United States vs. Manalinde

A person who kills upon the order of a datto and the promise of reward is fully criminally responsible, the order not constituting proper obedience; and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not negate premeditation where the accused deliberately planned, armed himself, and persisted in carrying out the criminal design over the course of a day and night of travel.

The case arose in Cotabato, Moro Province, during the American colonial period, under the Penal Code then in force in the Philippine Islands. The practice of juramentado — a Moro custom in which a person kills others without motive or reason — was a recurring phenomenon in towns of the Moro Province, and the established authorities had consistently punished such acts. The accused, Manalinde, was a Moro from the rancheria of Dupit, specifically from Catumaldu, and was acting under the direction of Datto Rajamudah Mupuck.

On the afternoon of January 19, 1909, between two and three o'clock, Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province. Without warning, he received a wound on the head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the store who was standing behind the counter, heard the noise and the cry of the wounded man and ran to his assistance, finding Igual lying on the ground. The aggressor — the Moro Manalinde — then approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the street. Just as Choa put down his load in front of the door of a store and was about to enter, Manalinde attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, causing him to fall to the ground. Manalinde, who had come from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped in banana leaves, fled by running away from the town. Both wounded men were taken to the hospital, where Choa died within an hour; the record does not state the result of the wound inflicted on Igual.

Upon his arrest, Manalinde pleaded guilty and confessed to the crime. He stated that his wife had died about one hundred days before, and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato to kill somebody, because Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a sergeant. Mupuck promised that if Manalinde was successful, he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but if captured, Manalinde was to say that he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal, and Inug. To carry out his intention to kill two persons in Cotabato, Manalinde provided himself with a kris, concealed it in banana leaves, and traveled for a day and a night from his home. Upon reaching the town, he attacked the Spaniard from behind, then immediately attacked the Chinaman, cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once. He stated that he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.

A complaint was thereafter filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court charging Manalinde with murder. The trial judge, on February 5, 1909, rendered judgment sentencing the accused to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case was submitted to the Supreme Court for review.

• Proper Obedience: Manalinde alleged that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck and therefore was not responsible for the killing, invoking obedience to a superior's directive.
• Mitigation by Limited Killings: Manalinde argued that he went juramentado by order of the datto and on that account killed only two persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would have killed many more, implying that his obedience to the datto's order somehow limited the ferocity of his conduct.

• Criminal Responsibility Under Orders: Whether the accused is criminally responsible for the killing notwithstanding his claim that he acted under the order of Datto Mupuck.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of promise of reward (No. 3) and premeditation (No. 7) under Article 10 of the Penal Code are present in the commission of the crime.
• Premeditation Despite Unspecified Victim: Whether the circumstance of premeditation is negated by the fact that the victim was not predetermined but was merely the first person encountered.

• Criminal Responsibility Under Orders: Yes. The accused is fully criminally responsible; the order of a datto to commit murder does not constitute proper obedience under the law.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. Both the promise of reward and premeditation are present as generic aggravating circumstances, the crime having already been qualified by treachery.
• Premeditation Despite Unspecified Victim: No, premeditation is not negated. The deliberate and persistent intent to kill, manifested from the moment the order was received through the journey and execution, establishes premeditation regardless of whether the victim was predetermined.

• Criminal Responsibility Under Orders: The accused's plea of guilty and confession established his culpability as the sole-confessed and self-convicted author of the crime. His allegation that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck could not exculpate him because it was not a matter of proper obedience. The excuse that he went juramentado by order of the datto — and killed only two persons instead of many more — was rejected as unacceptable under the laws of civilized nations. Such exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, and the people who practice such acts are well aware that the established authorities can never allow them to go unpunished, as punishment has followed every such crime in towns where juramentados appear.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The presence of aggravating circumstances Nos. 3 and 7 of Article 10 of the Penal Code — promise of reward and premeditation — was taken into account. These were held to be generic aggravating circumstances since the crime had already been qualified by treachery. The accused voluntarily obeyed the order given by Datto Mupuck to go juramentado and kill someone in Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with the order, the accused acted of his own volition and with knowledge that he would inflict irreparable injury on his fellow beings, depriving them of life without any reason. Both the instigator (Datto Mupuck) and the accused knew perfectly well that the accused might be caught and punished.

• Premeditation Despite Unspecified Victim: Upon accepting the order, the accused deliberately considered and carefully meditated over the nature and consequences of the acts he was about to carry out. He provided himself with a weapon, concealed it by wrapping it in banana leaves, and traveled for a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking the lives of two persons he did not know and with whom he had never had any trouble. The fact that the arrangement between instigator and tool contemplated killing unknown persons — the first encountered — does not bar the consideration of premeditation. The nature, circumstances, perversity, and material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not alter the nature of the crime. The firm and persistent intention of the accused from the moment he received the order until the crime was committed is manifestly evident. Although premeditation is not inherent in an offer of reward or promise, and the two are independent of each other, the accused's subsequent conduct after the crime was agreed upon showed persistence and firm intent in carrying out the plan. The case was distinguished from United States vs. Caranto et al., whose facts were materially different, and from the situation where a criminal who has decided to kill a certain individual kills a different person instead — Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two persons he encountered.

• Proper Obedience as a Defense — An order from a superior (here, a datto) directing a person to commit murder does not constitute proper obedience and cannot exculpate the actor from criminal responsibility. The defense fails where the order is to commit a crime against persons unknown and without lawful justification, and where the actor voluntarily complies with full knowledge of the criminal nature of the act.

• Independence of Reward and Premeditation as Aggravating Circumstances — The aggravating circumstance of promise of reward (Article 10, No. 3) and premeditation (Article 10, No. 7) are independent of each other. Premeditation is not inherent in an offer of reward, nor is it necessarily included merely because such an offer was made; the one may exist without the other. Both may concurrently aggravate a crime where, after the crime is agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal's subsequent conduct demonstrates persistence and firm intent in carrying out the plan.

• Non-Predetermined Victim Does Not Negate Premeditation — The fact that the victim of a killing was not predetermined but was merely the first person encountered does not bar the appreciation of premeditation as an aggravating circumstance. Where the accused deliberately planned the killing, armed himself, concealed his weapon, and traveled for a day and a night with the firm and persistent intention to kill, premeditation is established regardless of the identity of the victim.

• "nor can his allegation that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible exculpate him, because it was not a matter of proper obedience." — This passage articulates the rejection of the obedience defense, establishing that an order to commit murder from a tribal chief does not constitute lawful obedience.

• "The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation." — This defines the rule that premeditation is not negated by the victim's lack of predetermined identity, so long as the intent to kill was deliberate and persistent.

• "such exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as the very people who up to the present time have been practicing such acts are well aware that the established authorities in this country can never allow them to go unpunished" — This passage reflects the Court's rationale for rejecting cultural custom as a basis for mitigating criminal responsibility, grounding the holding in the supremacy of established law over local custom.

• United States vs. Caranto et al., IV Phil. Reports 256 — Distinguished. The Court noted that the facts in the present case were "quite different" from those in Caranto, as could be seen from the mere perusal of the statement of facts, without elaborating further on the specific points of distinction.

• Article 403, Penal Code — Defines and punishes the crime of murder, enumerating treachery (alevosía) as one of five qualifying circumstances calling for the greatest punishment. Applied to qualify the killing of Choa as murder, the deceased having been unexpectedly and suddenly attacked with a deep cut on the left shoulder while unarmed and unable to defend himself or flee.

• Article 10, Nos. 3 and 7, Penal Code — Enumerates aggravating circumstances, including promise of reward (No. 3) and premeditation (No. 7). Both were appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances, the crime having already been qualified by treachery, with no mitigating circumstance present to neutralize their effects.

• Article 53, Penal Code — Imposes accessory penalties. The Court directed that in the event of a pardon being granted, the accused shall suffer the accessory penalties imposed by this article.

• Acts Nos. 451 and 1577 — Govern the execution of the death penalty. The Court directed that the penalty imposed on the accused be executed in accordance with the provisions of these Acts.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concurred.