proof of Marriage: The appellants argued that the alleged marriage of Abrigo and Memoracion was not a proven fact and that there was no legal presumption of its existence.
• Lack of Knowledge of Marriage: The appellants contended that Dalmacio Uri did not know, at the time of the alleged illicit relations, that Cecilia Memoracion was a married woman.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Attorney-General for the appellee maintained that the evidence presented, including the husband's testimony, the eyewitness testimony of Briola, and the presumption arising from twenty years of cohabitation, sufficiently established the fact of marriage and Uri's knowledge thereof.

• Competency of Husband's Testimony: Whether oral testimony of the husband is competent proof of marriage in a prosecution for adultery.
• Competency of Eyewitness Testimony: Whether the oral declaration of a witness who was present at the wedding is admissible to prove the existence of a marriage.
• Admission of Marriage Certificate: Whether the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit G, the marriage certificate issued by the parish priest.
• Presumption of Marriage: Whether there is a legal presumption of the existence of marriage between Abrigo and Memoracion based on their cohabitation.
• Knowledge of the Co-Accused: Whether the evidence proved that Dalmacio Uri knew that Cecilia Memoracion was married to Eustaquio Abrigo.

• Competency of Husband's Testimony: Yes. The declaration of either the husband or wife is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, and corroboration is not absolutely necessary if the declaration satisfies the conscience of the court.
• Competency of Eyewitness Testimony: Yes. A witness who was present at the time a marriage takes place is a competent witness to testify as to whether the marriage took place; admissibility depends on competence, while acceptance depends on credibility.
• Admission of Marriage Certificate: No error. Although Exhibit G was admitted over objection, the lower court expressly excluded it from consideration, stating it was improperly admitted and would not be considered as evidence.
• Presumption of Marriage: Yes. Under subparagraph 28 of section 334 of Act No. 190, a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, and this presumption can only be rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence.
• Knowledge of the Co-Accused: Yes. Given that Uri had visited the couple's house twenty or more times, had seen them living together, and had been in the community for several months, the Court was convinced that he must have known they were at least living together as husband and wife.

• Competency of Husband's Testimony: The Court reasoned that if a man and woman are married, the declaration of either of them is competent evidence to show that fact, as no witnesses are more competent than the spouses themselves. Whether the declaration of a husband alone is sufficient depends upon each particular case; there might be a case where the judge would not believe the declaration, in which case corroborative proof might become necessary. However, corroboration is not absolutely necessary if the declaration is sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the court. In this case, the husband's declaration was corroborated by proof that he and his alleged wife had been living together for twenty years, which gave rise to the presumption of marriage, and by the testimony of another witness who was present at the wedding. The Court distinguished the case of U.S. vs. Nebrida and Saorda (32 Phil. Rep., 160), which held that substantially uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness as to the fact of marriage is not sufficient to establish the fact beyond a reasonable doubt, because in the present case the declaration was corroborated.

• Competency of Eyewitness Testimony: The Court held that a witness who is present at the time a marriage takes place is certainly a competent witness to testify as to whether a marriage took place. Whether his declaration should be accepted depends upon his credibility, but his declaration is admissible for the purpose of showing that fact.

• Admission of Marriage Certificate: The Court found no reason to sustain the appellant's contention because the lower court itself stated in its decision that the certificate was improperly admitted but was excluded from the record and would not be considered as evidence. Thus, Exhibit G was not considered as proof for the purpose of determining the existence of the marriage.

• Presumption of Marriage: The Court quoted subparagraph 28 of section 334 of Act No. 190, which provides that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Citing United States vs. Villafuerte (4 Phil. Rep., 559), the Court stated that a man and woman living in marital relations under the same roof are presumed to be legitimate spouses, and this presumption can only be rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence. The record showed that the alleged spouses had been living in the same house, under the same roof, and cohabiting for a long period of time, a fact not denied or questioned.

• Knowledge of the Co-Accused: The Court noted that the illicit relations between Uri and Memoracion were not denied and were proven beyond a reasonable doubt by eyewitnesses. The husband declared that they had lived together as husband and wife in the community for a number of years and that this fact was well known in that community. Uri had visited the house twenty or more times, had seen them together, and knew they were living there together. The Court found it scarcely believable that Uri did not at least know they were married, and in the absence of positive proof to the contrary, concluded that he must have known they were at least living together as husband and wife.

• Competency of Spousal Testimony to Prove Marriage — The declaration of either the husband or wife is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage in a criminal prosecution. Corroboration is not absolutely necessary if the declaration is sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the court, though the sufficiency of the declaration alone depends upon each particular case. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the admission of the husband's testimony that Memoracion was his wife.

• Competency of Eyewitness Testimony to Prove Marriage — A witness who was present at the time a marriage takes place is a competent witness to testify as to whether the marriage took place. The admissibility of such testimony is distinct from its credibility, which is a matter for the trier of fact. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the admission of Nicolas Briola's testimony that he was present at the wedding.

• Presumption of Marriage from Cohabitation — Under subparagraph 28 of section 334 of Act No. 190, a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence. The Court applied this doctrine to the twenty years of cohabitation between Abrigo and Memoracion, finding the presumption unrebutted.

• "If a man and a woman are married, the declaration of either of them is competent evidence to show the fact. No witness is more competent than they are. Whether the declaration of a husband alone is sufficient to prove that fact must depend upon each particular case." — This passage establishes the competency of spousal testimony to prove marriage and sets the standard for when corroboration may be necessary.

• "A witness who is present at the time a marriage takes place is certainly a competent witness to testify as to whether a marriage took place or not. Whether or not his declaration should be accepted depends upon his credibility, but his declaration is admissible for the purpose of showing that fact." — This passage establishes the competency of eyewitness testimony to prove the occurrence of a marriage.

• "A man and woman who are living in marital relations under the same roof are presumed to be legitimate spouses, united by virtue of a legal marriage contract, and this presumption can only be rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence." — This passage, quoted from United States vs. Villafuerte, states the canonical formulation of the presumption of marriage from cohabitation.

• U.S. vs. Nebrida and Saorda, 32 Phil. Rep., 160 — Distinguished. The Court noted that this case held that substantially uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness as to the fact of marriage is not sufficient to establish the fact beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal action. The Court distinguished it because in the present case, the husband's declaration was corroborated by proof of twenty years of cohabitation and the testimony of an eyewitness to the wedding.

• United States vs. Villafuerte, 4 Phil. Rep., 559 — Followed. The Court quoted this case for the proposition that a man and woman living in marital relations under the same roof are presumed to be legitimate spouses, united by virtue of a legal marriage contract, and this presumption can only be rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence.

• Article 61, Penal Code — Cited in the lower court's sentence as the basis for the accessory penalties imposed upon the defendants in addition to the principal penalty of prision correccional.

• Section 334, paragraph 28, Act No. 190 — The disputable presumption provision providing that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Court applied this provision to the twenty years of cohabitation between Abrigo and Memoracion to presume the existence of their marriage.

Torres, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concurred.